I have a 1903 Springfield built by Remington in 1943. I understand that there weren't enough Garands to issue to all infantrymen at the beginning of WWII, but why were they still manufacturing '03s so late in the war?
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I have a 1903 Springfield built by Remington in 1943. I understand that there weren't enough Garands to issue to all infantrymen at the beginning of WWII, but why were they still manufacturing '03s so late in the war?
The last M1903A3s were manufactured about February, 1944 and some M1903A4s as late as mid-1944. Obviously parts production continued at least through early 1945. While M1903/A3s were not being used by many infantrymen (except as grenade launchers and a couple of other specialized tasks) there was still enough specialized demand for them, if nothing else, by support units.
However, the Army wasted no time in "obsoleting" them once WWII was over, especially the M1903s.
WWII procurement is a complex subject. The starting point is the Army Supply Program, an attempt at developing an overall procurement plan. Started in Apr 42, seven reports were generated by Oct 44 - or roughly one every six months. Requirements were constantly changing as conditions changed and data from the field was gathered.
Every procurement program starts with assessing requirements: how many of what item do you need and when do you need it. The army first determined the size and composition of the force, then how each type of unit would be equipped, then the schedule for unit activation. After all that, estimated attrition rates and needs for the other services and Lend Lease requirements had to be included. Only then could production be scheduled.
I have a copy of the first ASP report from Apr 42 and was surprised to see a total requirement for 4.8 million '03s with 3.5 million of that total for Lend Lease (and other foreign aid) and none for the navy. Not sure what country that massive number of '03s was intended for unless it was China, but it's a minor point since this first ASP was quickly set aside as U.S. production capacity could not possibly meet the astronomical demands it calculated. It did serve as a starting point, however, in allocating resources. As they say, the first step in solving a problem is in defining it. Gotta get your arms around the question first.
My guess is that the Aug 43 edition of the ASP would show you what the current state of affairs was when plans were being finalized for production of your rifle. If you'd like to request that report from NARA, PM me and I'll send you the file location (NARA troopies seem to respond quicker when they can go right to a document - has to help their beancount). Depending on their mood, the report will cost you either $0 or $20 (the latter being their stated minimum charge - often waived for small orders).
An example of changing requirements is seen in the Army Service Forces Annual Report for 1943 (FY43, not calendar, I believe). It mentions changing T/O&Es in '43 to equip 25% of service forces EMs with '03s - astoundingly for AA use. That would serve to increase demand, presumably while L/L demand was falling. I have a few 1942 T/O&Es for service units - it's a mixed bag - some already have approx 25% '03s and others have approx 100% carbines. In one or two cases where I have both a '42 and a later T/O&E for the same unit type, they show no '03s in the early version and 25% '03s in the later one, seemingly consistent with the ASF annual report's description.
Wartime demands did change - as I recall, the original plan was for something like 216 divisions and something like 35-40 armored divisions. Only 91 divisions were raised, IIRC.
One thing I forgot to mention in my post is the power of "inertia" - sometimes, it look awhile to slow down the production of a certain item. I think that was true of M1903s.
Fairly certain the 03's ended up in Basic Training posts. The US Navy got a pile of Remington M1903's early on. But a buddy of mine was a SeaBee and he carried an M1 Carbine. I think the Army was disposing of M1917's even before the war ended in 1945. By the end of the war there excess everything in the inventory.
As I recall, M1917s were declared surplus in Nov., 1944 - I think the M1903s shortly before or after the end of the war. M1903A3s were still being overhauled at Springfield after WWII.
By the time 03A3 production began, the army's troop basis had been reduced to 100 divisions - fairly close to the number at war's end. Personnel strength fell in about the same proportion, though service units total strength actually went up by about 500k as the army learned it took a lot more support than expected. Still, army service unit EMs only totaled 1.5 million in 1945.
The navy officially said they got 330k '03s (of all types) through the procurement process - though this figure likely did not include in-theater requisitions (which probably wouldn't have accounted for a huge number). This navy figure excluded USMC rifles. Since the USMC had 50k Springfields in 1941, it's unlikely they got a huge additional quantity.
That's the procurement side. On the distribution side, all I can offer is in Jan 45, the ETO reported about 270k '03s (all types except 03A4) which included almost 40k in the hands of French forces. ETO had about 60% of the army's overseas forces, so 400k would probably be a decent estimate of '03s overseas with army forces.
In 1945, ETO and MTO used an estimated attrition rate of 2% per month for '03s. The SW Pacific used an 8% monthly rate and even the ZI (stateside) used 0.5%. Not huge quantities, but losses do whittle away at total supply. Reserve stocks really eat into supply. The Pacific used 90 days of reserves for a good part of the war. So, at the SWP's 8% per month attrition rate, a 90 day supply would mean a reserve of 24% of numbers in the hands of troops would be required.
Though the picture is far from complete, I'm becoming suspicious that the army might have disposed of its '03s overseas after the war ended and shipped none home (except those with ETO/MTO troops redeploying to the Pacific).
I read one statement that many of the USMC M1903s were handed over to the Navy, when M1s were issued in large quantity.
In March this year a bunch of M1903 A3s surfaced here in Germany. I wasted no time in buying one. Looks brand new and was made in Sep 43 by Remington. I thought it was a bit strange to make rifles and not use them, but weapons procurement is a strange business and I'm not complaining about my "new" Springfield.
As a point of reference, at the beginning of 1944, my late father qualified as a Sharpshooter with the M1 Garand, top in his training company, at Great Lakes Naval Induction Center.
Bob
I recall reading a few years back that P. Berretta had a large inventory of M1903's in storage. They had no idea what to do with them. FN had/has some USGI parts in their warehouses dating for post-WWII when the US Army selected them to rebuild small arms in Europe. Does anybody know what the Germans did with all of their Garands? Lots of equipment has seemingly vanished. Hard to explain, for sure. There is still a fair amount of equipment stashed in secret/hidden dumps around Europe. The US Army will not discuss them.
Which dealer sold those guns? I assume you're not referring to those rifles by Janssen, are you?Quote:
Originally Posted by Ex Crab
In Greece there are still a lot of spare parts. I even got a NOS M1903A4 bolt from there.
That's pretty Neat Georg!
Arms procurement during WWII is a very complex subject. But unfortunately a lot of very important details were lost along the way. I'll narrow this down to the USMC for reasons of making this easier to condense. What is important to remember, is the Marine Corp we know of today is not the same Marine Corps that existed in the 1930s and 1940s. During the Post WWI and Depression era timeframe, the United States went through an almost complete state of demobilizations and this showed drastically after Pearl Harbor. In the Pacific Theater, the USMC felt the brunt of it. Their state of affairs in the Pacific can be summed up into "foraging for pointing sticks and big rocks."
Let's first look how the complex increase in personnel from 1939 through 1945.
1939= 19,432
1940=28,345
1941=54,359
1942=142,613
1943=308,523
1944= 475,604
1945=474,680
The United States military (specifically the Marines) was NOT set up for this sort of increase as the Hollywood movies and many history books would like you to believe.
A report from the Quartermaster of the USMC dated 2/30/1941 stated they had 9,517 M1 Garands and 15,104 1903s on hand and serviceable.
Yes they had rifles in storage, but they weren't battle ready. The Marines didn't have funding for the upkeep during the Depression.
Another report from the QM stated that what the USMC had in storage and inventory the follow rifles between 9/30/1941 thru 1/15/1942 were 15,000 (M1 Garands) and 10,000 (1903s).
By 1/15/1942 as the Marines were preparing to leave for the Pacific and eventually the Canal, the QM stated they had 89,857 rifles on hand in the USMC which was a reduction due to calculated battlefield losses of 2,264.
Bureau Ordnance Report to USMC Ordnance stated a turnover of 31,500 1903 rifles These rifles were not combat ready 2/4/1942 and would need rebuild
11/21/1942 Bureau of Ordnance ,requesting a cut in Carbine,M-1s to the Navy 20% of monthly production, split with the USMC.
Ordnance Bureau requesting transferring 3000 Johnson rifles (YES 3,000 not 750) in lieu of Carbines to the USMC to cover loss of 3000 M-1 Carbines
In October of 1942 (the Canal campaign is raging at this point), Camp Elliott sends a urgent letter to Philadelphia, stating they are running out of rifles to issue to recruits that are about to be transferred to combat units in the Pacific. They state they are currently short 6,000 rifles for recruits at the post.
In mid 1942 the QM of the USMC sent a requisition of parts to Springfield Armory to continue rebuilding the M1903s and to make them serviceable. SA sent back the requisition crossing out EVERYTHING except for screws. The only thing SA could furnish to the Marines were screws. (If that doesn't explain the state of affairs for the Marines in the pacific. I don't know what does.)
This isn't even getting into the shortages of rifles to Army units in the Pacific. When you compare the numbers of Marines to available rifles for the Marines. We were dealing in VERY scary times.
All of these numbers are from my research which is obtained from documentation at the National Archives.
I typed an error. Could not figure out how to edit the post.
The QM Document from 2/30/1941 stated they had 42,500 rifles (both M1 Garands and M1903s) as the actual count in the hands of Marines. They had 9,517 M1 Garands and 15,104 M1903s in inventory stores.
Apologies on the typographical error on my part.
Great job, Smoke. I loves me some beancounts. To fully appreciate the WWII production miracle, it helps to understand the low ebb at the beginning. A couple of questions and additions to your good work:
1. Note that the dates for those yearly manpower numbers are as of end of fiscal year (not calendar year). No biggie.
2. Does the document really say Feb 30? I never knew the marines celebrated Double Leap Year (in the wrong year)! Could you check the date to make sure the info makes sense for late Feb 41.
3. Brophy's SA book is composed of the armory's annual reports - mostly lists of items made or rebuilt. They were getting out of the '03 rebuild business by end of FY42 (they resumed later in the war). So, it would not surprise me if they sent their '03 parts to other facilities so they could rearrange the furniture to increase Garand production. So, the USMC QM may have sent his requisition to the wrong place. Maybe he made a phone call next time.
4. Not being ready to adopt the Garand yet, the USMC received special approval to carry forward Garand budget money from FY40. Maybe if they had requested the funds be reassigned to '03 rehab, Congress would have allowed it - and they could have stocked up while SA was still making lots of '03 parts. Late in the war, with plenty of experience to base it on, for planning purposes, Army Ordnance used a 0.5% per month attrition rate for rifles and carbines - for STATESIDE units! This is for total losses; weapons needing repair might have been even higher. Training is hard on equipment.
5. The army had its problems too. As an example, the commander of the 94th Infantry Div wrote that when his unit was activated in Sep 42 "our rifles and carbines were issued...on a 25% and 20% basis."
6. In Jul 42, the army still had over 500k M1917s. Would be interesting to learn whether they didn't offer them to the USMC or if the latter turned their noses up at them.
7. It's hard for us milsurp people to accept, but small arms only made up about 2% of the War Dept's WWII procurement budget (plus another 2-1/2% for ammo). And those figures include .50 cal. for ground use and also include purchases for Lend Lease, USN, and USMC. All military leaders had plenty to worry about in '41-'42 - well before the large scale ground fighting began.
My favorite WWII shortage story comes from this period. At the height of the submarine menace in early '42, it was feared copper ore from South America would be cut off. Everyone here is familiar with the development of steel case .45ACP and carbine ammo (lots more brass was saved by also making some naval shells out of steel). To help head off a potential crisis, the park rangers at the Gettysburg battlefield park were ordered to prepare an estimate of the total weight of the park's bronze statuary and cannons in case it was needed later for ordnance use. That's pretty serious if Lee and Meade almost got drafted for WWII service. Fortunately, it didn't come to that. I no longer have the book I saw that tidbit in - or I could tell you the total weight they came up with.
There were plenty of other monuments and "trophy" cannon that got sacrificed. The battleship Oregon, which was a museum ship in Portland, OR, was sacrificed, for one.
firstflabn. thanks for your pointed reply. Let me reply to your questions individually.
1. The personnel numbers (by year) was merely used to establish trending over a set period of time. However, if you wish them by month, I can provide them through National Archive Monthly recruitment figures.
2. Document # KK/S79(278) was generated by the Navy Department, Bureau of Ordnance, Washington, D.C. referring to the request of the Quartermaster of the USMC File #215-12 of 10 Jan 1942 was dated 4 Feb 1942 and received by the Quartermaster of the USMC on 14 Feb 1942 with the Subject "Rifles, caliber .30 U.S. Model 1903" The specific date in Februrary was a typographical error on my part.
3. The requistion form was sent from the Quartermaster at the Philadelphia, PA Depot and the answer was returned from Springfield Armory on their letterhead specfically denying their request for parts (other than screws).
4. These documents acquired at the National Archives from 1942 concerning Ordnance Issues of the USMC paint a picture of their inability to procure the necessary firearms, except to empty all USMC installations (sometimes all but one rifle in some cases).
5. no comment
6. I have not come across any documentation confirming the transfer of M1917s to the USMC. The Army did share with the USMC on rare occasions but it was not an easy process. Case in point the M1 Garand enbloc shortage problem the USMC dealt with thru 1942.
"still manufacturing 03's so late in the war"
There is another consideration that hasn't been discussed. We know now that the war ended in August, 1945 but nobody knew about that in 1943, 1944, or even in 1945. The invasion of Japan was scheduled for Spring, 1946. Without the atom bomb, the war would probably have dragged on into 1947 or beyond.
The US Navy was told to bring back brass cases for re-use. The Navy always tossed brass overboard and they used large amounts of brass/copper. They used the brass in 1943/44 pennies.
1943 pennies were made of steel and zinc plated, there were a few copper cents struct.Quote:
Originally Posted by Calif-Steve
Good point, Art. The world certainly looks different through the other end of the telescope. Actually, though, the first phase of the invasion of Japan was scheduled for Nov 1 45.Quote:
Originally Posted by ArtPahl
Logistically there's a big difference between providing initial issues to troops and replacing losses later. The U.S. was nearly completely mobilized by 1944, so of course the all out procurement effort could begin to wind down. Additionally, there were 3 million small arms in the hands of troops in the ETO and another 600k or so in the MTO. Only 400k of those were slated for European occupation forces. Planners used 75% as an estimate on recoverable small arms. At worst, that's 2.4 million available for the Pacific (ignoring smaller areas like CBI). SA alone rebuilt 60k '03s and 124k Garands in FY45 - and that's before any weapons from Europe could have arrived.
By 1945 the '03 was slowly being replaced by the Garand in some service units' T/O&Es, so planners understood the big picture on availability coming with the completion of the 03A3 procurement program. Garand production averaged about 90k per month for the last six months of full production; carbines over 125k. No reason to believe those quantities were not sustainable. The '03's job was about done by the time the invasion of Japan was being planned.
To this already lengthy reply, I'll add my favorite quote on WWII procurement. It's from the Army Green Books and was made by MG Brehon B. Somervell, commander of Army Service Forces. He was appearing at a Senate committee hearing chaired by Harry Truman. Truman made his name nationally by doing what politicians do best - second guessing the actions of the doers. He was investigating waste in WWII military procurement.
If you've stuck with me this long, read Somervell's somewhat disgusted response and see if it warms the heart of a milsurp collector:
There are a lot of people, sir, who would like to have us fire the last cartridge at the last Jap after we have eaten the last K ration and after we have dropped the last bomb in the last emplacement.
We don't think we are going to be able to do that. Naturally, we are going to wind up with stocks.