Canadian Rifle Issue

[Seaspriter]

The pertinent question that should be being asked about LB No4T production is this. If production of LB sniper rifles was always dictated by the slow rate of No32 LENS production why on earth was REL No42 production so prolific?

Other things about REL production seems mysterious to me too! I have worked on several REL's.
17 Mk1's, and 18 1A's ranging in mixed numbers from 10C to 469C
18 Mk2's ranging from 475C to 690C
38 Mk3's ranging from 1C to 353C.
That's 91 and there's probably more too that I haven't listed

Peter, these are excellent questions, and get to the heart of many production issues regarding the Long Branch snipers. I will try answer these with some limited knowledge and some intuition, and others will have more to add to the answer. To begin, we need to understand the nature of REL:

First, unlike many UK scope manufacturers that had been producing telescopes for generations since the English defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588, the Canadians had neither a telescope industry populated with industrial production facilities, nor skilled craftsman who understood the process of creating scopes, nor the a ready source of optical equipment and supply of quality glass. Remember, in 1940, this is still a fledgling nation of 11 million people spread over a vast territory about the same size as the US. In 1940 Canada is still an agrarian nation with emerging industrial capacity.

Second, the role of the National Research Council in Canada is a vital piece of the story. Major-General McNaughton became the president of NRC in 1935. He was noted for his championing advanced technology, including the 1920s development of a cathode-ray tube direction finder, and could see the possibility of detecting aircraft by some electrical means, thus sowing the seeds for Canadian involvement in the exploration of radar well before it became known Great Britain was already working on this technology. Radio Physics programs were already underway at McGill, University of Western Ontario, Queens, and Toronto. McNaughton apparently understood if Canada was to become a player on the world scientific stage, the best strategy would be to work closely with its natural partners, the United Kingdom and the United States. NRC became the centre of all the radar work in Canada, and was responsible for pulling together teams from these universities to engage in top-secret work. It was this radar effort that became the central focus of both NRC for development and then hand-off to REL for engineering and manufacturing. As a fascinating underlying story, in early 1940, a secret mission was conducted by the British to engage as many as 300 Canadian and American scientists into joint research and development of Radio Direction Finding (the code word for what would become Radar see "Radar Development in Canada: The Radio Branch of the National Research Council of Canada 1939-46"). NRC had been approached by the Tizard Mission from the British government, whose purpose was to begin joint development and design by exchanging critical radar technology needed for the war effort. (see "Top Secret Exchange, The Tizard Mission and the Top Secret War" -- Britain had no money to develop the advanced magnetron tube that power a Radar transmitter on a massive scale; Churchill agreed to offer the magnetron to the Americans in exchange for their financial and industrial help. Apparently this was the Top Secret part of the "deal" to entice Roosevelt to launch the Lend-Lease program .) Within three months, this scientific collaboration was commencing. Before the end of 1940, the Radiation Laboratory had been set up on the campus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to develop various types of radar using the magnetron; NRC and MIT had close liaison for development, setting the stage for rapid innovation by collaborative interchange of ideas. This became the standard of excellence at NRC & REL which was imbedded their corporate cultures from inception.

Third, by the spring of 1940 at the time of Dunkirk, just before the Battle of Britain, that the urgency became clear in Canada for new electronics and optics (such as binoculars, battle optics, which then grew to a need for dial sights such as range finders). As the private sector did not have sufficient capacity nor a return on investment model for developing an electronics or optical industry. The initiator of the NRC/REL project, General McNaughton recalled the optics shortages in the Great War and resolved to prevent the problem. He formed joint collaboration agreement for support in both the electronics and optics fields (the US National Bureau of Standards, Bausch & Lomb in nearby Rochester New York, and Spencer Lens of the American Optical Company in Buffalo, just across Lake Ontario; all of whom recalled the US problems of optics supply during the past war and were forthcoming to lend a hand in solving the problem. The Canadian government spun off a Crown Corporation, which is essentially a government owned, quasi-government, independent corporation run for the good of the people. For this reason, Research Enterprises Limited was created for advanced electronics and special optics. A plant was built, which was ready by June, 1941, and continued to grow for the next four years. This was a startup company, creating everything anew. Pressures during the war created massive demand on REL to perform. Scientists included Dr. L.E. Howlett, head of the NRC Optics Section; and Dr. R.J. Montgomery, formerly in charge of optical glass at Bausch & Lomb, men who knew their trade well. The high degree of cooperation between the U.S., U.K. and Canada on technical development of radar and the proximity fuze is well documented. Similarly, the working relationship with REL and the U.S. National Bureau of Standards and the British Admiralty for binoculars seems to have been very mutually supportive and aimed at innovation. But the relationship with the British on sniper scope design and development seems less than collaborative, and quite testy at times, as the memos and actions show deep irritation with the lack of flexibility and desire to innovate in the U.K.. This would be termed a "culture clash," as the REL culture seemed quite innovative and entrepreneurial compared to its British "keepers of the standards" who where more rigid in their adherence to the current designs and drawings.

Fourth, because there was no optics industry in Canada, everything had to come together from scratch -- buildings, glass making, grinding, manufacturing, engineering, quality control, and the like. Further, much of the work was in small batches, which means no large scale production facilities could be utilized for economies of scale. As Clive Law says in Without Warning "It was necessary to embark on a series of limited gambles, creating facilities in what looked like minimum economic units, expanding, altering, and adjusting these as the real requirements became known." Additionally, REL had an equally important division focused on electronics. During its brief existence, REL produced more than 8300 highly secret radar sets for Canadian, U.S. and British forces, as well as most of the components, including vacuum tubes, magnetrons, klystrons, CRTs, spark-gaps or trigatrons, TR and ATR cells, rectifiers, neon RF indicators and any other tube required for their radar production. Most of the tubes were custom designed. Some tubes marked as 'REL' were actually built by Canadian and U.S. firms; others were built by REL itself. Very few is known about its tube production, some may have been for supplied to the U.S. forces. From the evidence, it appears REL was highly engaged in joint development with both British and US organizations in electronics, particularly radar and possibly proximity fuzes. This level of joint collaboration on electronics side of the business may have set a standard of expectations that the same would occur on the optics side of the business -- something that clearly did not occur.

Fifth, the business grew by leaps and bounds as the war raged. Hiring and training new staff, and, on the optics side of the business, finding quality optical sand, and furnaces to melt it was difficult due to the stresses of war on the support industries. In a note by McNaughton about the radar side of the business, in 1942 he comments about "a general deterioration of the nerves these days, people were tired and there was a lot of loss of control." Nearby Spencer Lens and Bausch & Lomb across the US border, natural and willing strategic partners, was under similar stress and could provide only limited help. This was complicated by the National Bureau of Standards used in the US did not coincide with British Standards, resulting in a rejection by the UK of optics made to American Standards. Thus the technical standards for batch composition, heating, cooling, and timing had to be provided by specialists sent from the UK rather than nearby US. Reading between the lines, this infuriated the performance-driven entrepreneurial and innovative Canadians who were always trying to improve methods of production and design in contrast to their British counterparts, who were more standards-driven, emphasizing few design changes to ensure quality. (In defense of the keepers of the standards in the UK, in addition to REL, there were six other scope suppliers that had to be dealt with: Vickers, W.Watson, Houghton-Butcher, Kershaw, Cook,Troughton & Sims, and Taylor-Hobson; which must have been an ordeal, because apparently they too were having problems with quality.)

Sixth, REL's optics facilities were pulled in many directions, including the fabrication of five different types of sighting telescopes, dial sights, tank periscopes, spare optic prisms, clinometres, and their transport cases. The Long Branch contract was just one of their many products. During the four war years, REL produced 160,000 optical items, sprawled out to 750,000 square feet of space and employed 7,500 people. Sniper scopes must have been a frustrating part of their business, having produced only 1,174 during the entire war -- a miniscule amount compared to 6 x 30 binoculars (almost 50,000 units) and 7 x 50 binoculars (about 25,000 units). REL was also not happy with the British engineering standards of No.32 Mk1 scopes, finding the design outdated and too complex, while the manufacturing process was cumbersome with too many production steps. These engineering and manufacturing problems resulted in delays in production, especially in 1943. Apparently this level of defects infuriated REL that could not afford a high production failure rate. The production system resulted in rejected scopes, cracked lenses, inability to retain zero, brackets that would not stay tight, and other problems. Recommendations for improvements were resisted by British authorities. REL produced new experimental designs, such as a 5X scope, but these were politely rejected. Eventually REL produced the No. 32 Mk1A, which was there version of a scope that would hold up under fire. REL presented alternative designs which, though improvements, were rejected in late 1944. Apparently REL was holding off production anticipating an approval of the improved designs, which was not forthcoming. REL created the C No. 67 MK. I, which was initially labelled by the British as C No. 32 MK. IV. The Canadians were infuriated, as their creation was 10 ounces (280 g) lighter than the British models – it was a radical departure from the incremental improvements designated by a Mark change – and deserved its own designation.

Regarding the 91 REL #32 scopes you have worked on Peter, your point is well taken. Recently I found a data base from a Dutch Collector (see http://photos.imageevent.com/badgerd...stracking2.pdf ) that contains a large number of (T) Scopes, often linked to rifles. In the data base are over 30 Long Branch/REL related rifles or scopes. Seaforth72 has an additional data base which has not yet been integrated with the Dutch data. And, if we add the Laidler data base we might have a very good picture of how many scopes are really out there. Like any alliance, only when we join forces can we get our arms around the details and anomalies and foggy conceptions.

[Seaforth72]

I am looking for REL scope C No. 32 MK. II SN 690-C which Peter Laidler mentioned above that he had worked on as it was originally matched to one of my Long Branch sniper rifles, 71L0573.

Seaspriter has shared the Dutch list with me and I am adding the data to my database. Thank you Robert.

Colin

[Peter Laidler]

The REL Mk1A telescope was simply a Mk1 telescope with Mk2 1MoA clicker plates - and without the other refinements that differentiate a Mk 2 from a Mk1 tele. Nothing more or less and nothing to do with lenses, optics or mechanics that would stand up under fire. Unless you have anything to substantiate this.

At a guess, I would venture to suggest - and this is only a guess on my part, based on my fondness for the bleedin' obvious, that the Mk1A was introduced in order to use up he back-log of awaiting Mk1 telescopes and/or tubes while the Mk2 was being prepared for production. This is based on a) the fact that the Mk1 and 1A serial numbers are pretty intermixed and b) that you can very clearly see that the letter 'A' has been added due to the slightly different font and mis-alignment

[Seaspriter]

The REL Mk1A telescope was simply a Mk1 telescope with Mk2 1MoA clicker plates - and without the other refinements that differentiate a Mk 2 from a Mk1 tele. Nothing more or less and nothing to do with lenses, optics or mechanics that would stand up under fire. Unless you have anything to substantiate this.

Peter, let me first say I am not an authority on scopes, and your hands have dug into the inner workings of the scopes, so your insights are certainly precious. Here's all I can contribute to the discussion -- from Clive Law's book: (p 54)
" By August 1943, due to manufacturing difficulties encountered by REL, only 91 Mk I scopes had been delivered. These difficulties led to readily identifiable defects in finished scopes. The defects had been identified as: failure of the mechanism to keep any adjustments for range or deflection; the tendency for the lenses to chip or crack; and the change of optical focus. It was felt that REL would have fewer difficulties once the drawings had been received for the Mk. II scope. By December, 1943, according to the monthly letter of the Director of Small Arms & Ammunition, REL was 'also issuing some which are half-way between Mk. I and (the proposed) Mk. II.' This was the Canadian Mk. IA."

[Peter Laidler]

Chipped ocular lenses are a feature of Mk1 AND Mk2 telescopes due to the lenses being mounted directly in the telescope tube as opposed to the later method of mounting the lenses inside a protective brass lens cell - or carrier - out of direct harms way. This protective carrier was then screwed into the tube

In short, Mk1 and well into UK and Canadian Mk2 production (and No42), ocular/eye lenses mounted directly into the tube
Later Mk2 and all Mk3 (and No53) ocular lenses mounted into brass cell which is threaded into the actual tube.

Incidentally, it is THIS change of ocular design that reduces the field of view slightly and NOT the change from Mk2 to 3 spec as often, wrongly stated.

It is difficult to understand why a Mk1 or 2 telescope should find difficulty in maintaining adjustments for range and deflection. Simply because on these telescopes, the range and deflection adjustments from the drum to the graticle are DIRECT. In other words, there is a DIRECT threaded link between the drum to the graticle diaphragm via the threaded leadscrew. On the other hand........

The Mk3/L1A1 this is quite a different matter and difficulty maintaining adjustment of the range and deflection CAN (and regularly does) occur. This is because the Mk3 graticle block or diaphragm is free floating within a vertical and horizontal window. Only controlled by a spring loaded shoe* acting against the diaphragm acting against a nut fixed to the leadscrew.
*It is for this reason that the tension of the shoe springs must be fairly accurately adjusted by the small central adjuster screw so that........... anyway!

I didn't quite understand quite how that conclusion had been reached knowing what I know about the mechanics and optics of the telescopes. but let it slide over my head. Being one of those who has learned the hard way that the first person to read your book immediately known more than you do. Because he knows ALL that you have researched and written PLUS the tiny bit he knew before. So I try NEVER to re-write or perpetuate what someone else has written

[Surpmil]

Gil, you are probably correct. (Coincidently I was drafting an article about this very issue just this morning) We aren't sure if 71 were produced in 1943 or in the period of 1941-1943. Here's the clarification:

The Inspection Board of the UK and Canada (reference: Clive Law's Without Warning - page 37) reported "71 had already been delivered by the end of 1943" (IOW between 1941-43; however, later, on pages 37 and 40 Clive Law writes "in 1943" -- thus the confusion. We need to find the original documents to understand the true meaning.) We know Long Branch produced a small number of snipers in 1941-42, but we aren't sure how many, depending on how you read the evidence. (This stuff is only important to a few collectors -- most people won't care, but it's all part of understanding why so much of the Long Branch sniper story is clouded in a shroud of mystification).

Probably only a very small handful of Snipers were produced in 1941 (only one has shown up); probably about ~20 in 1942 (only 2 have shown up); and about ~50-71 in 1943 (depending on what the Inspection Board records actually say). However, in the 1943 production range, 21 snipers have shown up, which is far more than statistics would project. (Thanks Lee Enfield for sharing your data base -- see you in 2 weeks).

The possibility cannot be ruled out of No4's being fitted up with bases post-war in Canada. I was told by a retired armourer that he saw this work being done at workshops in Montreal in the early 1950s. My impression was that he was simply reporting what he saw, rather than telling a tale. Whether these were pads or "G&H" type bases he didn't say. I should ask him again I guess.

Because so many (perhaps as much as 50%) of the genuine Long Branch Snipers did not get the (T) designation stamp, they are prone to FORGERY. Beware collectors of Long Branch Snipers, especially in 1943! Apparently (according to a very reliable source on this site) two very unscrupulous scoundrels (one now dead) from Manitoba produced a dozen or more FAKES over a 25 year period. Thus the very high number of 1943 snipers showing up recently.

Anyone who could convincingly replicate the pads and their fitting shouldn't have much trouble with a "T" stamp. No guarantee of anything IMHO.

For collectors, the safest period for collecting is 1944-45, because Long Branch started using "serial block numbering" which makes it reasonably certain that if your sniper falls into a certain serial block, it is probably genuine.

Of the Wartime production, (1941 through first quarter 1945) only about 1000 were produced. Less than 90 have been reported (including the Fakes). IOW, the Wartime Long Branch Snipers are mighty scarce.

Even more scarce are the REL scopes that were mounted on many of the Long Branch Snipers. According the Seaforth72, who has been tracking the REL scopes, only 35 of these have been reported (and while they are much harder to fake, don't be surprised if someone tries, given their value on the market). (Thanks Colin for sharing your information.) There are more unreported REL scopes that will surface, but don't expect as many as the UK scopes.

We are currently starting to figure out where the missing snipers went, because only 9% of the Wartime production and 22% of the Postwar production have been accounted for. The short answer to the question of the Missing Snipers is that a few percent (perhaps 10%) are still in collectors closets, but sadly most were either destroyed in combat, missing in action, destroyed after the war, or scrapped for parts (parted out).

Regarding production, when the war started, the initial order from the Canadian army was for 50,000 standard No.4 rifles from the Master General of Ordnance (MGO), quickly followed by an additional order of 100,000 from the British Ministry of Supply, while the plant was under construction. (ref: Clive Law).

In the early-mid war years (1940-2), Canadian troops in the UK, Hong Kong (1941), and Africa were carrying British WWI No.1 MkIII rifles. By the time the Canadians reached Italy (1943), they were issued the No.4 rifle (thanks Seaforth72). Photographs taken during this period show the Canadian Sniper Forces at that time were using the No.3 Mk1* (T) rifle (which was the Winchester P-14 from WWI, fitted with an Aldis scope.) So, early in the war, many Canadian troops left Canada without Long Branch rifles. (According to Clive Law, p 42 " All No.4 (T) rifles were supplied to the Canadian Army by the British War Office.")

There was no Canadian infantry in Africa, only airmen. I've yet to see any photos of the Alex Martin P14s in Canadian use, but some may well have been. The P14/Warner & Swasey combination was definitely on issue until late 1943. Previous post:

In "Without Warning" it is mentioned that, "...a survey of British Army sniper equipment taken in November 1943 revealed that there were 3,756 rifles with No.32 scopes, 900 rifles with Patt. '18 scopes and 450 rifles with Aldis scopes [Alex Martin P14 conversions - not all with Aldis scopes] still on issue to the British Army." The Canadian Army was not up to establishment in No4(T)s until around January 1944 according to the same source and their requirement was about 1400 rifles.

Ultimately Long Branch produced nearly a million rifles. A large portion went either with Canadian troops or to the ordnance pool as Captain Laidler indicated. Many ended in the hands of Commonwealth Countries (like India, South Africa and ANZAC) as well as NATO countries after the war and other Allies (like Greece & Turkey), or into postwar English warehouses and then scattered through surplus sales (many to the US via suplus dealers) or destroyed as scrap iron or through overboard at sea.

For example, Seaforth72 reports: "many went to NATO countries as aid in the 1950s. There is a report that the Dutch eventually scrapped their rifles but about 50 out of 350 of the Lyman scopes and brackets ended up being bought by a collector. I have found the rifle for my Lyman scope in Australia as an ex-sniper with the mounting holes plugged."

We all wish there was a secret stash of Long Branches sitting in a warehouse somewhere (like the end of the Indiana Jones movie), but that's hardly likely.

.....

[Surpmil]

The pertinent question that should be being asked about LB No4T production is this. If production of LB sniper rifles was always dictated by the slow rate of No32 LENS production why on earth was REL No42 production so prolific? All these were for use in Churchill Mk7 and 8 gun tanks (and later for the Centurion Mk1 and 2?) made in the UK. Later production of the REL No32 benefited from a relaxation in the acceptance standard whereby to accept easier to produce duplo (double) convex ocular and erector lenses as opposed to the standard plano-convex. And this relaxation was carried over onto REL No42 production. (I haven't seen an REL No53 telescope)

It seems to me that a good 75% of the No42's stripped for spares in the last 5 years have been REL's. And unless you use the lenses as a matched set, life in the dark-room against the optical screen can become VERY difficult

If REL were really struggling with lens production, why on earth didn't someone call a stop (or even a START.....) to production of the No42 for UK tank production!

The equipment was built mostly to UK orders in keeping with the Canadian policy of total industrial and military cooperation, aka "subordination".

A very foolish policy in my opinion, but then we had a silly old woman named McKenzie King as PM. A creature who spent WWI hiding in the employ of John D. Rockefeller, not the likes of Sir Robert Borden, who once shook Lloyd George by his lapels and told him if he wanted any more Canadians in France he'd better stop squandering their lives on idiocies like Passchendaele.

Presumably No42s were what was ordered so that is what was produced. What other reason could there be?

All those I've looked through were very bright and clear, and I think we all know the uniformity of manufacture was well ahead of any made elsewhere.

Peter, let me first say I am not an authority on scopes, and your hands have dug into the inner workings of the scopes, so your insights are certainly precious. Here's all I can contribute to the discussion -- from Clive Law's book: (p 54)

"By August 1943, due to manufacturing difficulties encountered by REL, only 91 Mk I scopes had been delivered. These difficulties led to readily identifiable defects in finished scopes. The defects had been identified as: failure of the mechanism to keep any adjustments for range or deflection; the tendency for the lenses to chip or crack; and the change of optical focus. It was felt that REL would have fewer difficulties once the drawings had been received for the Mk. II scope. By December, 1943, according to the monthly letter of the Director of Small Arms & Ammunition, REL was 'also issuing some which are half-way between Mk. I and (the proposed) Mk. II.' This was the Canadian Mk. IA."

In other words the defects inherent in the design. You'll probably find that is a UK report, along the lines of the one that complained that the REL MkIs weren't sufficiently waterproof! By 1944/45 the Canadians had figured out how the little games were being played, as Law documents. Anyone who had taken an REL No32 apart knows they were painstakingly finished and assembled, far more carefully than all but the earliest UK production MkIs, based on the 25 or so of the latter I saw the guts of.

How the MkI lenses were ever going to stand up to the vibrations of a Bren gun I really don't know. And the three handed adjustments...painful. As "Without Warning" also mentions, the designers at REL felt the No32 MkI was a waste of time, along the lines of the Telescope, G.S., Signaller's etc. They made some attempts to update the latter though in 1942, and very finely too. The C67 and the Telescope Observing Sniper's were their answers to both, along with the Stand, CNo.47 to replace the three legged wooden wonder of the No21, the monte carlo buttstocks, etc.