As the Falklands War comes to an end tomorrow 38 years ago on the 14th June 1982, this short video puts the whole war into perspective.
The Falklands - MiniWars #1 - YouTube
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As the Falklands War comes to an end tomorrow 38 years ago on the 14th June 1982, this short video puts the whole war into perspective.
The Falklands - MiniWars #1 - YouTube
Strange opening graphic, suggesting the M16 was the UK's weapon. :confused:
And simple Simon forgot the curious removal of the British dead in contravention of all war graves policy since WWI, and the careful exhumation, identification and reburial on the Islands of the Argentine dead!
Yes, very curious indeed...
While certainly not widely issued, the M16 was used by various units in the Falklands campaign, specifically, some Royal Marine elements (Mountain and Arctic Warfare), plus SAS and SBS.Quote:
Originally Posted by Surpmil
Not true.. Initially all the dead were buried locally, however following modern repatriation capabilities, it was offered, and taken up by the next of kin in most cases. Not all bodies were repatriated and some 13 remain buried at Blue Beach Cemetary, Port San Carlos including Lt Col H Jones which I visited several times. My friend Capt Dave Wood, was also buried there, but was subsequently re-interred. The Argentine dead were interred on the island although I understand an offer was made to the Argentine Government to repatriate the bodies, but was refused.Quote:
Originally Posted by Surpmil
UK practice changed after the Falklands, mainly due to the ability to repatriate bodies quickly by air, something that was not practical in earlier conflicts. All fatalities from both the Iraq and Afghanistan conflicts have been repatriated. This can only ever be a local policy as in the situation where active conflict in train, the need to hygienically deal with the dead will always depend on circumstances!
I'm glad to hear that, thank you for shedding light on it. No surprise that the Argentines would refuse repatriation of their dead! Why they were even given a choice is a mystery to me.Quote:
Originally Posted by bombdoc
Yes, I was aware of there was specialist use, but of course not being a general issue the image still struck me as odd.Quote:
Originally Posted by mrclark303
THE BATTLE FOR WIRELESS RIDGE – 13/14TH JUNE 1982
By David Chaundler
On the 10th June 1982 2 Para were flown-up from Fitzroy onto the West slope of Mount Kent. Our orders were to follow-up behind 3 Para and RV with them next morning after they had captured Mount Longdon. The RV was to be at Furze Bush Pass behind Longdon. Meanwhile, to the south, 45 Commando were to capture Two Sisters and 42 Commando Mount Harriett.
We moved out at midnight. I must say something about timings. We worked on Greenwich Mean Time (Zulu Time). Dusk was at about eight in the evening and dawn came rather slowly between ten and eleven in the morning.
We left the Mortars behind on Mount Kent with a considerable amount of ammunition as the 81mm mortar is too heavy to carry with a reasonable amount of ammunition. We also left the Blowpipe Detachment behind as the Blowpipe is a cumbersome weapon to carry any distance. Besides, the air threat against the infantry is not great provided they are well dispersed. Also the Blowpipes would be more effective protecting the more static target of the Mortars. I intended to use helicopters to move the Mortars forward once I knew our objective and could select a mortar line.
Our bergans were also left behind to be flow forward after we had captured our objective. Not that we knew yet what our objective was to be.
We moved out at mid-night. It was a slow, but spectacular night. The going was hard. The peat had a frozen crust and when one trod on it your boot went through to the sodden layer below. I don’t think anyone in the Battalion had dry feet. In fact some soldiers suffered from trench foot. Also rock runs needed to be negotiated. One false step was a sprained or broken ankle. The average speed of the ‘Airborne Snake’ was only about one mile an hour.
In front of us we could see the lines of tracer, flares and high explosive of 3 Para’s attack. To our right was Two Sisters and 42 Commando’s attack and much further beyond 45 Commando’s attack on Mount Harriet.
The Argentineans were firing defensive fire tasks on likely routes. So we had to zig zag around these. At one stage during the night we were warned of a minefield, which we skirted round to the North. By first light we still had not reached Furze Bush Pass. I stopped the Battalion and got on the radio to The Brigade Commander (Julian Thompson). I explained were we were. We were new to the northern flank, we did not know if there were enemy to our north and it was now daylight and vulnerable to air attack. He said to go on.
At about mid-day John Crosland, who commanded B Company was in the lead, stopped the column. I joined him and we lay on the ground for about 20 minutes looking into Furze Bush Pass. Argentinean artillery was landing all round it. However, there was one area that was in the lee of the Mountain that the artillery could not reach. I moved the Battalion into this area.
I started to ask for orders. At about Six o’clock a helicopter landed close by me. The Brigade Liaison Officer (LO) – Hector Gullan, an old friend – got out waving his map shouted, “Wireless Ridge tonight chaps”. I think this was the shortest set of orders for a Battalion attack on record. But it was all I needed to know.
It was two hours before last light. By now we had called forwards the four light tanks (CVR(T)s) and they were with us, but it was too late to fly the Mortars up. I made a plan and started to give orders to the O Group. Half way through orders a message came through that our left hand boundary had been changed. As I got to the end of orders another message came through that the attack had been cancelled.
I flew to Brigade HQ and asked Julian Thompson what was going on. He told me that 5 Inf Bde was not ready to coordinate their attack in the south with our attack onto Wireless Ridge. He said our attack had not been cancelled, only postponed 24 hours. As an aside, we had two hours notice of carrying out an attack. 5 Brigade had had several days to prepare and still needed another 24 hours.
I flew back to the Battalion and passed on the news. There then followed the coldest night of my life. We did not have our sleeping bags, the temperature fell to well below zero and I found soldiers doing double sentry drill just to keep warm.
Next morning Tony Rice (The Battery Commander) and I flew up to Mount Longdon where we could overlook our objectives. Mount Longdon was under artillery and mortar fire. As we came into land a stretcher bearer party with a casualty was coming down towards us. It was hit with a mortar bomb and my helicopter was taken away to fly out the casualties.
I met Hew Pike (CO 3 Para) and then Tony Rice and I went to the Artillery OP to look over the terrain. It was quite obvious that the Argentinean positions we had been given were not entirely correct. Also, being under artillery fire, which I found most unpleasant, caused me to change fundamentally my plan. This included a change of objectives to conform with what we had seen of the enemy positions on the ground and of the fire plan.
Up to that point in the Campaign all attacks had been ‘silent attacks’. That is one relies on surprise and one does not use the artillery until one engages the enemy. I decided on a ‘noisy attack’. That is, one comprehensively shells the enemy first before attacking them. The Argentineans know we were going to attack them. What they did not know was from which direction and precisely when. It also has the advantage that a number of enemy would be killed or wounded before we attacked. A wounded soldier needs two soldiers to take him back to the casualty clearing station. Thus depleting the front line still further. Also the sight of wounded soldiers coming back is likely to demoralise those further to the rear.
Four Argentinian A4 Skyhawks then appeared. They flew below us and headed off to bomb Brigade HQ. Fortunately there were no casualties, but Brigade HQ had to make a rapid move. More serious from my point of view was that, whilst Argentinean aircraft were in the area, all helicopter flying was stopped. So much for the presumption that the campaign would be conducted under the umbrella of air superiority!
I could not get back to the Battalion to re-brief the new plan and, nor could I fly my Mortars forward. By the time Tony Rice and I was able to get back to 2 Para it was via 3 Cdo Bde HQ where I excused myself from the orders for the following night’s operation. It was about six o’clock before we got back to the Battalion where I was relieved to be told the Mortars had arrived and flown direct onto the selected mortar line . Also, whilst I had been at 3 Cdo Bde HQ the Company Commanders had been able to fly-up to Longdon and see their objectives.
I had the O Group assembled and gave out new orders. I still had a restrictive left boundary as Special Forces were meant to be operating there though I could not find out at that time what they were doing.
The Argentineans probably though they were about to be attacked from the west. Indeed most of their artillery effort was concentrated in this area. Consequently, the plan was to carried out a wide flanking movement and attack them from the north. C(Patrol) Company were to lead the way to ensure the route was clear of the enemy and then to hold the forming-up positions (FUPs) and Start Lines.
There would follow a four phase attack (see map) with each axis of attack being different. So, not only were we coming at the Argentineans from an unexpected direction, we would keep the subterfuge up for each subsequent phase of the attack. D Company would attack first, followed by A and B Company (Dair Farrar-Hockley’s and John Crosland’s Companies) together onto the main objective. There would then be small subsidiary attack on a platoon position by C(Patrol) Company and the Assault Engineers. There would be a pause for resupply, particularly for the tanks and Machine Guns Platoon and for them to move up to A and B Company’s objective ready to support D Company (Phil Neame) in the Fourth Phase. Finally D Company would carry out a wide flanking movement to clear Wireless Ridge itself from the west.
H Hour would be flexible as I wanted to make sure everything was in place before we started, particularly the artillery’s registered targets. I estimated that H Hour would be soon after mid-night.
I had told the Battalion in my initial talks that I would not commit the Battalion without proper fire support. I was as good as my word. We had two batteries of guns, the Battalion’s Mortars, 3 Para’s Mortars, a Frigate – HMS Ambuscade – and at one point during the night we had a second Frigate. And, of course, we had the four light tanks.
In outline, each Company when attacking would have a Battery in direct support and the tanks and Machine Guns Platoon would also be in support. Illumination would be provided by the Mortars. HMS Ambuscade was tasked to destroy an Argentinian Company just over our left boundary on Wireless Ridge. This they did with 200 rounds of Naval gunfire. HMS Ambuscade and the other frigate then switched to suppressive fire onto D Companies Phase 4 objective.
Three aspects; 3 Para claimed to have a company on D Company’s first objective. I was sure it was an Argentinean company at that grid reference. We still had not got clarification from 3 Para when D Company attacked it. However, we had comprehensively shelled it and 3 Para had not complained, so it seemed safe to assume it was an Argentinean position.
The second aspect was that it would be an advantage to have a Blues and Royals officer in my Tac HQ as an armour advisor with communications to the light tanks. In HQ 5 Inf Bde there was such an officer as a watch keeper – Captain Julian Field. So I swapped him for our Education Officer.
The Plan of Attack
After I had given out my orders Julian Field and, the tank Troop Commander, Robin Innes Kerr, came to see me and said they were not entirely happy with the way I was using the light tanks. I said, “What should I be doing?” They explained and it seemed like a better idea, so we did it their way.
The CVR(T)s were invaluable. Not only in providing direct support, mainly with their machine guns, but with their main armament filling-in gaps in the fire plan. Also with their second generation night sights they could tell us what was happening to our front.
Lastly, I needed one Company to carry out two phases. As I was still under the illusion of Chris Keeble’s description of Goose Green in that D Company had hardly taken part, I thought D Company needed to ‘win its spurs’. So I designated D Company for Phase One and Phase Four.
It was after I had given out orders, but before we were due to move out that the mail arrived. One really can do without being reminded of home at that particular time and my heart dropped as soldiers answered the mail call. I had one letter. It was from my daughter, Caroline, and it was all about how the dog had chewed the spout of the watering can complete with sketches of the deformed watering can.
At eight that evening we moved out.
By a little before mid-night we were in position. I was on a knoll from where Tony Rice and I could see the objectives and we were checking the artillery targets when over the radio, which was being carried by Corporal Cooper, came the message. “Hello Nine this is Zero we have something here you ought to see”. They were insistent. Corporal Cooper and I walked back to Main HQ. It proved to be a captured Argentinean map showing a minefield right across our main axis of attack.
We walked back to my Tac HQ. It was too late to do anything about it if we were to capture all our objectives that night. It is funny the things that go through one’s mind. I remembered clearly my statistics professor at Shrivenham saying that the statistical chances of stepping on a mine in a minefield was low. In the event two companies and my Tac HQ went through the minefield and nobody stepped on a mine. When I went back to Shrivenham to teach, I told my statistics professor I had tried it and he was right. He was appalled. Twenty years later I visited the Falklands and the minefield was still there.
This cameo story also illustrates something else more serious. I knew men would die that night and others maimed; as could I. If we were to lose a few more men on a minefield so be it, just as long as we captured our objectives. Within reason men’s lives ceased to be important and, as a commander, if casualties are your paramount concern then you are in the wrong profession.
I got back to my Tac HQ. John Crosland was there. “We’ve got a minefield out there”, I said. We looked at each other and shrugged. He went back to command his Company. I turned to Tony Rice and asked for ‘rate six’, which was six rounds a minute from each of the twelve guns that were supporting us.
For the record Tony Rice now ran the biggest fire plan in the British Army since the Korean War. Also, due to the weight of Argentinian fire on Longdon our targets where not registered until after dark. Tony and Willy McCracken, the Naval Gunfire Support Officer on Longdon, did a remarkable job in reregistering the targets in a shoot by coordinating HE rounds with illuminating rounds. Also, for the record, 800 shells were fired into A and B Company’s objective.
We crossed the Start Line at quarter past midnight. It was our third night without sleep, we had not seen a ration pack for 72 hours and we fought all night in blinding snow flurries.
D Company stared their attack, and from then on it went like clockwork. At one stage Julian Field, who had the radio that could ‘talk’ to the light tanks, became very excited as one of the tank commanders was injured and he asked if he could take over the tank. I said yes, but he was only a tank commander and, and though senior to him, he was subordinate to Robin Innes Ker who was still the Troop Commander. However, it gave me a problem of how to communicate with the tanks. At one time during the night I climbed onto a tank and banged on the hatch. I felt very exposed, particularly as the tank commander was not happy with having to open his hatch!
There was also another time during the night when, as Tac HQ was moving forward to A and B Companies, we picked-up boxes of 7.62mm link ammunition and took them up to the Machine Guns.
At one point Hector Gullan, the LO from 3Cdo Bde, turned to me and said, “David you are really enjoying this”. I was, everything was going to plan.
The night battle field is a spectacular sight. You see few men, just the occasional dark shadow darting to the next piece of cover. The flares burst overhead and swing down through the clouds reflecting an eerie light. The lines and lines of red traced and the occasional streak of flame as an anti-tank missile is fired and all the time the high explosive of the artillery, some of it in-coming and bursting above us and others throwing-up huge clods of peat as they exploded in the ground. And the noise………
Also I remember the sound overhead of our helicopters in remarkable feats of flying, flying-in resupply and casualties out.
At one point in the night a body of people were seen coming into our left flank. We laid the guns on them when John Crosland, who himself had been in the SAS, suggested that they were the SAS. He was right. Later I was told they had been trying to blow-up the oil tanks in Port Stanley. Why blow-up the oil tanks so close to victory – surely we would need the oil! In the event the SAS were blown out of the water and looking to us for help. This was vetoed by Julian Thompson.
[Cedric Delves in his book on the SAS in the Falklands claimed this was a diversionary attack to help us. First I had heard of it!!].
By first light we had captured all our objectives and D Company was counter attacked twice. The only time in the Campaign the Argentineans counter attacked. I joined Phil Neame on the final objective. We could see Port Stanley – the prize.
Suddenly out of the Moody Brook valley below us and off the mountains opposite us came what looked like back ants on the move as the Argentinean Army collapsed and, head down, dejected, defeated, they were headed for Port Stanley.
We were in seventh heaven - the adrenaline was flowing. The tanks and Machine Guns were firing into the valley, as were the Mortars. Tony Rice was controlling a Regimental fire mission – all three batteries. We were tearing-up the valley with high explosive and machine gun fire.
At one point Scout helicopters arrived and fired SS11 missiles into the valley, but I ordered them away as they were attracting too much Argentinean fire onto us.
Then something inside me said STOP, you are slaughtering these people for no good purpose. (There is a moral dimension in war). I ordered a ceasefire. This was some seven hours before the official ceasefire.
My next thought was we must get into Port Stanley before the Argentineans have time to reorganise. (I knew there was a big attack planned for that night that would involve fighting amongst the house, which could be costly in lives, including civilian lives). However, the radio link was not good and I was getting stupid messages relayed like, “How many Argentineans can you see?”
Eventually I got fed up. I had already ordered A and B Companies to close-up onto the final ridge. I now ordered B Company to go down through Moody Brook and up on to the high ground the other side of the valley, A Company to move down the road and into Port Stanley and D Company to follow-up. The tanks and Machine Gun Platoon to stay on the ridge prepared to give covering fire across the valley.
B Company had just started to move. I was standing out on the forward slope feeling pretty pleased with life when a helicopter landed behind the ridge. Julian Thompson, no doubt frustrated by the lack of radio communications, had come to look for himself. He crawled-up behind the ridge, saw me standing in the open and obviously thought, “My God I have already lost one CO of 2 Para”. He rushed out and rugger tackled me. As we got up I said, “It’s all right Brigadier it’s all over we need to get into Port Stanley”. He then saw for himself and probably seeing that B Company was already half way down to Moody Brook; agreed.
We walked off the ridge together and onto the road into Port Stanley. We were behind A Company and we walked some way together before he peeled off to join his Tac HQ. I then started to get orders to stop. “Stop on the 93 Easting”. “Anyone see the 93 Easting on the map?” I said. “Oh dear we have passed it”. We continued on into Port Stanley. No shots were fired by either side. My reasoning for a ceasefire was not only that it was morally correct, but I believed the Argentineans to have had enough and if we fired on them there was a danger that they would fire back and then we would be back into a firefight.
“Stop now”. Again I was being ordered to stop. I told Corporal Cooper to turn his radio off. I then got the order to stop over the Gunner net, which I ignored. I did eventually stop on the tactically sound position of the Old War Memorial. Also it was in line with Government House where General Menendez was. It would have made negotiating a surrender more difficult if we had overrun Government House. We had gone far enough.
We had 11 soldiers wounded and sadly lost Colour Sergeant Findlay from A Company and Privates Parr and Slough from D Company. We captured 37 Argentinians and their casualties are unknown.
Wireless Ridge is described by others as a classic All Arms attack – a coordinated infantry, artillery and armoured attack. Yes, we had the experience of Goose Green, but the two main relevant lessons were the paucity of fire support and the failure to coordinate it; and the lack of resupply and casualty evacuation. Fire support I have dealt with. However, I had the Echelons scoured to find enough soldiers under WO II Glynn Grace to carry ammunition forward on stretchers and casualties back. (They did not wear red cross armbands)!
In particular Wireless Ridge was the only time the CVR(T)s were used in an attack. (The Scots Guards used them in a diversionary role).
Were the actual plan of attack was concerned we have carried out ‘Wireless Ridges’ in training all over the World. In particular I remember, when I was in 3 Para, they monthly exercised in the Trucial States (now the Emirates). Every exercise ended with a long night approach march round the flank of the ‘enemy’ and a dawn attack. That is exactly what we did, except we attacked just after mid-night as we needed darkness to capture all our objectives.
So there is nothing special about the planning for Wireless Ridge. It’s what we had trained for and it worked. But more to the point we had the soldiers to make it work.
The Falklands Battle that most impressed me was Tumbledown.. I have walked all over it, and stood in both the British and Argentinian positions.
It is completely bare.. no cover anywhere and the attack is completely uphill. The defenders were operating from good positions, were well equipped with FAL, M2HBs and 105 recoilless M40s.. they were also regulars, not conscripts! There was stuff lying about all over the place.. plenty of ammunition and food.. there was a completed field kitchen at the north eastern end of the ridge, complete with a "goulash cannon" stove...
It should have been a bloodbath.. how the guards took that objective I will never know.. if anyone had suggested that such tactics would work at Staff College, they would have been laughed out of court..
Amazing what grit and determination and trained, experienced troops can do!