I just ordered a copy.
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I just ordered a copy.
Published on Dec 26, 2012
Quote:
Recorded at The Western Front Association's East Coast (USA) Spring 2012 World War I History Symposium, Saturday May 12 held at York County Heritage Trust, York , PA.
Mitchell Yockelson is an archivist at the US National Archives and an instructor at the US Naval Academy. His presentation to WFA East Coast is based on his book 'Borrowed Soldiers' which tells the story of the American 27th and 30th Divisions which fought under British command on the Western Front in 1918.
Borrowed Soldiers by Mitchell Yockelson - YouTube
Extracted review from a larger set of reviews contained within the PDF file attached.
Regards,
Doug
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Borrowed Soldiers: Americans under British Command, 1918.
By Mitchell A. Yockelson. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2008.
256 pages. $29.95.
Reviewed by Dr. Douglas V. Johnson II (LTC, USA Ret.), Research Professor, Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College.
Having read an earlier version of this book in draft and reacting with enough reservations to expect the author to be an enemy for life, this reviewer now has to say that Mitchell Yockelson has provided a highly competent piece of work that belongs in every World War I historian’s library. It has a place as well in the libraries of those who, not too many years ago, were shouting that Americans never have and never will serve under the command of foreigners.
Yockelson’s conclusions are an appropriate, well balanced, and supported critique of comparative inadequacies in the operations and sustainment of purely American forces operating under purely American command. As John Eisenhower notes in the Foreword, American soldiers serving in the 27th and 30th Divisions were routinely better fed than their counterparts in the American Expeditionary Forces serving in the 1st American Army, but they were not without their complaints. Americans are coffee drinkers; Englishmen drink tea. Englishmen eat light breakfasts; Americans prefer ham, eggs, toast, etc. and if you look at the typical menu for American soldiers, you have to wonder where breakfast and lunch divide. This culinary cultural difference was an enormous irritant to the Americans serving with the British forces, but, as Yockelson points out, one that was overcome.
The undercurrent in this book returns in various forms to the a historical posturing noted above, which forms the title — Borrowed Soldiers. When the United States entered the war, both the French and British made strong appeals for US manpower to be integrated into their armies. Americans are seriously touchy on such matters, and the French were quick to sense that the American government and people were simply not going to allow foreign command and quickly changed their approach. The British were not so perceptive. After all, weren’t “we” all of Anglo Saxon origin? As Stephen L. Harris makes abundantly clear in Duffy’s War: Fr. Francis Duffy, Wild Bill Donovan,and the Irish Fighting 69th in World War I, “we” were anything but, and Irish Americans were seriously ambivalent about fighting with the hated British under any circumstances. As the war ground on through the remainder of 1917, both the British and French returned to the entirely logical argument that the American Expeditionary Forces lacked the experience, in their hugely expanded structure and particularly in their greatly increased staffs, to manage effectively. But General Pershing had a man date from President Wilson and Secretary of War Baker to create a uniquely American Army. There were political reasons beneath the mandate, but Pershing was not about to deviate substantially from it and only reluctantly permitted these two divisions to remain under British command.
It was refreshing to read Charles Messenger’s abridged version of Field Marshal Paul von Hindenburg’s The Great War in which the old Field Marshal noted that the prewar Americans could become a problem, that Europe’s diplomats erred by allowing them to become a potential problem, and finally that matters should have been brought to a conclusion before the Americans arrived, as they had indeed become a problem. Yockelson relates that Field Marshal Haig wished he had more US forces and was privately bitter when Pershing reclaimed the divisions then training with the British, excepting the 27th and 30th.
All of this is relatively good reading, but when the narrative begins to describe the actual conduct of operations, many of the same ills that bedevilled American forces in WWI emerge with depressing familiarity. Training, even under British supervision with all the accumulated expertise of years of trench warfare, cannot “take” in a short time. Offensive operations, which the Allied armies were obliged to undertake, required extensive coordination of all arms, excellent small unit leadership, and ingrained initiative and imagination. Pershing condemned the British and French instruction in trench warfare tactics because he felt it sapped the initiative of Americans, especially the officers. It is an unhappy fact that many American unit histories of this period re port initial successes in combat followed shortly thereafter by sharp withdrawals. The 27th and 30th Divisions’ baptism under fire was not any more successful, as chaos was combined with a very able enemy that had just stymied the advances of some rather good British units. In the end, however, the American divisions improved markedly.
In addition to exceptionally thorough research of a number of primary sources, abetted by the fact Yockelson works at the National Archives, one of the more delightful aspects of this book is the maps. The supporting maps are clean of clutter and clearly depict the essentials of ground, boundaries, and unit organizations. The photography collection is likewise a well chosen set of illustrative shots. Buy and read Borrowed Soldiers, or at least read it.
Re: US WW1 troops with SMLEs:
Remember that the Brits used a large quantity of type 30 and 38 Arisakas in a training role. The RN also had a few. I doubt that many ever got close to the two-way rifle range. The bayonet for the type 30 was the direct inspiration for the change from the P-03 (a re-hashed P-88) to the P-07, complete with Japanese-styled hooked Quillon.
Likewise, Arisakas acquired by the Russians during the short Russo-Japanese war were supplemented by additional stocks after the two countries "made up". Most are reputed to have been in the hands of garrison troops and training establishments.
However, they were seen in combat in the "Winter Games" between the Soviets and the Finns.
Russian designer Federov rightly thought the 6.5 x 50 was a MUCH more suitable cartridge for his "Avtomat" than the hefty 7.62 x 54. His design, in several variants, and of which only a few thousand were made, stayed around in the Soviet system until 1945. So, either the Russians tooled up to make the ammo, or there was quite a bit left over from their early acquisition and use of the Japanese cartridge.
Video here: Fedorov Avtomat All Variants Prototypes - YouTube
Has anyone seen an Arisaka with any (genuine) sign of Russian "ownership"?
Many thanks for this post and all contributions to it. Very informative.
I cannot remember the markings on all the Arisakas I saw on my first trip to Estonia a few years ago but did wonder why there were so many Japanese rifles there. It was only later that I discovered that most of them had been supplied to 'White' Russian forces by the British in 1919. A few years ago a got some 6.5 x 55 Swedish Mauser ammunition from Weller and Dufty. However some of it did not look right. I was to discover that the paper wrappings were Finnish, and the headstamps were a mixture of Japanese and British. It had been swept up as the Finns cleared their stores in 1955? and sold off as surplus.
Some more info here:
http://dmna.ny.gov/historic/reghist/...InfDivMain.htm