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ANNEX BAKER

INTELLIGENCE

Reference: Division S.O.P. No. 1-45.

1. MAPS, PHOTOGRAPHS AND SUPPLEMENTARY INTELLIGENCE:

a. Maps:

The number and types of maps supplied to this unit during the planning phase of this operation were more than adequate. Twelve out of the twenty-eight items sent over from Corps for distribution would have been sufficient for familiarization and briefing purposes. These twelve items were: 1/20,000 map w/grid, 1/10,000 map w/grid, 1/10,000 situation map, 1/10,000 Beach map "A" w/o grid, G-2 Study, G-2 tactical study of terrain, 122-44 JICPOA Bul., Enemy defenses folder, Propaganda sets, surrender leaflets, Enlarged obliques of East Beaches, and Landing Information sheet. The other sixteen items duplicated in some way the twelve items or else were not necessary for an echelon as low as regiment. In addition, a great number of maps and studies serve more to confuse echelons lower than regiment rather than to aid in clearing up the picture.

The 1/10,000 special air and gunnery target map of Iwo Jima designated as the official operations map was received in sufficient quantity to satisfy all needs of this regiment. This map plus the revised 1/10,000 intelligence map received at Saipan were the two principal maps used during the operation. The 1/20,000 special air and gunnery target map was used to some extent but not as an operations map.

The operations map was generally accurate on horizontal control, but the twenty foot contour interval used gave a very deceptive map picture of the terrain to the North and East of airfield number two. The captured Japanese map could only be considered better in that it made no attempt to contour this area at all except along and just inland from the coast. It might have been well to use hachure contouring on such jumbled terrain.

Relief maps were very good for purposes of over-all breifing.

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b. Photographs:

During the planning phase of the operation vertical photographs were adequate both as to quality and quantity. Oblique photographs were only fair. It is difficult to understand the lack of excellent low obliques on an operation which presented as difficult a landing problem as this one did. These photographs are a necessity for a study of the beaches and approaches inland. The best vertical can not take their place.

During the operation itself the aerial photographs supplied to this unit were completely inadequate. The verticals were foggy or cloud covered in most instances. Those taken by a PRO photographer from an Oy-1 airplane of VMO-4 were very helpful over a limited area.

If intelligence S.O.P. and the photographic plan outlined in appendix 12 to annex Dog of Fourth Marine Division operation order No. 49-44 had been carried out, good photographs should have resulted. Photographs at least as good as those used in the Tinian battle are very desirable for use by battalion and regimental commanders.

c. Hydrographic Information:

Hydrographic information was excellent. The G-2 section special study of the beaches was a very fine job for familiarization and briefing purposes. It would have been better if a supplement bringing it up to date had been issued.

The material presented in writing and verbally by the U.D.T. personnel brought aboard this unit's APA was excellent. It was an outstanding example of "on the spot intelligence" properly disseminated. It was exceptionally accurate.

d. Other Intelligence:

Both prior to and during the operation all intelligence material available appeared to be very ably disseminated to this unit by D-2.

The G-2 tactical study of the terrain was for the most part very good. It failed however to portray the true picture of the northern part of Iwo Jima. Once again the greatest difficulty here was the lack of good aerial photographs. It is impossible to produce an accurate terrain study of totally unfamiliar terrain without good to excellent aerial photo coverage.

The API reports of enemy installations to our front deriving from Corps-2 during the operation were most helpful in coordinating artillery fires and Naval gunfire.

The monitoring of the air reconnaissance net throughout the operation proved most helpful. This is a valuable source of intelligence and should be utilized to the utmost both day and night.

The enemy defenses target folder as adopted by this regiment was used by each company commander. They expressed the view that the folder would be of great help to them in a less static situation.

The SCR-300 division intelligence OP net did not operate as planned on D-Day. The only units manning it were this unit and RCT-25.

2. INTELLIGENCE FUNCTIONING:

a. Collection of Information:

The collection of information on this operation was much more difficult than on previous operations that this unit has been on. Several factors were governing in this situation.

First and foremost was the Japanese attempt to destroy or burn all documents, radios and other papers or equipment which they felt would be of any intelligence value to our forces.

Second, few if any good OP sites were ever located in this regiment's zone of action. The personnel were well trained, but the terrain was most difficult for this type of work.

By D plus 2 evening the R-2 was the only officer remaining in the section. Enlisted personnel casualties had further reduced the efficiency of the section. A replacement officer was received in the section on D plus 6 but proved unsatisfactory due to lack of training in field intelligence.

b. Evaluation and Dissemination of Information:

The evaluation and dissemination of pertinent information was speedily carried out throughout this unit. Battalion reports were far better on this operation than ever before. Especially were they so in the timeliness of information reported. This regiment reported much more often to D-2 than in the past and in turn D-2 called regiment more often.

c. Communications:

Communications between the OP and the CP were normally very good. They were maintained by SCR-300. Other communications were excellent.

d. Liaison:

Liaison with D-2 was much improved over past operations. As between R-2's, however, much can be done. There seems to be a reluctance to disseminate information to adjacent units. This is true of battalions also.

e. Training and Use of Personnel:

As has been stated in previous reports, it is believed that personnel for intelligence sections should be carefully selected. This should be done by the R-2 and Bn-2's. The schooling for intelligence personnel should be intensive and carefully directed. There is no room on the field of battle for results of slip-shod instructions.

As a whole the intelligence functioning of the regiment was much smoother than in past operations despite the difficulties outlined in paragraph (a) of this section. It is believed that this was mainly due to the selection of personnel and the school program used by this regiment while it was at base camp.

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The basic schooling was a six weeks course conducted by the R-2 section and attended daily by all members of the Bn-2 sections including officers. At the conclusion of this school the R-2 and Bn-2 sections met from time to time for selected class and field work on a combined basis. This program served to unify to a high degree basic intelligence functioning throughout the regiment. It further served to let each section know what it could expect from others. It was suggested at the time that an intelligence CPX involving all intelligence personnel of the division should be had. Other work interfered and this was not taken up with D-2 at the time.

Japanese language personnel attached to this regiment at the time of landing consisted of two officers and two enlisted. The two officers were wounded and evacuated on D plus 1. On the night of D plus 1, one officer and one enlisted reported from D-2. One of the wounded and evacuated officers was returned on D plus 5. Throughout the operation these officers and men were most cooperative and helpful. The men went daily to Bn. CPs whether the battalions were working with RCT-24 or not. The officers remained at the Regimental CP except when special search parties were organized. Considering the scarcity of documents and other material, plus a lack of prisoners, their work was excellent.

From a standpoint of working with this and lower echelons, the linguists should have an opportunity to become thoroughly acquainted with key personnel throughout these units. In addition, they should be schooled in the fundamentals of tactics and subjects such as map reading. This would give them a far better grasp of the daily situation while on an operation.

It is not imperative that linguists be permanently attached although their job is easier if they are. The most pressing need at present is for all language personnel to get additional training in school. In a period of more than a year the language personnel of this unit have had no opportunity to increase their conversational capacity and little opportunity for extensive work with documents, with the result that their efficiency from a linguistic standpoint has been decreased greatly.

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Nisei were only employed by this regiment once. The opportunity was limited but the two men involved were most cooperative. Their conversational talent appeared far superior to that of the other linguists. It is believed that this talent must be developed to meet the needs of forthcoming operations.

3. PRISONERS:

RCT-24 captured four prisoners of war. Three were Army personnel; one was a cook from a Naval Aviation unit. Other prisoners captured by component BLT's while they were attached to either RCT-23 or RCT-25, were evacuated through those regiments. No civilians or Korean laborers were identified as being killed or captured in RCT-24's zone of action.

Prisoners were interrogated briefly at Battalion CPs and given first aid at that time if necessary. Enlisted language personnel handled this and merely tried to ascertain whether the prisoner had companions near his place of capture and his unit. The prisoner was then forwarded to the Regimental CP and interrogated briefly on matters relating to RCT-24's zone of action. This interrogation was always brief and the POW was then forwarded to the Division Stockade.

All POW's were very cooperative. But they were captured late in the operation. The information was either confirmatory of previous information or of a local nature involving his place of capture.

The enlisted Japanese language personnel assigned to RCT-24 proved thoroughly competent from a linguistic standpoint to interrogate prisoners on a battalion or regimental level. Their chief difficulty appeared to be a lack of knowledge as to what items were of importance. They require training in the tactical worth of enemy interrogation and enemy documents which do not appear important at first glance.

Selected line troops who were given an eight weeks course in the use of selected military phrases proved generally ineffective, in the dealing with the POW's

This was true due to several factors. These men were trained mainly to aid in the handling of large numbers of civilians. They were to be used on military personnel only to get them to surrender, not for interrogation. A number of these men were killed or wounded. Many of them forgot or garbled the phrases they had been taught.

4. CAPTURED DOCUMENTS AND MATERIEL:

During the training period at base camp the importance of collecting enemy documents and materiel was stressed during periods of instruction. As this regiment was landing in reserve, all units were instructed to glean the rear areas for any documents or materiel not picked up by the assault units. This proved most beneficial, for on D plus 1 morning, scouts from BLT 1-24's two section found a T/O of the Japanese Naval Forces on the island. This served to immediately revise the estimated enemy strength on the island upward by more than five thousand.

Throughout the operation, scouts and observers from the Bn-2 sections and R-2 section constantly scoured the areas just behind the front lines. They investigated many caves and gun positions. The number of documents turned in was not impressive yet the area was thoroughly covered. On several occasions, special search parties with either Nisei, Jap prisoners or additional language personnel were dispatched on special missions at the request of the battalions. All enemy guns, gun positions, mines, minefields and incidental materiel were reported directly to D-2. Whenever possible, samples were turned in to D-2. Varying types of enemy shell fragments were turned in to enable artillery to identify the weapons being used on our forces.

The cooperation of enlisted personnel in the front line units on the collection of documents and enemy gear is worthy of comment. These men made a conscious effort to turn in all letters, diaries and other papers found, as well as dog tags, and anything else that they thought might be of interest. All troops of this unit and attached units appear well indoctrinated in intelligence matters. There is also the element of personal

interest from a souvenir standpoint but the majority turn over gear and documents with just the idea of helping out. The presence of enlisted interpreters at Bn. CP's was a definite aid here.

Information of immediate use obtained from any source whatsoever was given rapid distribution to higher, lower and adjacent echelons.

As compared to past operations, documents, radio and radar gear and other specialized material which Jap forces knew would be of value to us were found in small quantities. Repeated evidence was found to bear out POW reports that special security measures were taken to prevent such materiel from falling into our hands. Radio and radar gear was smashed, documents burned and torn up, and other types of gear were either burned or smashed.

The items of greatest immediate tactical value were dog tags, letters, postcards and the Naval T/O previously mentioned. By use of these items it was possible for the language personnel to piece together an order of battle and to tell from day to day what enemy forces had been encountered. This served as an indicator of who was still in front of us. On two ocassions, detailed diagrams of enemy positions directly to our front were found, translated, and sent directly to the Company commanders to whose front these positions were.

A few documents of value in assembling general and technical information about the enemy were found. Among them were aircraft and propeller logs, a few unit journals of small units, notebooks and publications containing technical data on rockets, mortars, aircraft and others, as well as the usual military handbooks. A few navigational instruction folders, some charts and topographical maps were turned in. Of particular interest were two books of complete military and geographic data on O Jima and Hachijo Jima.

5. PROPAGANDA:

RCT-24 did not request the use of propaganda leaflets over and above those used by higher echelon. No one of the four prisoners captured remembered seeing any of the leaflets. It is believed that propaganda on such

objective is next to useless. On larger objectives with a large civilian population, well written propaganda should be very valuable.

All attempts to induce surrender of Japanese by vocal attempts proved fruitless in RCT-24's zone of action. On four different occasions groups of Japanese holed up in caves were approached and spoken to at some length by interpreters. The only reply to pleas for surrender were explosions from the interior of the caves.

It is believed that the most effective means of inducing surrender is to use captured prisoners, who have been well treated, to return to caves or behind the lines and bring others back.

6. COUNTER INTELLIGENCE:

Counter intelligence was SOP. No special measures were employed or considered necessary. The orders expressed in the Division operation order were carried out to the letter. It is worthy to note that all personnel in this unit were acutely aware of the necessity for preventing maps from falling in the enemy's hands. On numerous occasions personnel exposed themselves to the enemy fire to insure this not happening. All compromising documents were quickly recovered from crashed planes whenever possible.

The enemy's counter intelligence measures were far superior to any yet encountered. He made a studied effort to prevent any compromising material from falling into our hands. He issued specific orders to cover the destruction of material which might be compromising in nature.

It is noted that very few casualties were suffered by friendly personnel relieving the lines under cover of darkness.

7. PUBLIC RELATIONS:

One of the two regimental combat correspondents was wounded and evacuated on D plus 5. Other correspondents from Division filled the gap from day to day.

It was noticed that civilian correspondents got closer to the front more often on this operation than on previous ones.

The two regimental photographers plus a movieman from Division were landed on D night and spent the next three days taking PRO pictures. In addition, throughout the operation, PRO photographers from Division were in evidence with front line units.

Generally speaking all went smoothly from a PRO standpoint. It was noticed that the collection of stories by Division PRO personnel slowed down after D plus 3, but this was easily remedied by use of message center.

8. THE ENEMY:

a. Organization:

The enemy forces on IWO JIMA were well organized and capably led up to almost the very end of the battle. The overall command of the island was Japanese Army. It was a far better defense than any as yet encountered by this unit. This was noticed from the first hour of landing until the last big infiltration in force on the night of D plus 17. Although certain units were destroyed almost in their entirety from time to time, they were destroyed as a unit fighting bitterly to the end with the aid of all supporting arms other than air and Naval gunfire. The above is especially true of Japanese Army forces encountered. The Naval Force was used mainly to man the coast defense and AA batteries. When these positions were overrun and destroyed, the personnel remaining alive either holed up in caves or was absorbed by the Army. The Naval units did not appear to have attained the high state of training of the Army units.

Complete order of battle information on Jap forces was obtained by various methods already discussed and will appear in higher echelon's report.

b. TACTICS:

The enemy's estimate of the situation so far as the possibility of an attack on IWO JIMA was concerned was very good. He apparently decided that our forces

would make successful landings on either the East or West Beaches. Captured maps indicate such to be the case. The cross island defense line was clearly defined on maps of a maneuver held late in January, according to POWs. The island commander apparently had a good idea as to the effect of our pre-landing bombardment, for he withdrew all troops from the beaches except those who were in large buried blockhouses or pillboxes.

Even though IWO JIMA lent itself to defense, the island commander did an excellent job of selecting his positions, and placing his troops. In a matter of two hours after initial blue landings, he skillfully brought to bear all available weapons on the beach areas. The results speak for themselves.

The enemy's use of automatic weapons to pin advancing infantry down and then pound them with big mortars was remarkably well coordinated. In most instances, the Jap forces had observation for this mortar fire. When they appeared to lack observation they had their own forward units fire air bursts with light mortars. These air bursts gave off a very heavy greenish-smoke. The big mortars would then register in on the air bursts. The air bursts were not particularly effective against personnel.

The anti-tank defenses of the island were exceptional, far superior to any as yet encountered. The use of planned minefields covered by supporting fire was well thought out. The mutually supporting anti-tank weapons found between airfields one and two and around Hill 382 were particularly effective.

The overall defensive set up running from the quarry to "Turkey Nob" Hill, thence around the "Amphitheatre" to Ryobu Ame and thence north to Hill 382 was the hardest to crack of any ever faced by this unit. The use of underground tunnels to join positions was common. These tunnels were also used to conceal guns, mortars and rockets. They were used for every conceivable purpose from a stowage of aviation gasoline to the operating of a field hospital. A few of them were concrete inside, but the majority had only clay walls. Many of them were entered through pillboxes. When they were abandoned by Jap forces, they were invariably booby trapped.

ANNEX BAKER (Continued).

Extensive use was made of anti-personnel mines and all types of grenades. The terra cotta mine with plastic fuse and the ceramic grenade as well as anti-tank conical hand mine have never been encountered by this regiment before. All types of prefabricated and home made booby traps were used.

On a number of occasions the enemy used smoke, apparently to conceal troop movements and displacement of weapons from our forces. Smoke also was used to conceal gun flashes.

The Jap forces made a practice of waiting in caves, tunnels, and dugouts until our artillery preparations were complete and then coming out to man positions to meet the attack. On one occasion we launched an early attack without artillery preparation, and apparently caught the enemy off balance. Good initial gains were scored.

In some instances small groups of enemy or individuals were killed wearing Marine Uniforms, helmets, and individual equipment or parts thereof. It is noted that some Japanese "G.I." dungarees are not unlike the Marine Corps issue in color.

The 150 MM mortar, 320 MM spigot mortar and eight inch rocket fire was the most devastating ever faced by this unit.

c. Equipment:

The enemy's individual equipment on IWO JIMA was standard. Ordnance equipment was far superior in quality and quantity to any as yet encountered by this regiment It is believed that every type of Japanese weapon from 6.5 MM rifle to a 320 MM spigot mortar was on the island. Several types of grenade launchers were found. Many types of grenades were found and turned over to higher echelon. Every type mine and booby trap known by our forces to be used by the Japanese was found. Many standard and improvised devices were used for anti-tank measures. Several different types of rocket were encountered. Coastal defense and anti-aircraft weapons were located in great numbers. All ordnance equipment appeared to be new

and in excellent shape with the exception of field artillery. It was standard.

The enemy motor transport was not good and was quickly eliminated. Radio and telephone gear appeared in quantity. Although most of it was smashed, it appeared to be new.

From a standpoint of battle readiness, the enemy was in better shape than on any island yet invaded by this unit.

9. RECOMMENDATIONS:

Better prior planning as to the map needs of all operational echelons would save much paper and time. Closer liaison should answer this problem.

Every effort should be made to make the operations map as near perfect as possible. No time nor means should be spared to accomplish this end.

No effort should be spared to get good aerial photographs. The loss of a few planes may save thousands of Marines' lives. Better photographs than those taken before and during the past operation must be gotten.

An air observer should be up in the Division's zone of action twenty-four hours a day, during an operation.

More training from a liaison standpoint is indicated as between R-2's and as between R-2's and D-2's.

All intelligence personnel should be carefully selected.

Basic intelligence schooling should be carried on within regiments under the direction of R-2's.

D-2 should excercise supervisory control over R-2's training and should aid in this training by utilizing specially trained personnel as lecturers. In addition it is suggested that weekly conferences be held between D-2 and the various R-2's of the Division.

All language personnel should be sent to a school

in the states or else a school be set up for them here at which they can be given formal instruction in both written and spoken Japanese.

All Japanese language personnel should be taught a few fundamentals of military tactics and basic subjects necessary for them to perform their function in the field to a better degree.

At least three enlisted per battalion and two officers per regiment would be a proper number of linguists to have on hand for future operations.

Stress the importance of small scraps of information in training language personnel and in indoctrination of troops.

Needs for replacements have run about the same after each operation. It would be much better to have at least partially trained intelligence personnel with the other replacements rather than having to reorganize completely as is done now.

If radios and radio channels are available it would aid intelligence functioning greatly to have a Divisional intelligence net embracing all echelons in two work.

If future operations are planned for larger land masses, it is imperative that an intelligence and reconnaissance platoon T/O as used by Army regiments be adopted.

Some system of tagging enemy dead should be worked out. This would prevent over-estimation and dual-counting. It would give a much better picture of the exact number of dead and those remaining.

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1. REHEARSAL:

a. The terrain selected by Division for rehearsals was similar to terrain anticiapted on IWO JIMA. Boundaries, objectives, plan of attack, and area assigned units was relatively the same as those assigned on D-Day.

b. Camouflage discipline was strictly enforced and all vehicles were painted so as to blend with the terrain on IWO.

c. The Communication plan was the same as that used for the operation and personnel were able to become familiar with the various call signs and code names.

d. On one rehearsal BLT 1/24 was attached to RCT 25 and BLT 2/24 to RCT 23. This was considered as a possibility on D-Day and therefore units became accustomed to their likely employment on D-Day. On D-Day it turned out the attachments were employed as rehearsed.

e. Boat assignment tables were prepared by each BLT prior to the rehearsals and corrections were made to these tables after each rehearsal. Long before the final rehearsal each man knew what boat team he was in. Aboard ship, daily debarkation drills were held so that every man became thoroughly familiar with his debarkation station and the route to it.

f. Landing diagrams were prepared so that once debarked each boat team became thoroughly familiar with which wave they were in and what position they occupied within the wave.

2. STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE:

a. Reconnaissance:

(1) In accordance with a Division SOP all BLT Commanding Officers, when in reserve, reconnoitered the lines of the battalions in attack which they were most likely to relieve. When RCT 24 was in reserve, the Commanding Officer, RCT 24 reconnoitered the zones of the assault RCTs.

(2) For the initial landing it was planned that if the assault RCTs needed additional strength, BLT 1/24 would be attached to RCT 25 and BLT 2/24 to RCT 23. With this

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possibility in view, the Commanding Officer of BLT 1/24 was to reconnoiter the zone of RCT 25, and the Commanding Officer of BLT 2/24 was to reconnoiter the area occupied by RCT 23. The Commanding Officer of BLT 3/24 was to reconnoiter the beach areas in the Division zone.

b. Issuing of Orders: Operation orders were received every night from Division for the following day. RCT orders to the BLTs and supporting units were delivered in person by liaison officers to their units. Only on two occasions was it necessary for the RCT Commanding Officer to issue an operation order orally to the BLT Commanding Officers.

c. As soon as possible after the front lines consolidated for the night the artillery and NGF forward observers registered their night harassing and defensive fires. Overlays of these fires were then submitted by the BLTs to the RCT artillery and NGF liaison officers. These fires were then plotted on the RCT situation map. After they were plotted, the RCT Commanding Officer then had a picture of what areas were being covered and could call for additional fires where he thought they were needed.

3. ARTILLERY:

a. When possible, 3/14 was assigned to be in direct support of this RCT. They fired preparations for attacks, harassing fires (day and night), defensive fires, and targets of opportunity. Excellent cooperation and liaison was maintained with the artillery battalion through the liaison officer and by the artillery battalion commander's visits to the RCT CP.

b. Each rifle company had an artillery forward observer who in most cases, stayed right with the front lines enabling him to adjust close supporting fires. Most Japanese positions were so well constructed that artillery was only able to neutralize rather than destroy them.

4. NAVAL GUNFIRE:

a. As in the base naval gunfire, in deep support, proved very effective in neutralizing targets. Most firing was adjusted by air spot. Numerous targets were destroyed by naval gunfire employing VT plane spot.

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b. On this operation it was advantageous to employ LCI gun boats along the coast. They were particularly effective against observed enemy personnel and emplacements. They fired mortars, rockets and 40mm guns both in close and deep supporting missions.

c. Overlays of target areas for prearranged and harassing fires were turned into the Regimental NLO from the Battalion NLOs for coordination with air and artillery. Coordination was extremely good. Prearranged fires and night harassing as well as deep support fires were effective in neutralizing and pinning down the enemy. Night illumination was in most cases adequate.

5. AIR:

a. Air Support:

(1) Out of 36 air strikes requested by this RCT, 22 were completed. The average delay between the request for a strike and the strike was two hours. Nevertheless, in most cases the strikes were still effective.

(2) The Air Liaison Officer with the RCT coordinated the requests from the BLTs and submitted them nightly to the RCT Commanding Officer for approval. In this way thorough coverage for a preparation prior to an attack was always assured.

b. Air Observation:

(1) Air observation was available practically all of the time. Their observations were helpful and their presence over the enemy lines often casued the enemy to cease firing in order to avoid discovery.

(2) SAO - The SAO communications net was monitored at all times. Valuable information was obtained from their observations. 25 specific missions were flown for this RCT.

(3) OY-1 - This plane was often launched during the night and helped to locate the areas from which the enemy heavy weapons were firing. The observations received from the OY-1 observer were accurate both as the enemy and our own front lines. The plane was frequently used to observe areas within the RCT zone of action.

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6. TANKS:

a. Tank-Infantry Coordination:

(1) Company B, 4th Tank Battalion was attached to RCT 24 practically throughout the operation. In almost every Regimental Operation Order one platoon of tanks was attached to each assault BLT. Tank liaison officers reported to the BLT Command Posts and the BLT Commanding Officer was able, through the tank liaison officer, to have tanks report where and when they were needed. The tank company commander, or another tank officer, remained in the Regimental CP and in this manner the RCT Commanding Officer was able to control the use of tanks at all times.

(2) Tank-infantry coordination in the attack did not exist, because at no time would the terrain allow tanks to move forward with infantry. Usually two or three tanks supported each BLT by fire from the best positions available, as close to the front lines as possible.

(3) Tanks on many occasions drew heavy enemy mortar fire and at times the infantry preferred to operate without tanks for that reason.

b. Tank, M4A3: This tank was never able to maneuver in the zone of action of action of RCT 24. They were used whenever a route to the front could be found to support the attack by fire. On these occasions they could fire on caves and emplacements to the front.

c. Tank, M4A3: (Flame Thrower).

(1) Again it must first be mentioned that the terrain on IWO JIMA in almost all cases denied the use of tanks. On occasions it was possible to get a flame thrower tank to the front, but even then the tank usually could not get into a position from which flame could be thrown at the exact spot desired.

(2) The flame thrower tank was effective against caves when the above conditions could be overcome.

7. ENGINEERS: The engineer company attached to this RCT successfully completed the missions assigned . One platoon was attached to each BLT. They were frequently called upon to remove mine fields and clear routes for tanks and other vehicles, which they always did rapidly and efficiently. They provided demolitions and personnel for the sealing of caves. Routes for tanks and evacuation and supply were opened by the armored bulldozer, often under enemy fire.

8. COLLECTING SECTION, COMPANY "B", 4TH MED BN: About ten (10) men from this section were attached to each BLT. They were used to evacuate the wounded, to supplement the aid station personnel and as casualty replacements for rifle company hospital corpsmen.

9. 1ST JOINT ASSAULT SIGNAL COMPANY: JASCo supplied this RCT with the officers, men and communication equipment necessary to control air strikes, air observation and naval gunfire. Each BLT was assigned a naval gunfire forward observer, naval gunfire liaison officer an andair liaison officer with communication equipment and enlisted personnel to man it. Supporting fire by ships and airplanes was called for through the JASCo personnel and the cooperation rendered was commendable.

10. WAR DOGS:

a. The 2d Sec, 7th Mar War Dog Platoon attached to RCT 24 was used as a part of the CP perimeter defense. Every evening dogs were sent to the BLT in time for them to take up positions along the front lines prior to dark. BLTs were also able to fill gaps between units by placing the dogs in strategic spots, and they were also a great morale factor for the troops.

b. The Regimental Intelligence Officer used dogs with his patrols in searching out caves. The dogs were to precede the men into the cave and alert the handler if the cave was occupied. In many cases the dogs refused to enter a cave. It is believed that this was because the dogs were never trained to enter dark enclosures and some hesitated because they were afraid.

c. Scout dogs were used with one company operating along the beach with on effective results because of the terrain

11. LVT(A)4: BLT 1/24 proceeding northward on the eastern coast of IWO JIMA was the only unit which was able to use the LVT(A)4. The company commander of the company operating on the beach was unable to observe his front from the beach but was able to reconnoiter the area visually from the water in an LVT(A)4. They were not used on land or for fire support.

12. ROCKETS:

a. Barrage Rocket:

(1) Whenever the RCT was in the attack, a section of the rocket detachment was attached to it by Division. The section was either held under RCT control or attached to the BLT with the most difficult zone of operations. In either case any unit requiring the use of the platoon could request it through regiment.

(2) Although large troop concentrations were never observed within rocket range, many missions were fired by the rocket section. In any case where a unit met fierce and concentrated resistance the general location of the enemy positions became the target for a rocket barrage. A barrage falling forward of a unit almost always enabled that unit to make some advance. This can be attributed to the demoralizing effect of the rockets on the enemy and the helpful effect of the rockets on the morale of our own troops.

(3) The use of the barrage rocket was limited because of the shortage of rockets, as well as the difficulties in finding suitable firing positions.

b. 7.2 Rocket:

(1) Division carried a very limited supply of the 7.2 rockets.

(2) In the final stages of the operation the 7.2 rocket was used by this RCT as an experimental weapon.

(3) The launcher for this rocket is so heavy that it must be drawn by a tank and the range so limited that it must be fired from within the front lines. Since the tank must face in the same direction as the rockets are to be fired, the launcher has little maneuverability.

This combined with the terrain on IWO JIMA made the selection of a suitable firing position very difficult.

(4) On two occasions the rockets were fired and although definite results of the rockets were not observed. It is believed that this rocket should be most effective against the heavy emplacements used by the enemy.

13. INFANTRY:

a. Organization: This RCT adhered to the Tables of Organization for an Infantry Regiment with the following two exceptions.

(1) Assault Platoon: Each BLT organized one assault platoon consisting of 38 men and 1 officer. This platoon was extremely effective throughout the operation. Whenever a rifle company requested flame throwers or demolitions or both, the assault platoon immediately sent the appropriate number of men with the necessary equipment to the company. Their work completed with the company, they could return to battalion, service their equipment and prepare new demolition charges. Since there were so many caves to be sealed on IWO the assault platoon was employed frequently and very successfully. The following Table of Organization was established for this platoon:

	Squad	Platoon
1 Commissioned		
2 Lieutenant (Plat Ldr)		1
3 TOTAL COMMISSIONED		1
4 Platoon Sergeant (c)		1
5. Sergeant	1	4
6. Squad Leader (c)	(1)	(3)
7. Service & Supply (c)		(1)
8 Corporal	1	3
9. Asst Squad Leader (c)	(1)	(3)
10. PFCs and Privates	9	30
11. Demolitions (p)	(3)	(9)
12. Flame Thrower Man (p)	(2)	(6)
13. Asst Flame Thrower (p)	(2)	(6)
14. Wire Team (p)	(2)	(6)
15. Service and Supply (c)		(3)
TOTAL ENLISTED	11	38

(c) - Armed with Carbine (p) Armed [illegible]

(2) Scout Platoon: This platoon was used initially as security for the RCT CP. Early in the operation when BLT 3/24 suffered heavy casualties the scout platoon was attached to the BLT to supplement their reserve. The platoon remained so attached for two days and when the platoon returned to parent control it consisted of eleven men out of the original 30 men and 1 officer. These eleven men were used in the perimeter defense of the CP until towards the end of the operation when they were used to form a composite platoon. The following Table of Organization was established for the scout platoon:

	Hdq	Group	Squad	Total Plat.
1.Lieutenant	1			1
2.Plat.Comdr (c)	(1)			
3.TOTAL COMMISSIONED	1			1
4.Platoon Sergeant	1			1
5. Asst Pl Ldr (c)	(1)			
6.Sergeants	1		1	3
7. Guide(c)	(1)			
8. Squad Ldr			(1)	
9.Corporals		1	2	4
10. Group Ldr		(1)	(2)	
11.PFCs or Privates	6	4	8	22
12.Rifleman, Automatic		(1)	(2)	
13.Rifleman, automatic, Asst		(1)	(2)	
14.Riflemen	(4)	(1)	(2)	
15.Sniper (03)		(1)	(2)	
16.Communicator's (p)	(2)			
	NAVY			
17.Corpsmen	1			1
18. Corpsman (c)	(1)			
TOTAL ENLISTED				31
TOTAL PERSONNEL				32

NOTE: c - Carbine .03 - M1903 Rifle (w/scope)
p - M1918 Automatic

b. Composite Platoons:

(1) When the casualties became so high that front line BLTs often had an inadequate number of men in reserve, the RCT Commanding Officer organized two composite platoons consisting of the remainder of the scout and sniper platoon, and personnel that could be spared from H&S Company and Regimental Weapons Company.

(2) These platoons consisted of about 30 men each and although they were never tactically trained they were used to advantage by the BLTs to which they were attached. They were used to fill gaps in the front line night defensive positions, and as a holding unit when such was needed. Although they could not be expected to maneuver in the attack, they did perform a valuable service in the above capacity.

c. Weapons;

(1) The small arms normally carried by the infantry (M-1, carbine, BAR, etc) are not discussed in the following paragraphs as their use was no different on this operation than on any other.

(2) Bazooka: Since very few tanks were encountered by the RCT, the bazooka was not used as an anti-tank weapon. It was, however, put to good use firing into caves. In most cases where a cave was holding up a unit, the terrain did not allow the use of vehicle drawn weapons and limited the infantry to using demolitions, flame thrower, small arms and bazookas. Because small arms are ineffective against a cave, and as flame thrower and demolitions can only be used at a very close range, the bazooka was the only weapon which could fire a potent shell into the cave. The A.T. rocket proved effective in this capacity as did the W.P. rocket.

(3) Flame Thrower: The flame thrower proved to be an effective weapon against caves, however its short range limited its use. It is not necessary to have a flame thrower with the rifle company at all times. A rifle company is more efficient without the burden of refueling and maintaining the flame throwers. Also the flame thrower is too heavy to be carried every place that the rifle company goes. For these reasons the assault platoon under battalion control proved extremely effective. Companies called for the flame throwers when they were needed and after a mission was completed the flame thrower and operator returned to battalion.

(4) Demolitions:

(a) The 16 pound satchel charge of C2 which was used to great advantage on IWO JIMA [illegible]

sealing of caves. The composition of the rock and ground was such that a well placed charge of C2 was capable of sliding enough dirt and stone to close most small cave entrances encountered.

(b) Shaped charges were rarely used.

(c) TNT was used only as a booster for C2 satchel charges.

(d) Bangalore torpedoes were not used.

(5) Hand Grenades:

(a) Fragmentation: With the enemy very often but "a stones throw" from the front lines it is obvious that the hand grenade was extremely useful. The grenade was also used to great advantage at night when it was necessary to combat vague targets. All companies desired extra grenades which were issued to the men for the night defense. Every morning the extra grenades were turned in to the company dumps. It should also be said that the fragmentation grenade was far superior to any grenade used by the Japanese.

(b) White Phosphorous: This grenade was effective against small caves and hasty defensive positions. It was mostly used with white smoke as a screening agency for withdrawing troops and casualties under enemy fire.

(c) Incendiary: Since practically everything on IWO was underground there were few instances when the incendiary grenade could be used effectively. There were occasions when it could be used to burn out a small cave but on the whole the absence of inflammable material limited the use of this grenade.

(d) Illumination: This grenade was extremely useful and was excellent in the front lines at night. It was the first time the men were able to provide their own illumination where and when they wanted it to clarify suspicious shadows or movements to their front. It can also be hooked up as a trip flare.

(6) Trip Flares:

(a) M-48: All units used this flare to good advantage. Front line companies very often ran trip flares the entire width of their front with excellent results in that the troops were duly warned of anyone approaching their position by the flare being tripped. This flare was sometimes used as an illuminating hand grenade.

(b) M-49: Although much more elaborate than the M-48 flare, this flare was less effective. The parachute is shot so high that very often the spot at which the flare was tripped is not illuminated. Undoubtedly in open terrain where observation is more satisfactory this flare would be the better of the two.

(7) 60mm Mortar: This weapon proved to be the most effective close support weapon in the regiment. Its accuracy allowed units to fire as close as 30 yards from the front lines in cases of emergency.

(a) Illumination Shell: Where the illuminating grenade provided illumination for the individual, the 60mm illumination shell was used successfully to illuminate for the company. Some companies fire this shell at intervals throughout the night and some fire only when enemy activity to the front is suspected. The available supply of this shell was inadequate, however the naval gunfire star shell and the other means of illumination discussed previously helped provide successful illumination at the front.

(8) 81mm Mortar: Because of the shortage of 81mm ammunition this mortar did not attain its maximum efficiency. At times mortar platoons were able to supplement their supply of ammunition with captured Japanese 81mm ammunition. Although many mortar men felt that the 81mm mortar was not large enough to materially damage or destroy the enemy positions, it was used effectively to fill the gap between the 60mm mortar and the artillery. Since the exact location of the front lines was sometimes not certain, units which attempted to fire without observation fired dangerously close to adjacent front lines.

(9) 37mm Gun: The type of terrain encountered was not

suitable for extensive use of this gun. Since this weapon requires long fields of fire and fairly good routes to a firing position, in most cases neither was available so the gun could not be used. On occasions the 37mm gun could be brought to bear on a cave and canister was fired. Its most advantageous use was in the night defensive line, when it was possible to move the gun up by hand to cover likely enemy routes of approach.

(10) 75mm Half-track: The 75mm gun on the half-track was used on several occasions to fire into caves. On the whole, the terrain did not permit movement to the front, of the 75mm half-track, until late in the operation.

14. ENEMY TACTICS:

a. Anti-Tank Measures:

(1) Anti-tank ditches on IWO JIMA were so disturbed by the pre-invasion bombings that they became ineffective as a tank obstacle.

(2) The enemy laid an anti-tank mine field the entire length of the landing beaches about 150 yards inland from the waterline. Many tanks were lost as a result of these mines. Almost all roads were mined. In most cases where the enemy used barbed wire as an obstacle, the mines were laid in conjunction with the barbed wire. Roads became the only safe routes for vehicles because engineers were able to clear the roads of mines.

b. New Defensive Measures;

(1) Use of Smoke: On several occasions the enemy laid smoke in areas forward of our lines. It is believed that this was done in order to screen displacement of weapons and personel to the rear.

(2) Uniforms: It was reported by several units that some enemy personnel were dressed in complete U. S. Marine uniforms. Numerous enemy dead were found wearing our camouflaged helmets. They were also found using our weapons which they undoubtedly recovered from our dead.

(3) High Angle Weapons: Mortars of all sizes were much more effectively used by the enemy than in the past. Several high trajectory weapons used with deadly effect have been identified as rockets of various sizes, characteristics of which have not been studied as yet by this unit.

(4) Colored Shells: Certain of the enemy high angle weapons fired a shell that gave off a green smoke. It is believed that in several instances this shell was used for registering fires, in many cases they were fired as a barrage.

(5) Defensive Tactics:

(a) In general it can be stated that the enemy tactics differed from that encountered in the past in that the defense of the island was more cleverly planned. The exceptionally large number of caves and the very rugged and almost impassable terrain lent itself to the very determined resistance of the enemy.

(b) Counterattacks on a large scale were never encountered. Infiltrations were attempted very infrequently. On the night of D-17 all front line units received localized and small scale counterattacks. The following day the enemy resistance appeared broken, scattered and disorganized. For that reason it is believed that on the night of D-17 all enemy units had orders to counterattack from whatever position they held. This is further substantiated by the fact that at several points enemy officers were found dead but completely attired in dress uniform with sabers drawn, obviously killed in a futile banzai charge.

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ANNEX DOG.

SECTION I.

SUPPLY AND TRANSPORTATION.

1. LOADING.

a. Planning Phase:

(1) Accurate loading plans were prepared and completed forty-eight hours prior to the time loading commenced. Some changes in vehicle priorities were necessary after the loading was completed due to changes in boat assignment tables by the 3-Section. The boat assignment tables determine the sequence of unloading of high priority vehicles.

RECOMMENDATION: That the 3-Section submit to the 4-Section, prior to the time that loading plans are drawn up, tentative boat assignment tables with debarkation stations to include all vehicles to be embarked with the assault and call waves.

b. Loading Phase:

(1) The loading of equipment and supplies was completed without difficulty within the time allotted. Ship's characteristics for the AK assigned this combat team were entirely inaccurate. It was necessary to make a complete set of new plans after the AK docked.

RECOMMENDATIONS: That Combat Team TQM's be sent to check the characteristics of respective ships they are going to load as soon as the ships come into the area.

2. UNLOADING.

a. Balanced LCVP loads of high priority supplies were assembled off the line of departure subject to call by the Control Officer. Conditions of the surf and beach made it impossible to land small boats during the assault phase. When balanced LCVP loads were landed the small quantities of some priority loads became lost in the general confusion during the early stages. Pre-loading of certain supplies on LST's on this operation such as "ten-in-one" rations caused LVT's to be tied up unloading supplies which could not be used on the beach but, when landed, had to be unloaded. Some Troop TQM's were forced by the ships' Captains to commence general unloading or to unload cargo which was not being called for in the early stages. The Troop TQM of the USS Hendry was forced to commence general unloading on D-Day with the result that all the USS Hendry's boats were tied up with [illegible] loaded on the beaches until from forty-ei[illegible]

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2. UNLOADING. (Cont'd).

Due to conditions of the surf and beach and unbalanced pre-loads on the LST'S, the supply situation on Blue beaches was very critical for the first few days.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That on future operations, a definite understanding be reached between the Navy and those directing the unloading of Marine Corps supplies so that there will be no interference with the unloading plans and directives set forth until such time as general unloading commences.

(2) That the officer representing the combat team on the control boat have two enlisted personnel as assistants to help him keep necessary records of unloading.

(3) That the combat team be given the opportunity to make recommendations for pre-loaded supplies for their respective LST's.

(4) That the mixed priority loads be loaded only on LVT's so that they can be sent directly to the assault troops.

(5) That priority LCVP's be loaded with only one priority item or type of supply.

3. COMBAT SUPPLY.

a. Assault Phase:

(1) In the early stages of the operation the Shore Party Commander was swamped with requests for supplies from small units. It was impossible for the Shore Party Commander to handle all these requests.

RECOMMENDATION: That a representative of the Combat Team Quartermaster go ashore with the Shore Party Commander for the beach over which the combat team will operate and work in direct liaison with the Shore Party Commander. The combat team Quartermaster working directly with the Shore Party Commander can consolidate all requests and take over the issuing of all supplies from initial Shore Party Dumps. It will be necessary for the combat team Quartermaster to have at least four Quartermaster personnel checking supplies on the beach in direct communication with himself by means of SCR 536 radio. In addition the combat team Quartermaster should have direct communication with his representative on the control boat by means of SCR 300 or SCR 610 radio.

b. Supply Inland:

(1) The Regimental Dump was established and functioning on D plus 4 Day. From that time on inland supply functioned smoothly. The levels of supply on Blue beaches were never adequate to support the Combat Team. It was necessary to employ LVT's to go to Yellow beaches for supplies. Due to the poor condition of the roads initially, it was necessary to employ LVT's to supply the units of this combat team until D plus 10 Day. Because of poor road conditions, much hand carrying was necessary to get supplies to front line troops in the early stages of the operation. By D plus 10 Day, roads became improved and the Division Quartermaster was delivering supplies to the Combat Team. From that time forward, inland supply functioned very smoothly.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Engineers attached to the Combat Team be supplied with at least two armored bulldozers to improve routes of supply during the early stages of an operation.

4. ADEQUACY OF SUPPLY.

a. There was an adequacy of all mounting out supplies with the following exceptions:

(1) Sandbags.

RECOMMENDATION: That on all future operations with similar soil conditions, the allowance of sandbags be doubled.

(2) Ammunition.

(a) There was a shortage of most types of high explosive ammunition and pyrotechnics. (Specific recommendations under ammunition).

5. TRANSPORTATION.

a. For the first time adequate transportation was embarked with the exception of Ambulances, 1/4-ton, 4x4. The present TO allowance of Ambulances, 1/4-ton, 4x4, for the Infantry Regiment is insufficient to properly handle casualties. The cargo carrier, M29C, proved invaluable due to the type of terrain encountered. The above vehicle is invaluable during the early stages of an operation when road conditions are poor. It can be used to great advantage to supplement organic jeep and trailer transportation but cannot replace it due to increased maintenance difficulties. The special allowance of trailers, 1/4-ton, 2 wheel, issued prior to embarkation made enough trailers av[illegible]

RECOMMENDATION: That the following TO allowances for cargo carriers, M29C; trailers, 1/4-ton, 2 wheel, cargo; and Ambulances, 1/4-ton, 4x4, be established for the Infantry Regiment:

(a) Cargo Carrier, M29C.

3 per Regimental Weapons Company.
2 per Regimental Service Platoon.
1 per Regimental Communication Platoon.
1 per Battalion Supply Section.
Total: 9 per Infantry Regiment.

(b) Trailer, 1/4-ton, 2 wheel.

1 per truck, 1/4-ton, 4x4, cargo.
Total: 36 per Infantry Regiment.

(c) Ambulance, 1/4-ton, 4x4.

2 per Infantry Battalion.
4 per H&S Company, Infantry Regiment.
Total: 10 per Infantry Regiment.

6. GENERAL COMMENTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS.

a. Supply Communication:

(1) Heavy traffic on available networks made it impossible to get messages for priority supplies urgently needed on the beach through to individual ships. In some instances two or three hours were required for such messages.

(2) During the inland phase of supply, there was little need to use radio communication because of the short lines of communication throughout the operation, but it was readily apparent that on any future operation of a more extended nature, it will be imperative that a supply network be set up within the Division. It is very difficult to use a tactical net for supply communication.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That during the unloading phase, a logistical net be set up within the combat team using SCR 300 or SCR 610 radios to include the combat team Quartermaster on the beach, his representative on the control boat and the TQM's on each shi

(2) That a supply network with its own frequency be set up within the Division.

b. Water.

(1) There was a sufficient supply of water in expeditionary cans, but much of the water was undrinkable due to the lining of the present expeditionary can used by the Marine Corps.

RECOMMENDATION: That either the Army expeditionary can with the large clamp type mouth be employed or some method found to improve the lining of the present can.

c. "B" Rations:

(1) "B" rations cannot be used by a combat team during an operation.

RECOMMENDATION: That only the following components be loaded in assault shipping:

(a) Fruit and fruit juices.
(b) Coffee, milk and sugar.
(c) Necessary components for making bread or doughnuts.

All other components should be block loaded on re-supply ships with a high priority and unloaded only when the situation permits their use.

d. Palletized Cargo:

(1) It is believed that the disadvantages of loading palletized cargo and handling such cargo during the assault phase of an operation outweigh the advantages.

RECOMMENDATION: That only cargo be palletized which is not needed in the early stages of an operation, and that most of the palletized cargo be loaded on the AK's to be landed after the assault phase is over.

e. Organizational Equipment:

(1) It is necessary for the combat team to carry much organizational equipment which, in many cases, cannot be used. Much of this equipment is lost or destroyed through needless handling.

RECOMMENDATION: That the following organizational equipment be carried by the Division Quartermaster to be block loaded on AK's and landed as the situation permits its use:

(a) All camp equipment except tarpaulins.
(b) All mess equipment except food vacumn containers, fire units and G.I. cans.

f. Clothing:

(1) Some Army type field shoes with the high top and two buckles were issued just prior to the operation. This type shoe was excellent in the field.

RECOMMENDATION: That the Marine Corps adopt the above type shoe.

g. Salvage:

(1) Salvage operations were carried on by all echelons beginning D plus 1 Day. Salvage materials moved back through the Regimental Dump to Division agencies. A salvage section from the Second Service and Supply Platoon was utilized to clean up the beaches in the regimental zone of action. The Regimental Service Platoon provided an organized salvage squad that functioned throughout the operation within the Regiment's zone of action. Salvage operations insofar as the Regiment was concerned were highly satisfactory.

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SECTION II.

ORDNANCE AND AMMUNTION.

1. Supply and re-supply from salvage of all weapons was adequate throughout the operation. Spare parts and accessories carried within the organization were adequate for the repair of ordinary malfunctions. All other repairs were made by the Division Ordnance Company. Due to the terrain encountered, it was possible to employ the 37mm Guns and Halftracks for only four days. The caliber. 50 machine guns carried by the Weapons Company were not used at any time during the operation. All other weapons had twenty-six days of battle employment. Below are listed the number, type and caliber of weapons used and the total number of weapons lost.

a. Number, type and caliber used:

(1) Pistol, cal..45, M1911A1	82
(2) Carbine, cal..30, M1	1710
(3) Rifles, cal..30, M1	1361
(4) Rifles, cal..30, M1903, w/telescopic sight	21
(5) BMG, cal..30, M1917A1	54
(6) BMG, cal..30, M1919A4	65
(7) Mortar, 60mm, M2	39
(8) Mortar, 81mm, M1	12
(9) Launchers, Rocket, M1 and M9A1	27
(10) Rifles, Browning, automatic, M1918A2	243
(11) Shotguns, 12 Gauge	100
(12) Gun, 37mm, M3A1	12
(13) BMG, cal..50, M2, (HB)	10
(14) Flame Thrower, portable, M2-2	81

b. Weapons Lost:

(1) Pistol, cal..45, M1911A1	37
(2) Carbine, cal..30, M1	1010
(3) Rifles, cal..30, M1	669
(4) Rifles, cal..30, M1903, w/telescopic sight	14
(5) BMG, cal..30, M1917A1	14
(6) Mortar, 60mm, M2	7
(7) Launchers, Rocket, M1 and M9A1	25
(8) Rifles, Browning, automatic, M1918A2	156
(9) Shotguns, 12 Gauge	56
(10) Gun, 37mm, M3A1	1
(11) Flame Thrower, portable, M2-2	1

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That a heavier mortar be adopted for use by the Infantry Regiment.

(2) That a luminous aiming stake be provided for night firing for all mortars.

(3) That the .50 caliber machine guns in the Weapons Company be replaced by .30 caliber light machine guns.

(4) That the following personnel be armed with the pistol, caliber.45, Model 1911A1:

(a) All medical officers and corpsmen.
(b) All flame thrower men.
(c) All bazooka men.
(d) All SCR 300 radio operators.

2. COMBAT VEHICLES.

a. Number, type and caliber used:

(1) 75mm Gun, M1897A4, mounted on carriage, M3 - 5

(2) Combat vehicles lost - 2

3. AMMUNITION.

Ammunition supply presented no difficulty except for the shortages of 81mm Mortar ammunition, 60mm Mortar-Illuminating ammunition and Green Star clusters. Several new types of ammunition were available but the unit had not been able to use any of the new ammunition during the training period. As a result very little of this ammunition was used. All ammunition in the Regimental Dump was stored in revetments. No loss of ammunition from enemy action occured within the regiment. It was impossible to store ammunition on the beaches in revetments during the early stages and as a result a large quantity of ammunition was destroyed by enemy shelling on Blue Beach 2 on D plus 2 Day. Types and methods of packaging are adequate and suitable with the exception of the new container for the 60mm Mortar shells. This container is not waterproof. Much of the 60mm Mortar ammunition was rusted and corroded. Below is the list of ammunition expended during the operation:

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a. Ammunition Expended:

(1) Cart., carb., cal..30, M1 -	90,000	rds.
(2) Cart., AP, cal..30, 5 rd clips -	194,000	"
(3) Cart., AP, cal..30, 8rd clips -	197,200	"
(4) Cart., AP & T, cal..30, belted,(250rds) -	163,000	"
(5) Cart., ball, cal..45	9,500	"
(6) Shell, HE, M49A2, w/fuze, PD M52, for 60mm Mortar, M2 -	33,944	"
(7) Shell, Illum., M83, w/fuze, time, M65, for 60mm Mortar, M2 -	4,314	"
(8) Shell, smoke (WP) T6, w/fuze, PD M52, for 60mm Mortar, M2 -	500	"
(9) Shell, HE, M43A1, w/fuze, PD, M52, for 3in. TM Mk I & 81mm Mortar, M1 -	5,578	"
(10) Shell, HE, M56, w/fuze, PD M53, for 3in. TM, M1 and 81mm Mortar, M1 -	5,217	"
(11) Shell, smoke (WP), M57, w/fuze, PD, M52, for 3in. TM, Mk I and 81mm Mortar, M1 -	650	"
(12) Canister, (fixed) M2, for 37mm Gun, M3, M5 and M6 -	520	"
(13) Shell (fixed) HE, M63, w/fuze, BD, M58, 37mm Gun, M3, M5 and M6 -	440	"
(14) Shot (fixed) APC, M51, w/tracer, for 37mm, M3, M5 and M6 -	320	"
(15) Shell (fixed) HE, M48 (N.C.) w/fuze, PD, M48, for 75mm Gun, M1897, all mod. & M2 & M3. -	100	"
(16) Shell (fixed) HE, M48 (NC) w/fuze, T&S.Q, M54, for 75mm Gun, M1897, all mod, M2 & M3 -	76	"
(17) Shot (fixed) APC, M61, w/fuze, B.D. M66A1, for 75mm Gun, M1897, all mod, M2 & M3 -	140	"
(18) Shell, smoke (WP) Mk II (unfuzed) for 75mm Gun, M1897 all mods, M2 & M3 -	147	"
(19) Grenades, hand, frag, Mk IIA1, w/fuze, igniting, M10A2 -	18,830	"
(20) Grenades, Hand, smoke (WP), M15, w/fuze, M6A1 -	2,275	"
(21) Grenades, hand, Inc., (Thermite), M14 -	525	"
(22) Grenades, hand, Inc., Frangible -	393	"
(23) Grenade, Projection, Adapter, M1 -	818	"
(24) Grenade, Hand, Illuminating, Mk I -	2,775	"
(25) Grenade, Rifle, AT, M9A1 -	150	"
(26) Rocket, HE, 2.36", M6 -	1,410	"
(27) Rocket, (WP) 2.36" -	276	"
(28) Flare, Trip, Parachute, M48 -	4	

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(29) Flare, Trip, M49 -	1,330	"
(30) Torpedoe, Bangalore, M1 -	30	"
(31) Explosive, shaped charge, 35#, T3 -	23	"
(32) Caps, blasting, non-elec. -	1,020	
(33) Cord, Detonating, spools (100 ft) -	112	
(34) Fuse, time, spools (100 ft) -	12	
(35) Explosive, C-2, in satchels, 2/bx -	363	bxs.
(36) Explosive, TNT, 1/2# Blks, 50#/bx -	45	bxs.
(37) Lighters, fuze -	750	
(38) Explosive, Demolition Chain of 8 blocks, M1, w/carrying case -	34	bxs.

RECOMMENDATIONS:

(1) That 60mm Mortar shells be packed in fibre containers within the metal container and that the lid be made waterproof.

(2) The following changes in the U/F are recommended:

Weapons:	AP	HE	Tracer	Other Types	Total:
Carbine cal..30				30-Ball	30
Rifle cal..30	64				64
BAR cal..30	260				260
Automatic or Revolver cal..45				21-Ball	21
MG 50 cal.HB or AA (WC)	120		60	120-Inc.	300
37mm AT or Tk	20	60		20-Canister	100
60mm Mortar		90		30-Illuminating 10-W.P.	130
81mm Mortar		140Light 40Heavy		20-W.P.	200
75mm Gun, S.P. Tk or AmTrac.	30	60Super		10-W.P.	100

Changes in the U/F for Miscellaneous Munitions:

(a) Grenades, Hand: One per individual.
(b) Signals, Ground: Recommended that three times the amount of the following ground signals be carried on future operations as were carried on the past one:
  (A) The Ground Signal (Green Star Cluster) used to denote friendly artillery falling short.
  (B) The Ground Signal (Yellow Smoke) used as front line markers.

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RECOMMENDATIONS:

(2) (Cont'd).

(c) Grenades, Illuminating: The amount carried on future operations should be three times that carried on the past operation.

4. ENEMY MATERIEL.

a. Two (2) Japanese 81mm Mortars were captured and used by this organization. A total of sixty-seven (67) rounds of Japanese 81mm Mortar ammunition was fired. Some rounds were fired in our 81mm barrels, and some in Japanese barrels on our bipods and baseplates. The ammunition was fired with all increments at a range of approximately 2400 yards. Hits were not observed. Four mis-fires due to faulty primers occurred. Primers were well dented by the firing pin. Our barrels were not scarred or damaged by the ammunition.

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ANNEX DOG.

SECTION III.

MEDICAL REPORT.

1. PREPARATORY PHASE.

a. General: This phase covered the period from the end of rehabilitation until loading for this operation was completed.

b. Medical Training: Training in all its phases was seriously hampered by the late arrival of replacement corpsmen and medical officers. Training in professional subjects was carried on continuously and followed battalion and regimental schedules. Didactic instructions, demonstrations and examinations were employed in all subjects. The objective of this training was the acquisition of a high degree of professional skill by all hands. Emphasis was placed on the use of field expedients in all phases of instruction.

c. Unit Training: By simulating casualties, problems in treatment and evacuation were worked out during maneuvers with all echelons. The Collecting Section of the CT Medical Company worked in the field with the battalions of the regiment, thus becoming familiar with the problems encountered in combat, as well as learning to know the personnel with whom they were to work.

2. PRE-COMBAT PHASE.

a. General: This phase consisted of the period between the completion of loading out and D-Day. During this phase the Medical Sections of the regiment participated in all ship-to-shore maneuvers.

b. Training Aboard Ship: Training of all hands was continued aboard ship. Lectures and general briefing were conducted daily after leaving the Hawaiian Area.

c. Care of Embarked Troops: Sick call for Marines embarked was held twice daily by the Medical Department personnel of the Landing Force. Daily sanitary inspections of troop living and messing facilities were made. In general, the troop compartments and rations were far superior to those of other operations. Sickness aboard was minimal.

d. Regimental Dental Officer: Prior to the departure from the Hawaiian Area, the Regimental Dental Officer was evacuated to a Naval Hospital with atypical pneumonia. An officer replacement was obtained from the Division Rear Echelon.

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3. COMBAT PHASE.

a. General:

(1) This period consisted of the time between D-Day and the final securing of the target area.

(2) All Medical Sections of the regiment landed on D-Day, with the exception of the Regimental Medical Property man, who remained aboard ship until all Medical Department gear had reached the beach. Company Aid-men landed with their platoons; battalion Aid-Station personnel and Collecting Section personnel landed with Battalion CP's, and the H&S Medical Section landed with the Regimental CP. Medical personnel and property were distributed throughout their respective waves in the interests of the principle of dispersion.

(3) Throughout the operation, Aid Stations operated in the general vicinity of their respective CP's, thus taking advantage of the CP security measures.

(4) Whenever necessary and practicable, covering fires and smoke were provided Company Aid-men and litter-bearers. Cooperation by line elements in this regard was far superior to that received on previous operations. The importance of this protective measure cannot be too strongly emphasized and constant training should be standard procedure for all Medical Department personnel attached to infantry units.

b. Evacuation:

(1) On the whole, this operation may be considered exceptional from the point of view of the speed and efficiency of evacuation of wounded. After D-Day, with its attendant confusion on the beaches, casualties were dispatched from the front and reached definitive care in an incredibly short time.

(2) Early, all casualties were transported by litter carrier only. Due to the relatively long carries involved, and the nature of the terrain, litter bearers became physically exhausted in short order and frequent reinforcements and replacements were required. Casualties were high among the litter squads. The Second Band Section was employed by battalions as litter bearers, but all elements of the regiment cooperated wholeheartedly in furnishing temporary reliefs. On about D plus 6 Day forty men from the 24th Replacement Draft were assigned for duty as litter bearers only. These men were outstanding.

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(3) Later, as vehicles became available and the beachhead was enlarged, casualties were evacuated from Battalion Aid-Stations to the beaches, and finally to Division Hospital by jeep ambulance. Through the wholehearted cooperation of "B" Medical Company, it was possible to maintain three jeep ambulances at each Battalion Aid-Station. One ambulance was kept at Regimental Aid-Station. This vehicle was invaluable as a "free" ambulance which could be sent where needed in a very short time. The senior driver made periodic inspections of all vehicles, thus insuring proper maintenance. He superintended the necessary repair work. The "free" ambulance was used as a substitute for the vehicle undergoing repairs.

(4) A serious disruption of an otherwise smooth evacuation system occured three days before this CT left the line for the embarkation point. The Division Hospital was closed and all Medical Battalion vehicles were withdrawn to be reembarked. This necessitated evacuation of all casualties on the five organic ambulances from the front to the Corps Hospital. The condition of the roads, traffic congestion and other factors, made this a forty-five minute trip from a Battalion Aid-Station to the Hospital. As a result, the available transportation spent the greater part of the time on the road. Casualties piled up. Some relief was afforded by the arrival of two VAC ambulances late in the morning. Due to the increased evacuation distance and withdrawal of Medical Company jeeps, adequate provision for transportation should have been made. In view of the fact that the regiment was still in the line and sustaining casualties, such a move constituted a serious hazard to the proper functioning of the Medical Department.

c. Supply:

(1) Initially, supplies were carried ashore by corpsmen and litter bearers. Items for early re-supply were carried ashore in seabags by the Regimental Aid-Station personnel.

(2) At all stages of the operation, needed supplies and equipment were procurable at the beach from the Shore Party Evacuation Station and "B" Medical Company. Re-supply was adequate and prompt. Regimental Aid-Station re-supplied battalions with items unobtainable elsewhere, and acted as distribution point after the establishment of Division Medical dump ashore. The need for a larger supply of small battle dressings was demonstrated.

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d. Personnel:

(1) Training of all hands was adequate to the needs of the operation. However, it is felt that a larger percentage of corpsmen should be trained to act as Company Aid-men in order to afford proper relief to men on the line. Regimental and Division pools of men so trained would be invaluable. These pools would help to prevent many evacuations for combat fatigue by means of a system of periodic replacements for the men under fire.

(2) The assignment of Marines for duty as litter bearers is most urgently recommended. The tactical and psychological training they receive enables them to operate more efficiently at this duty than Hospital corpsmen. A minimum of twenty men per battalion is recommended.

(3) The morale and efficiency of all Medical Department personnel was good.

(4) The Regimental Dental Officer was assigned additional duty as Regimental Burial Officer. In this capacity, he correlated the work of the battalion and the division sections. Location, tagging and collection of bodies was begun on D plus 1 Day. Due to the tactical situation, removal of our dead to the Division Cemetery was not begun until D plus 4 Day. By D plus 7 Day the area held by this regiment was maintained throughout the remainder of the operation. Due to shortage of transportation and the nature of the terrain, enemy dead were temporarily interred in the locality where found. Their graves were marked so that later removal for burial in a permanent cemetery could be effected.

The Regimental Dental Officer gave the following treatments:

(a) Total number of patients requiring immediate treatment: twenty-six (26).
(b) Temporary sedative fillings placed: twenty-three (23).
(c) Extractions (under local anaesthesis): three (3).
(d) No post operative treatments were necessary.
(e) There was no marked incidence of gum conditions; ginginitis or Vincent's Angina.
(f) Equipment taken ashore was adequate to cope with the emergency situations encountered during the operation.

e. Equipment:

(1) Medical equipment was found to be ade

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(2) The addition of a trailer, 1/4-ton, for each battalion, would greatly aid in the movement of supplies and increase the mobility of the Aid-Station.

(3) The addition of five jeep ambulances to the present Tables of Organization would permit faster and more efficient evacuation of casualties.

4. MISCELLANEOUS:

a. General Condition of Troops:

(1) In spite of the long period of time spent aboard ship prior to landing, the troops were in good physical condition. Special attention to physical exercise aboard ship proved to be more than worthwhile.

(2) Health of the command has been excellent. Only a minimum of sickness, mainly mild upper respiratory infections, was encountered while en route to and on the target.

(3) No epidemics were encountered.

b. Rations:

(1) Throughout the entire operation, rations were plentifully supplied. The early use of "10-in-1" and the new type "C" rations provided a welcome change from the usual monotony of field rations.

c. Water:

(1) The supply of water was at all times adequate.

(2) Many of the five gallon expeditionary cans had not been properly cleaned before filling for this operation. As a result, much foul smelling, unpotable water was encountered initially. As soon as facilities for distillation of sea water became available, this condition was alleviated. Water brought ashore in fifteen gallon drums was almost universally good.

d. Sanitation:

(1) During the early phases of the operation, field sanitation was at best haphazard, due to the frequent and heavy enemy bombardments. However, as the tactical situation improved, more care could be devoted to the establishment and policing of heads, di[illegible] refuse, etc. DDT spray was invaluable [illegible]

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d. Sanitation: (Cont'd).

was used locally at all CP's as well as being sprayed from planes. Individual rations were used throughout the operation by this regiment. Three small galleys were in operation by elements of the regiment during the last few days. They were carefully supervised and were found to be in good sanitary condition at all times.

(2) In summary, it may be said that field sanitation presented no serious problems during the operation.

d. Local Diseases:

(1) No local diseases of importance were encountered.

(2) POW's stated that Paratyphoid Fever had been endemic on Iwo Jima. No cases were discovered in troops of this regiment.

f. Location of Missing Personnel:

In this regiment a Chief Pharmacist's Mate was assigned the mission of locating personnel listed as missing, or missing in action. As additional duty, he assisted the Graves Registration Section. Prior to leaving base camp, this CPO received special instructions in the mechanics of the field record systems. By receiving all information concerning missing personnel immediately, this CPO was able to locate them before they were officially listed as missing or missing in action. Fifty-one (51) personnel were located by this agency alone after they had been declared to be in a missing status by lower echelon. The adequacy of this system is attested to by a comparison of the figures on missing in this regiment and any other regiment engaged in this operation. The success of the procedure was largely due to the following factors: (1) institution of an immediate search for the missing; (2) using a properly trained individual for this work; (3) making the location of missing personnel the chief duty of a specially trained individual.

g. Treatment of Chest Wounds:

After a series of tests made at base camp, this regiment adopted a simple and effective method of sealing off chest wounds, especially those of the "sucking" type.

Liquid rubber cement, such as is used in shoe repair trailers and issued by Marine Quartermaster departments was used as the adhesive agent. The cement is applied to the chest wall and th

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g. Treatment of Chest Wounds: (Cont'd).

covered with rubber tissue, obtained by cutting rubber condoms to the required size. This combination provided a simple, easy to apply, and airtight dressing. The application of a gauze dressing immediately over the wound interferred in no way with the airtight dressing. The cement dries very quickly and will adhere to a greasy moist skin surface.

Reports from the Division Hospital indicate that chest casualties treated in this manner arrived at the hospital in better condition than those treated with a battle dressing or adhesive tape seal.

6. RECOMMENDATIONS.

The following recommendations are made by the Medical Department of this regiment as a result of experience gained on this and on previous operations:

a. That Marine Corps personnel be assigned for duty as litter bearers. A minimum of twenty (20) men per battalion is recommended.

b. That continued efforts be made to provide potable water during the early phases of an operation.

c. That a larger percentage of corpsmen be trained for duty as Company Aid-men, thus allowing greater freedom in providing for replacements.

d. That each regiment be provided with a pool of corpsmen trained in Company Aidand Battalion Aid-Station work; thus enabling the Regimental Surgeon to institute proper relief for men at the front, and in consequence of such reliefs, reduce the number of casualties due to fatigue, both mental and physical.

e. That the number of jeep ambulances allotted to each regiment be increased to ten (10) with a trailer, 1/4-ton, provided for at least five (5) of the ambulances.

f. That a lighter litter be provided for the medical activities attached to Marine units.

g. That at least four (4) properly trained men be assigned by each regiment for the purpose of locating the missing and missing in action. Additional duty for those men should be correlated by the R-1.

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7. STATISTICS.

a. Table Number 1: Recapitulation of Hospital Corps Strength Reports with casualties:*

Unit:	W&E	KIA:	S&E:	OB:	Total:
H&S Co.	3	0	3	10	16
1st Bn.	11	5	1	21	38
2nd Bn.	12	5	8	15	40
3rd Bn.	12	2	6	19	39
Totals:	38	12	18	65	133

Personnel attached to organic units:

Organic Unit:	Parent Organ:	W&E:	KIA:	S&E:	OB:	Total:
1st Bn.	B Med Co.	2	1	2	5	10
	4th Tank Bn.	0	1	0	2	3
2nd Bn.	B Med Co.	6	1	2	4	13
	E Med Co.	4	0	4	1	9
	4th Tank Bn.	0	0	0	1	1
3rd Bn.	A Med Co.	1	0	0	4	5
	B Med Co.	6	1	2	6	15
	E Med Co.	5	2	2	2	11
	Total:	24	6	12	25	67
	Grand Totals:	62	18	30	90	200

*All figures are cumulative, i.e., include replacements.

b. Table Number 2: Casualties treated, by types, not including KIA (these figures include personnel of other units treated in 24th Aid-Station):

Unit:	GSW	W.Frag.	Blast	W.Mult.	ComFat.	Neuros	Misc.	Total:
H&S Co.	3	35	6	0	7	6	29	86
1st Bn.	160	184	69	67	59	0	102	641
2nd Bn.	112	268	42	27	87	1	97	634
3rd Bn.	204	226	28	172	113	9	320	1072
Totals:	479	713	125	266	[illegible]	1[illegible]	[illegible]	2433

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c. Table Number 3: Wounds treated by anatomical location:

Unit:	Legs:	Arms:	Torso:	Head:
H&S Co.	11	7	11	5
1st Bn.	148	45	159	74
2nd Bn.	116	96	101	45
3rd Bn.	84	109	142	59
Totals:	359	257	413	133

d. Table Number 4: Recapitulation of disposition of casualties of the regiment, by class:

Disposition:	H&S	R/W	1stBn	2ndBn	3rdBn	Total:
Wounded, not evac.	7	12	45	50	20	134
Wounded, evac.	35	38	479	486	520	1558
Sick, evac.	8	9	30	147	139	333

Returned to duty:	From W&E:	158
	From SK&E:	68
	From MIA:	3
	Total:	229

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