65 years ago in the pacific

[jon_norstog]

sorry if this is a little on the long side, guys. Thought you might like to know

It had been a week since the landings at Leyte. Many of the men and most of the material were still aboard the 701 USN and 13 RAN ships anchored in protected waters offshore of the island, with their backs to the big island of Samar. The Japanese were being pushed north to their strongholds at carigara and Ormoc.

The Japanese knew they had seen the last of their rubber and oil if the Americans took the Philippines. The plan was to strike the fleet in Leyte Gulf while reinforcing their troops on Leyte. A major obstacle to their plan was Halsey's Third Fleet, with its carriers and BBs, then patrolling the seaward approaches to the landing beaches.

The Japanese sent a “ghost fleet” - four big carriers and a few escorts – into the area to lure Halsey out for a big sea fight. The carriers weren't much use since all the planes and pilots were lost in the Marians Turkey Shoot in June. Halsey took the bait, taking all his fleet carriers, all his Bbs and all the cruisers as well. He left a three light task forces (Taffy 1- 3) to guard the wide eastern entrance to Leyte Gulf. Taffy 3 the northernmost of the 3 task forces, included 6 escort carriers (CVE), 4 DEs and 3 DDs. The CVEs couldn't handle the new, fast, planes. They had F4Fs and Avengers, which could operate from the shorter flight decks. The heaviest gun any of these ships carried was a 5”-38.

Meanwhile the real attack was coming from the Center Force of the Japanese fleet: Four Bbs, including the Yamato, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers and 11 DDs for escort. The center force steamed east through the night, rounding Samar early in the morning of the 25th. They were spotted by Ensign Wm. C. Brooks in his Avenger at 6:37 AM. Brooks had a couple depth charges, which he dropped on a cruiser. They bounced off. The Yamato started firing 18” shells at 0659. The American DDs started laying smoke and the Japanese, still out of range of the Americans' guns, started firing 6 inch, 8 inch and 14 inch shells. Sprague ordered every plane into the air, and the CVEs to run for it.

The Japanese apparently mistook the CVEs for fleet carriers (CVAs), broke their line and ordered a general attack. It was a chase, with the Japanese able to bring to bear only their forward guns. Which was plenty. The DDs and DEs laid smoke all the time dodging toward the splashes of the Japanese shells.

It was closing up. The escorts stood their ground, covering the CVEs. There was nothing for the Americans to do but attack. The DDs Johnston, Hoel and Heermann steamed forward at flank speed, firing as soon as they got into range. The Japanese were surprised by the attack. They were firing mostly AP shells, which just went through the unarmored American ships – when they could hit them. They may have mistaken the big Fletcher-class cans for light cruisers.

The Fletcher-class can USS Johnston was out front and on its own engaged the cruiser Kumano with 5-inch fire, then blew her bow off with a torpedo. The cruiser Suzuya left the fight to assist Kumano. Johnston took six large caliber hits as she turned back, but escaped destruction by ducking into a providential rain squall. Johnston was able to repair he damage – she was being steered manually, with a tiller in the lazarette. Orders had to be transmitted by yelling, since com was out. She saw a gang of 4 Japanese destroyers led by the light cruiser Yahagi, making a torpedo run on the CVEs. She fired with her remaining guns, scoring enough hits the Japanese force backed off and fired their fish at their maximum range. None of those fish found a mark. Roberts took a hit to her forward turret that set off the magazine. As she was going down, Admiral Kurita gave the order to break off the fight. Johnston's survivors in the water say they saw the men of one of the cruisers line the rail and salute as they passed.

At 0735 Admiral Sprague, the task force commander, ordered the remaining escort vessels to make a torpedo run at the Japanese fleet. They went in firing their 5-inch guns, then fired their torpedoes.

The American DDs and DEs fought until they couldn't move or shoot, or until they sank. The Heermann on her own attacked the Japanese line of four Bbs. She squared off against the battleship Kongo – first with 5” guns, then fired 3 torpedoes. Moving right on she did the same to Haruna and bracketed Yamato, forcing her to break line and evade, taking her out of the fight for 10 minutes. Heermann moved in so close the big ships couldn't depress their guns to hit her. Heermann survived the fight.

The DE Samuel B. Roberts had gotten ahead of the other DEs. When the order came in for the torpedo run, Roberts went in too. She moved in on the heavy cruiser Chokai getting in close enough Chokai's big guns couldn't bear. Roberts fired her torpedoes, then stayed in the fight. She fired 600 rounds of 5”, targeting the bridges of the capital ships around her. Roberts' gunfire set the bridge of the Chikuma on fire. Roberts finally took so many hits she went down.

From about 0730 on, the Japanese came under increasing air attack from the planes of Taffy 3, then Taffy 1 and 2. The Japanese just weren't up for this fight, and finally retired.

This summary can not do justice to them men and ships who fought what was one of the great sea-fights of history. A recent book is Hornfischer, James D.. The Last Stand of the Tin Can Sailors:

also there is a pretty decent website here:

The Battle Off Samar - Main Menu

and of course Wikipedia gives you a pretty decent account.

The U.S.Navy lost two escort carriers, two destroyers, and a DE. The Japanese lost 3 heavy cruisers and a destroyer, plus three more heavy cruisers and a destroyer badly damaged.

Some things that really helped even up the odds were: The Fletchers were one of the greatest warship designs ever – the perfect can. All the American ships were armed with 5” guns, mostly late model 5”-38s with their mark 37 fire control systems. Radar controlled, point and shoot, they could stay on target while the ship maneuvered. Even the CVEs were able to do some damage with their single stern mounts.


Kurita, I think, was looking for a battle between his force and American capital ships. You have to wonder what would have happened if he had just oderd his ships into line, flank speed, and breezed past the Taffys to hit the transport and supply ships offshore of Leyte.

65 years ago today. Sailors are going to be telling this story for along time.

[bb1]

I read the story in "Tin can Sailors" I think the Navy left the sailors in the water for 72 hours. [i] was never able to find out why. Anybody know?
Bill

[Kirk]

They fell through the cracks. The losses & request for SAR were not properly made and the people who received them did not realize the import of the requests. The result was a poorly organized & executed operation.