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Please do not watch this achieve footage if you are easily upset because it does show the consequences of war, including brave Canadian and allied soldiers who made the ultimate sacrifice.
The Churchill? tanks marooned on the beech was just one of the many things that went wrong with this raid.
Canadian Raid On Dieppe Aka Dieppe Landings (1942) - YouTube
The Dieppe raid was a disaster. One of those bad decisions that often occur in wartime; and young men pay the price.
However it is possible that it made D-Day safer. Finding out how NOT to do something is often a part of the process in learning how to do it right!
"...The Churchill? tanks marooned on the BEACH..." Yep. Nobody bothered to go look at the beaches to see what the ground was like. Tanks and assorted wheeled vehicles really dislike loose rocks(shingle). Nobody thought they should go look either. That being one of the lessons learned from the Raid. The primary previous experience at amphib ops was at Gallipoli in W.W. I.
Knew a guy who was there. He walked off the beach with 8 bullet holes in him. One of which caused a compound leg fracture. Johnny, all 5 foot nothing of him, didn't know that until the MO on the ship asked him how he got off the beach.
"...The Dieppe raid was a disaster..." Not really. A great deal was learned about amphibious ops. It was also learned that attacking a fortified harbour was a bad idea. And that open boats make lousy landing craft.
Because the Raid was ill planned and canceled then re-upped by Mountbatten with no changes, the security was bad. Fortunately, the Germans had no idea what was going on.
My late Grandmother once said, to me, that the "Canadians" had a very rough time on the Dieppe raid.
I have heard it claimed, in a documentary, in recent years that the real reason for the Dieppe raid was to create a cover for "pinching" (stealing) the German Enigma code books. The claim went onto say that the large scale raid was in order to disguise the fact that the actual reason for the raid was to steal the code books. If the code books were to be taken they had to be taken in such a way that the Germans didn't realise they had been taken or the codes would be changed. However, it would seem that any attempt to obtain the Enigma codes, on this raid, were unsuccessful.
Although my Regiment knows all about failure they always drummed into you the follwoing on NCO course regardless were the 6 "P"s:
Proper Preparation Prevents **** Poor Performance.
There is always more to these failures then meets the eye, and it is only best listening to those who were actually there to learn the true lessons of Dieppe!
I'm currently reading Churchill's The Second World War in six volumes. It is June 1940, Britain is on its heels and back on their own island, and Churchill is setting the tone for prosecution of the war. He adopted a philosophy that struck me and made me think of the Dieppe raid in particular. Churchill feared Britain becoming militarily entrenched and wholly defensive so he directed that attacking forces be created to make spoiling raids on the outer crust of the German defenses of Europe in order to force THEM to be on the defensive. Attack, attack, attack, don't simply defend.
Right after this he became aware that a Canadian division had just been sent to Iceland and was troubled that such a fine division should be wasted off in garrison duty on a remote territory.
Could Dieppe have been intended as the first of his smash and grab raids to keep the Germans off balance and the results have sort of put the rest of the plans on the shelf?
Bob
I am still trudging through his books on his early life and WWI to match the six volume set on WWII (I have those as well) you have to partner them up with the Chester Wilmot book "The Struggle For Europe" (Have that) Then to really wrap it up get the 4 book set on The strategic air offensive Against Germany to see what Churchill did on that front I'll never get through my books but they are a good source if a question pops up and I've read it in one of my books.
The Dieppe raid taught the brits allot hence why they sent Subs to the coast with divers to get the low down on depths, gradients and sand/soil samples for the D-Day adventure, yes the Churchill tanks failed but they did on D-day as well the Shermans launched to far out and swamping thank goodness the Tigers were 200 Klm away and Hitler was asleep.
Anyway get this book I have on the air war on that day as without air superiority your going to be hard pressed to win the day the Allied fighter pilots gave the navy ships a wide berth on that raid as they were apt to fire on anything remotely resembling a plane rather than finding out if it was a friend or foe!
In the Dieppe raid there was another raid inside that one which was meant for a group to discover the Germans radar capabilities in a book called "Green Beach" By James Leasor its a very good read a one way mission for the radar expert.
His minder for the raid on that station at Dieppe had it looked like they were about to be captured then the minder was to kill the British radar expert from memory as I read the book a while ago I do not think the radar tech was privy to that part of the mission.
Anyway given you a few good reads to get on to.
Bob,
It was Operation Biting, the pre cursor to Dieppe, also known as the Bruneval Raid, which was a British Combined Operations raid on a German coastal radar installation at Bruneval in northern France, on the night of 27–28 February 1942.
It was masterminded, planned and well executed by Major John Frost who was later at Arnhem to lead from the front yet again to great aclaim.
C Company of the newly formed 2 PARA and an RAF Boffin called Flight Sergeant Cox parachuted into the location on top of the cliff, took apart the most important piece of the Wurzberg radar unit that the British needed to ensure theirs had the same effect against the waves of German Bombers that continually bombarded English Towns with such immunity.
Our radar system was very basic, and it was known the Germans had mastered short and long wave interceptions, clearly forecasting ALL our day and night time raids, and sending up interceptors to curtail Bomber Command and the USA's 8th Airforce attacks with a great deal of success.
It was this successful raid I believe, that gave Churchill his "head".
Against advice from Lord Mountbatten, Head of Combined Operations, Churchill issued orders to get the job done regardless.
I have read the actual orders of those two nights in February 1942 many times at our museum, as it was, the Parachute Regiments very first Battle Honour after formation during WW2.
This was really ideal for a Commando raid, but one has to assume a seaborne attack by landing craft could have been a lot harder to achieve with the cliffs before them, so a parachute drop was favoured by Major Johnny Frost which switched it to the newly formed Parachute Regiment.
They were successfully picked up as well by landing craft with the most valuable prize of prisoners and the Wurzberg radar controller.
I have more intelligence than to believe or indeed disbelieve everything that I see on television or the internet.Quote:
Originally Posted by Gil Boyd
However, the claim in the documentary was made, in part, by a former British commando who took part in the Dieppe raid and was part of the team, according to the claim, tasked with pinching the Enigma code books etc from Dieppe. At the time that the documentary was made, he was the sole surviving member of the commando team tasked with pinching the Enigma code books.. This commando team, it is claimed, attempted to land at Dieppe, several times, from HMS Locust because it had shallow draught and could get right in to Dieppe harbour.
The Dieppe Raid Canadian Military History
Breaking German codes real reason for 1942 Dieppe raid: historian - National | Globalnews.ca
The enigma of Dieppe – was the raid part of a bigger game of espionage? TheSpec.com
There then is the part ......................more to it than meets the eye!
The facts should have now been released now after 74 years since the end of WW2
I believe that the urgency for capturing the "Enigma material" occurred when the Kriegsmarine switched to the 4 rotor Enigma machine which messed everything up as far as breaking German naval codes were concerned.
"...Churchill's The Second World War..." Read that this past Fall. Totally different perspective of the war compared to other books. However, Dieppe had nothing to do with Winston. Our 2nd Div's involvement was more about the lads having been sitting around for 3 years doing little but train.
Dieppe was chosen because of its proximity to the RAF.
There was also a new German radar the boffins wanted to look at. "Green Beach" by James Leasor tells the story.
The RN had captured an Enigma machine and its books in May of 1941 off a U-Boat.
I think it was a U.S ship in fact who recovered the first Enigma machine? or have I got that wrong?
I think that it was the Royal Navy that got the enigma from a U boat; but Hollywood told the story using a US Navy boat!
Correctumundo:
The first capture of a naval Enigma machine with its cipher keys from a U-boat was made on 9 May 1941 by HMS Bulldog of Britain's Royal Navy, commanded by Captain Joe Baker-Cresswell. The U-boat was U-110. In 1942, the British seized U-559, capturing additional Enigma codebooks.
:madsmile: Sunray I mentioned as further reading material in the book by James Leasor Green beach in the Dieppe raid in post #7
When the Kriegsmarine started using the 4 rotor Enigma machine there was a period when Bletchley Park was not able to decipher German naval codes and, therefore, hence an urgent need to obtain a 4 rotor Enigma machine with the associated code books and paraphernalia. Why the Kriegsmarine felt the need to switch to a 4 rotor machine while the Luftwaffe and Wehrmacht continued to use 3 rotor Enigma machines I don't believe has ever been explained. The only reason for adding the 4th rotor to the Enigma machine can have been to provide greater encryption but why greater encryption was felt necessary if the Germans believed the code to be unbroken I do not know.
Probably a small thing called "Esprit de Corps".
They did think they were the kiddies, very arrogrant by all accounts and hailed as a greater hero then others in the two other services.................until the code breakers turned the tide on their little massacre using torpedoes against harmless Merchantmen supplying England.
I read about the Bruneval Raid when I was a child in the '70s. I had thought it was later in the war but it is good to get the date info now as an adult.Quote:
Originally Posted by Gil Boyd
Bob
Bob,
I think that one raid recovering the Wurzberg radar and the recovery of the Enigma decoder changed the tide significantly in WW2. Two raids that noone really knew about either at the time!
Can anyone remember the name of the 1950's black and white film which tells the story of capturing the Wurzberg radar, please?
If memory serves me correctly in this film when the British scientist, who is taken on the mission to advise, is asked for his name by a German sentry he replies with the slightly amusing line of "Ich habe mein name vergessen.", (I have forgotten my name.).
Here you go: The Bruneval Raid (TV Episode 1998) - IMDb
There was 'Red Beret', the movie about the birth of the Parachute Regiment that starred Alan Ladd that featured the Bruneval raid and the Operation Torch assaults.
There was a childrens' book club fiction/fact book, I think called The Radar Raid that told the story through the eyes of a French boy that helps the Commandos plan the raid. I can't find it these days.
Bob
I was referring to an early black and white film made not that long after the end of WW2.
Flying10uk, you have triggered memories from my teenage years when I first read about the Dieppe Raid. Around 1959/1960, I recall lots of 2/3 full page stories with photos in Sunday newspapers, one was definately about the Dieppe Raid, another was D Day, I remember with a photo of Bill Millin piping on the beach. Reading these newspaper stories started me reading many wartime stories throughout my teens and I'm pretty sure the Dieppe Raid was the first and it certainly brought home the true nature of war.
I first became aware of the Dieppe Raid when back in the mid to late 1970's, as a child, I pulled a copy of, Dieppe, The Shame and the Glory, off the bookshelf and started looking at it and then started asking other family members about it. At this time there wasn't any Enigma code connection made with the raid and indeed it wasn't so widely known that Britain had broken the Enigma code during WW2.
Dieppe: The shames and the glory: Amazon.co.uk: Terence Robertson: Books
Interesting how we get attracted to these books at a young age. I've just realised that the first war story I read was when I was 13, it was The Great escape, reading about the Dieppe Raid came later. I don't want to cause a change to this thread, so I'll keep this short. If you're still an avid reader, try Skis against The Atom by Knut Haukelid, unless you have already done so. I read this when I was 15, as my aunt was the girlfriend of one of the saboteurs.
All histories pertaining to WWII and written before 1977, have to be re-written, or at least re-examined, with Bletchley Park and Ultra in mind. Our whole view of the North African/Mediterranean campaign alone is completely changed by Ultra.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flying10uk
I've read that Dieppe book, courtesy of our public library when I was a kid, whiling away the time between classes immersed in history, especially WWII. I've also seen the documentary to which you refer. It's actually a Canadian production, one of a number made by that same group. It speculates that Ian Fleming, of 007 fame, was waiting offshore for the commandos to deliver to him the codebooks. Certainly intelligence-gathering teams would have been attached to this raid, as they were for all such operations, and they undoubtedly targeted the communications installation. That they were specifically after the Enigma materials I'm not so sure. The miracle of Bletchley was not just that they had broken the German secret (building on the prewar work of the Poles, brilliant mathematicians who started well ahead of us.) The real miracle is that they kept it all a secret from the Germans right through the war. The Germans never lost faith that their system was unbreakable. If they'd thought for one minute that we had broken it, they would have changed to something else, with disastrous results for us. No piece of Ultra material could be acted upon unless it could be reasonably attributed to another source, lest the enemy figured out what was going on. That was the whole reason we maintained a base on Malta, for example. The codebooks salvaged from U-559 were believed by the Germans to have gone down with the ship. If you take the same materials from a shore installation, their loss would be obvious and the jig would be up. Photograph them maybe, but they couldn't disappear. I think the documentary was a clever bit of Canadian story-telling, but flawed in its conclusions.
My understanding of the Commands intentions, had they been successful in obtaining the the Enigma code books/material from Dieppe, was that they planned to demolish the building/s with explosives once the material had been taken from that building/s. Once a building has been reduced to a pile of rubble it is very difficult to decide what is and what is not missing. Presumably if this had be done several buildings would have been demolished, not just the one containing the Enigma material?Quote:
Originally Posted by vykkagur
I don't think that the documentary was flawed in it's conclusions but I also don't think that the purpose of the Dieppe Raid was solely to capture Enigma related material.
Either way, definitely an interesting theory. A great read is the book "The Secret War", which was based on the BBC series of the same name. Chapters cover not only Enigma and radar, but the Battle of the Beams, Battle of the Atlantic, the air war, V-weapons, the Oslo letter, and a whole raft of miscellaneous topics. I read and re-read this book for years.
1st Ed H/C "Green Beach" By James Leasor from my collection for those interested on the inner workings afoot in the Dieppe Raid.
The student of cryptography in history will note that capturing the enemy's code books is only of use when he doesn't know you've captured them. Where this was the case in WWI for example, the advantage gained was significant.
If you swarm some locale and seize his code books, the first thing in his after-action report will be, "where are the code books?"
His next step is to change his codes, not merely in detail, but if he is prudent, in a much more sweeping way, for the obvious reason that if the code books are lost then enemy now understands your system from the inside out.
When that kind of change is made, the inevitable result is usually that all your previous work on his codes is more or less nullified and you're back to square one. Of course, once technology allowed the recording of intercepts for future decryption, as in the Venona intercepts, retroactive decryption became possible. But of course retroactive decryption is of limited value in war.:rolleyes:
The Ultra Secret was so highly valued and guarded that the very idea of storming ashore to steal an enigma machine or related materials would have been complete insanity. THE LAST thing our side wanted to do was ANYTHING which might make the Germans suspect their system was vulnerable or compromised. That is why great attempts were made to limit the distribution of material, and to disguise its source when it was distributed.
So the idea of a full scale raid like Dieppe as cover for a snatch & grab raid on an enigma facility makes no sense at all to me, unless you're a historian looking for another way to put lipstick on a planning pig called Operation Jubilee.
And after the war the secrecy maintained until Wing Commander Winterbotham's book came out allowed our side to sell used Enigma machines to many second and third world countries and read their mail too for many a year!
(IIRC the credit originally goes to the Polish and French soldiers and agents who secured examples of the machines and moved them from Poland to France, and then to Britain.)
Yes they could not let the enemy know exactly how much of their codes had been compromised hence there were a few lambs sent to the slaughter to keep the ruse going.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Surpmil
^^^ What he said. :thup:
The point that you and others have missed is that, at the time of the Dieppe Raid, the allies/Bletchley Park were unable to decode Kriegsmarine Enigma codes because the Kriegsmarine had switched to the 4 rotor Enigma machine. This meant that instead of having the normal 3 rotors, the Kriegsmarine, had started using Enigma machines with 4 rotors and therefore Bletchley Park were unable to read Kriegsmarine messages encoded with the 4 rotor Enigma machine. A 3 rotor Enigma machine can communicate with a 4 rotor Enigma machine if the 4 rotor machine is properly configured so that only 3 of it's 4 rotors are in use, when in communication with a 3 rotor machine. Bletchley Park needed the information on the 4 rotor Enigma machine that was being used by the Kriegsmarine at the time of the Dieppe raid so that it could read Kriegsmarine messages.Quote:
Originally Posted by Surpmil
The claim has been made that either the main purpose of the Dieppe raid was to steal the Enigma code material, specifically relating to the 4 rotor Enigma machine used by the Kriegsmarine, or that it was decided to "tack" this operation onto the main Dieppe raid.
Either way, I don't see that it is up to me or to anyone else using the Milserps forum, unless they were actually there, to either dismiss or to agree with/confirm the claim.
Personally, I can see the logic in hiding a "pinch raid" within a much bigger raid. As for the Germans noticing the Enigma material "missing", like I say, my understanding is that the intention of the Commandos was to demolish the building, holding the Enigma material, with explosives once the material was removed. I assume that more than one building would have been demolished for obvious reasons.
Yes, it would have been pretty dicey to to be unable to read the Kriegsmarine's codes for a while, and the greatest danger would have been them noticing that their losses had suddenly gone down dramatically.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flying10uk
As for whether Bletchley & Co could have worked out how a four rotor machine worked, since they had some earlier versions of the three rotor machine, and some very clever people, as well as sense of urgency, I suspect it wouldn't have taken them long, and probably didn't.
Maybe I'm more suspicious than the Abwehr was, LOL, but if I found out that 'one our code machines is missing', and the Allies had stormed the location and blown the place up afterwards, I would have had the surrounding 1000 yards combed on hands and knees for the pieces and if they didn't turn up...well I think the rest is...obvious!
The fact that a larger raid occurred just down the road wouldn't make a pin of difference, anymore than St. Paul's burning down would cover a break in at the Bank of England.
Though it would make a super movie I'm sure.:lol:
You are entitled to your opinion.Quote:
Originally Posted by Surpmil
The fact remains that Bletchley Park were unable to decipher coded messages sent by the Kriegsmarine using 4 rotor Enigma machines, over an unexpended period of many months, because they didn't have they necessary means/material to decipher them.
Indeed, we are all entitled to logical deduction should we wish to avail ourselves of it.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flying10uk
As for Dieppe, it was a sop to Stalin's angry demands for a Second Front, a way of cooling the Americans' now forgotten, but then burning ardour for charging across the Channel in 1942/3, and an amusing way to bruise up the Canadians who'd been kept sitting around in the UK for years, doing their basic training sometimes as many as three or four times in a row to "keep busy", and whose WWI successes they were emphatically not going to be given the opportunity to repeat in that war, particularly after a series of even more humiliating debacles than those of WWI to which any such successes might then be compared: Dunkirk, Singapore and the Western Desert (Greece and Crete we may leave to the political leadership)
It would be nice to think that the boffins at least could have figured out that beaches comprised of fist-sized stones will not play well with tank tracks, or that seawalls can be significant obstacles to tanks, or that local air superiority is well worth having in combined operations.
But maybe they really did need to "test" all that at the cost of thousand odd lives, I don't know. What do you think?
[QUOTE=Surpmil;465373Though it would make a super movie I'm sure.:lol:[/QUOTE]
But only if it starred a major American actor (Pitt/Clooney/some fuzzy-faced kid with broody eyes) who enlisted with the Canadians because he couldn't wait to get at 'em. Oh, and there has to be a female. Even in the Sahara, they had to come across a female. 'Cause there always has to be a female character, no matter what. Preferably kick-boxing large numbers of hapless German sentries. (Did anything ever have a shorter life expectancy than the German sentries in 60's WWII movies?)
I didn't personally take part in the Dieppe Raid, during WW2, myself nor was I present in Dieppe during the "Dieppe Raid" to witness events unfold.
I do know that certain claims have been made, in recent years, suggesting that during the Dieppe Raid an attempt was made to seize Enigma material, specifically relating to the 4 rotor Enigma machine. I do not consider it fit for me to either confirm or dismiss these claims because I was not there myself.
However, I do have the intelligence to understand Bletchley Park's need for the 4 rotor Enigma material at this time in the war because they were unable to decipher Kriegsmarine coded messages once they had been encrypted using the 4 rotor Enigma machine. Of course the Germans would have changed the codes if they had discovered or realised that Enigma material had gone missing during the "Dieppe Raid" and that is why the material would have been taken in such a way that the Germans wouldn't realise that material had gone missing. If the plan was to demolish the building that contained the Enigma material, once it had been seized, the obvious thing would have been to demolish a number of buildings. Physical items didn't necessarily needed to be taken from Dieppe for Bletchley Park to obtain the material and information that they needed. An obvious way to achieve this would be to use a camera.
I believe that I am correct in stating that one of the Churchill tanks did make it up the beach at Dieppe and onto the seafront road, proving that the Dieppe beach could support tanks but not very well. Perhaps if lighter tanks were used, than the Churchill tank, more would have made it up the beach?
I'll grant you, that's a perfectly plausible scenario: Photographing without removing, then demolishing the building(s) to explain why the books were not removed. Risky, but can't be discounted.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flying10uk
Actually, the majority of the Calgary Tanks' Churchills made it off the beach and onto the seafront, 15 of the 29 landed. They were unable to penetrate into the town. The Churchill was heavily armoured and had excellent climbing ability, but always suffered from having too small a gun, being designed to the obsolete "infantry tank" specification. When they tried to exit the esplanade, they found all the streets blocked by heavy concrete structures that they couldn't demolish with their small guns. The planners had intended the sea wall and the concrete barriers to be demolished by charges placed by sappers on foot and without protection. Of course, they were unable to accomplish their objectives, most of them being slaughtered by the wall of machine gun fire and light artillery.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flying10uk
The operation was designed to test the feasibility of capturing a port, intact, from which to supply the landed forces. (There were a number of secondary objectives, such as drawing the Luftwaffe into a major engagement, and testing new equipment.) Dieppe proved conclusively that it was not feasible. This was to lead directly to the design of the portable harbours, the Mulberries, and things like PLUTO, pipeline under the ocean, so the advance could be supplied over the beaches. The fate of the sappers prompted the birth of Hobart's Funnies, that whole series of armoured engineering vehicles designed to cross soft ground, overcome obstacles like ditches and walls, and demolish concrete emplacements under fire. Fittingly, they chose the Churchill (because it was heavily armoured and had excellent climbing ability....)
The lesson learned at Dieppe, and the ingenuity of the solutions, was demonstrated on D-day - both ways. The British and the Canadians used the Funnies extensively and effectively during the invasion, and after. The Americans were offered them; Eisenhower was enthusiastic, but the commander of American forces, Bradley, regarded them as a joke and used only the swimming tanks on the day. They wasted them by dumping them in heavy seas miles offshore and almost none reached land. The Americans landed on their beaches with engineers, on foot, assigned to blow obstacles. On Utah they lucked out, missed the beach by four miles, and landed in an open area with no heavy fortifications, advancing quickly inland. On Omaha, they landed on a heavily-defended and fortified area with major concrete emplacements blocking the exit from the beach. The engineers were decimated, as were countless men who were then trapped in the killzone for hours. Deja view all over again.... They eventually got off the beach by blood and sheer bravery alone. The thousands of American dead and wounded on Omaha have much for which to thank Omar Bradley.
I probably should have mentioned about getting a Canadian started on talking about Dieppe. We take it right serious 'round these parts! It's like talking to Newfoundlanders about Beaumont Hamel in the First War.
According to the claim in the documentary it was British Commandos who were tasked with attempting to "seize" the Enigma material during the Dieppe Raid and a number of attempts, according to the claim, were made to put the Commandos ashore in Dieppe harbour from HMS Locust.
I am neither going to confirm or dismiss the claim, that an attempt was made to "seize" Enigma material during the Dieppe Raid, because I wasn't there but I can see how it could have been done and I can see how it could have fitted in neatly with the main Dieppe Raid.
As my late Grandmother put it "the "Canadians" had a rough time at Dieppe" but so too did all those at Dieppe from all nations present during the battle.
Very true indeed.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flying10uk
The lessons supposedly learned at Dieppe could just as easily have been learned by experiments and exercises on UK beaches. What the Armies had for experiments and research in combined operations I don't know, but the Admiralty had a thriving Department of Miscellaneous Weapon Development, headed by a Canadian as a matter of fact: Cmdr. Goodeve. They came up with weapons like the Hedgehog.
As in WWI where the Navy with Churchill as 1st Lord, pioneered the tank regardless of the Army's lack of interest, so in WWII. For example, Goodeve & Co. got to Churchill through his daughter and once WSC saw a demonstration of Hedgehog, he got on the phone to Dudley Pound and suddenly the Admiralty was all in, despite their previous lack of interest and the obstruction of the Directorate of Naval Ordnance.
But in 1942 what was needed was a good flop to show Stalin and the Americans it wasn't as easy as they thought and to get them both to back off.
Now, they say we should not ascribe to malfeasance what can be explained by mere stupidity, and we saw enough of that in both wars, but the curious violations of security and numerous other odd oversights lead me to suspect that "disaster" was a prospect not viewed with, shall we say, any great concern in the highest quarters.
This was total war, a game played for high stakes and sacrifices must be made, sometimes large ones.
The only rub comes in who is asked to make them, and whether they are truly necessary or merely convenient?
And as for the Ultra aspect, the only possible course that would have made sense was to quickly examine and photograph a machine, ensuring there were no German or French witnesses who might notice any interest, and then to leave it strictly as found, as though it had been overlooked completely or was unrecognized.
Of course, to send a group of commandos to attack such a facility as a special sub-raid would immediately indicate what their objective in such an attack was, unless some other piece of technology such as a radar installation was in the same immediate area and could be made to look like the real target.
The supposed commando "snatch" raid on the local Kriegsmarine HQ would have been completely obvious to the Germans as having a specific target, and blowing up some rooms or buildings would immediately raise the question of why they were specially targeted and what was being hidden by the demolitions, to say nothing of whether the wrecked machine was found in the debris or not.
Consider: we have a sudden drop in Uboat sinkings when the fourth rotor is introduced - that perhaps could be hidden by other countermeasures and increased efforts to sink Uboats and so make up the difference, but a specific raid targeting an Enigma facility would be very liable to blow the cover of the greatest intelligence coup in history. Fleming may have written good stories, but would anyone have been allowed to gamble with THE WHOLE Ultra Secret in 1942? Nonsense IMHO. Easy to leave a few bits of paper around in the archives later for someone to find though. Heaven knows, enough paper has been taken out of archives without any one much noticing!
One has to remember that a year earlier Crete was allowed to fall rather than tell Freyberg that we had ironclad "Ultra" intelligence of German plans and positions. He was told the information was from an agent in the German HQ in Greece IIRC, and he chose to disregard it as a result.
Lastly, it was only thanks to Churchill bucking the Army "club" that Hobart was brought back from the Chipping Camden Home Guard where he was serving as a corporal. He then trained IIRC the 11th Armoured Division - as he had trained the 7th in Egypt in 1939-40. However, the old boys club wasn't done with him yet, and found every possible excuse to prevent him from actually taking the Division to North Africa and getting a chance to prove himself and his ideas in combat. So he ended up with the 79th Armd. Div. and the "funnies". That much he was allowed to do, with Churchill's help.
That sort of petty vendetta was more important to the Club than the war itself, to say nothing of the lives of their subordinates. They had seen what the Germans had done, but since they weren't competent to do it themselves, they damned well weren't going to let anyone else, least of all 'one of those damn tank fanatics' they'd been squabbling with and obstructing ever since WWI.
If the claim is true whatever action was necessary would have been taken, I am sure, to ensure that the Germans were not aware that Enigma material had been seized at Dieppe, even if that meant not using the seized material for a period of time. In the event the commandos didn't manage to seize Enigma material at Dieppe.
I am neither going to dismiss nor confirm the claim that an attempt was made to seize Enigma material at Dieppe,because I wasn't there, but I can see how it could have been done in a way not obvious to the Germans.
I would offer that this is not true. While military training exercises try to replicate what will be done and what will happen when the 'real thing' comes, it can not and does not contain those unexpected events that occur in real warfare. One only needs to look at the Tarawa landings or even D-day examples.Quote:
Originally Posted by Surpmil
As for your contention that Dieppe was intentioned to fail for political reasons, I would offer in reply that the entire operation was an on again, off again, and on again affair in which operation security was thrown to the winds. One can not plan an operation of that scale, brief the decision makers and commanders, and then leave it to be executed virtually unchanged at a later date without 'word getting around'.
One has to remember that certain things that happened during WW2 are still covered by the UK Official Secrets Act and those most sensitive matters will be under a 100 year classification. In theory there should be some very, very interesting material released into the public domain in 20 to 25 years time. How much material material "mysteriously gets lost" before it is released remains to be seen. I would imagine that not all material currently covered by the Official Secrets Act will be released even after 100 years if it is felt to be too embarrassing or damaging to the UK's national interests.
Was there ever a training exercise that could reveal "those unexpected events that occur in real warfare"? Training is not "real warfare".Quote:
Originally Posted by Paul S.
Tarawa was another piece of carelessness wasn't it? Why weren't the reefs detected and provided for in planning? It's not like air photos couldn't have been taken and studied. Probably they were, but unwelcome news is often ignored once egos and careers get involved.
The "on again, off again" nature of Operation Jubilee was indeed one in which operational security was "thrown to the winds".
That's not normal procedure is it? Therefore, when it happens one has to ask "why?"
Going from memory, both Dieppe and Tarawa had practice exercises before the day. Again from memory, the Tarawa reefs were a known factor, but the tides and their effects weren't.
I remember reading somewhere during my studies that the aerial reconnaissance of Tarawa was so extensive that they knew almost to the man how large the Japanese garrison was by counting the number of Loos.
A book titled Green Beach by James Leasor contains some interesting perspectives on the raid.
Do tell us then.Quote:
Originally Posted by MSW2
Lots of info on the raid as a whole, but looking specifically at the background and then execution of one of the objectives. The then Radio Direction Finding, what the Brits had, what the Germans had, the importance to the outcome of the war. About a technical specialist / scientist that went on the raid whose objective was to get to a German radar installation and learn what he could and if possible bring equipment back.Quote:
Originally Posted by Flying10uk
In novel form but interesting nonetheless. I read it many years ago but will again in the next week or so. A good read for blokes like us on here that are interested in its subject matter.
see post #32 on this book.......like it stated if Mountbatten had known the directive on imminent capture of Nissenthall then he would have scrubbed that part of the raid and it would not have progressed he never knew that part of the agenda of the secret agenda........:dunno:Quote:
Originally Posted by MSW2
Whist we are on all this secret stuff here is another couple of books from my library shelves to get your teeth into both on WWII secret agendas, Beyond Top Secret U By Ewen Montagu and Most Secret War By R.V. Jones also the way I see it having collected and read the odd book on WWI - WWII and other guff over the last 50 years there is probably allot more that will never be released to the general public its just that simple as all we can do is try and put 2 + 2 to = 5
Reading more and posting less would have helped me here :)Quote:
Originally Posted by CINDERS
Thanks for the information on the other books.
One would assume that the most sensitive material would, in theory, be released after 100 years but in the real world you may be correct.Quote:
Originally Posted by CINDERS
To release the cat here ~ From somewhere in my mind I have come across some plausible info cannot state when/where many years ago but as we know the allies did eventually get hold of a 4 rotor Enigma they sent convoys out full well knowing the disposition of the enemy they did not send all of them towards the U-Boats but enough to deceive the Germans that their Kreigsmarine Enigma was not compromised. As had all of a sudden things gone quiet for the U-Boats then the games up and they may have designed a 5th rotor'ed one.
Now if this in fact did happen can you imagine the furor of relatives who found out that lives were sacrificed, I am in agreeance that some operational stuff should remain classified as things had to be done to overcome a tyranny that threatened our whole way of life on this rock.
"Things were done in the midnight sun no tongue will ever tell", and much closer to the opposite Pole as well.:D
It was Churchill after all who said that in war truth must be surrounded by a bodyguard of lies.
There are quite a few books around which give stories, some no doubt true or mostly true about "unorthodox" operations or events, or "inside" views of whole periods. For example:
"The Nazi Connection", F.W. Winterbotham
"The Secret Hunters" Anthony Kemp
"To Steal an Air Force", Michael O'Hagen
"Op. JB" Christopher Creighton
"The difference between truth and fiction is that fiction has to make sense". Tom Clancy.
One caveat here. The book No Queensbury Rules, about WE Fairbairn and EA Sykes' WWII SOE and OSS service quickly points out that the biggest problem the researchers encountered was the abundance of published, and widely accepted as fact, 'fabricated' histories of individuals' SOE/OSS experiences, training and operations, including Ian Flemings historical account of events. In fact, the editors repeated cautions that about the questionable validity of certain accounts that they included was annoying for me when I read the book.Quote:
Originally Posted by Surpmil
I should add that the researchers also point out that many (read most) of the SOE files were reportedly destroyed immediately after 'closing shop' after the war.
https://cqbpublications.com/products...combat-1940-42
I'm of the opinion that after 100 years it's time to let any remaining secrets into the public domain. We all have a fairly good idea of the sorts of things that may have been kept secret for 100 years but anyone directly involved will no-longer be around, so lets get it out in the open and make it part of history. All sorts of extremely unpleasant events can and do occur in war and war crimes can be committed by all sides in a conflict.
My father first experienced war, aged 6, at the end of April 1940 and 6 people died, 4 Germans and 2 British.
You're not wrong. Everyone who was in a position of authority on all sides in WWII has long since begun pushing up poppies. Get it out and tell the story.
SOE was a bit of a cowboy club like the OSS, some say. Also seems to have been full of marxists of various stripes, and aroused the violent resentment of other similar organizations IIRC, M16 in particular. That would be one reason for purging their files: so the organization could not be easily reconstituted if needed again; or politicians merely decided it was. Probably it also contained many very talented and original individuals well able to "think outside the box", but when peace is declared the "establishment" generally tries to put things back where they were before "the recent unpleasantness" so rudely interrupted routine! LOL. Hence for example the disappearance of the Machine Gun Corps and the near disappearance of the Royal Tank Corps after WWI. In the later case the senior officers of the Corps cleverly got the King to become Colonel-in-Chief which scotched the plans for outright abolition.Quote:
Originally Posted by Paul S.
Richard Meinertzhagen, not necessarily an entirely reliable witness one must admit, stated that before the war he was working on a plan with Lawrence and Churchill and perhaps a few others to somehow amalgamate British intelligence, and perhaps counter-intelligence services. He states in his memoirs IIRC that after Lawrence's death, he had to give up this plan. Now it so happens that some odd events surrounded Lawrence's death. Could there be a connection? Not likely we'll ever know.
There was no love lost between SIS and the SOE. That is a certainty.
My father (told me himself this family history) lost his brother on the docks during the blitz his brother and another worker were heading for cover when a bomb fell on them they found the other bloke but of my dads brother nothing it just atomized him.
My family was lucky. Everyone of my male relatives that were old enough served in the Army, Navy or Air Force during WWII. My godfather (RAF fighter pilot) and godmother (Army) both served as well. A number of my aunts worked in defence industries. One uncle had what would be called PTSD today. Some others had minor injuries, but we had no one lost during the war, thank heaven.
Somewhere I do still have some of the bomb splinters that were pulled out of one of the craters from one of the bombs that nearly killed my father and other family members in November 1940. I will eventually find them and posts some pictures of them when I do. But when you see them, it's easy to understand why such terrible injuries were cause to people by hot shrapnel, with razor sharp zagged edges, flying through the air, at high speed.