Originally Posted by
firstflabn
You had the glimmer of a couple of good questions there, but kinda spoiled it by leaping to a conclusion. It took two PhD historians who had served during the war 1700 pages in the Army's official logistics history to explain how the system worked.
How did you determine that 'millions and millions' of carbines and Garands produced by 1944 should have been enough?
To have a chance of drawing an accurate conclusion, you would need to know at a bare minimum: the total force size, how equipment was assigned, reserve requirements, loss rates, and reporting methods. On top of all that, some knowledge of lead times for production and distribution would be helpful.
As often attributed to Yogi Berra, "Predictions are hard; especially about the future." Logistics planning is dependent on predictions about the future, so Yogi would have been right at home.
I won't attempt to give you a lesson in the basics of WWII logistics, you'll have to do that yourself, but I'll give you some data from a 1944 OD planning document. A monthly report showing current stock status along with projected near term procurement and demand levels was created in mid-44. It was a way to help planners avoid overproducing one item while the need for others went unfilled. Classic Econ 101: efficient use of resources in the face of scarcity. Doesn't matter if their projections turned out to be right - it was their best guess at the moment using available info. These calculations were used to determine production quantities - for thousands of major items.
The earliest of these reports I have for the '03A3 (including '03 and 03A1) is dated 31 Aug 44. In the section titled 'Total Supply Less Total Demand' for the following month (in other words, 'how many over or under projected need do we have right now?) it shows 18,821 (enough, but just barely). I don't know what the status was six months earlier when '03A3 production was ended, but looks like they made a pretty accurate prediction. BTW, that same month showed carbine status as -196,300, a rather large deficit, unlike what you suggested.
As an example of how uncertainty is part of war, this Aug 44 report projects zero future need for this item for international aid (going out two years). A month later, the status report showed 200,000 would be required for international aid. So, in one month, requirements had increased from zero to 200,000. Are you beginning to see how much fun it was to be a planner in WWII and why reserve stocks were kept?
My guess is this sudden increase might relate to a decision to significantly expand the Chinese army, but it's just a guess based solely on timing. As our advance across the Pacific went faster than expected - plus giving up on building a large Chinese army as a logistical impossibility, this requirement for international aid soon dropped by about 75%.
One last point: this is an OD report. It tracks quantities in OD custody - in depots, not yet requisitioned by using units. Once shipped, OD was out of the picture (except for receiving returned items for repair and storage - at which point it would reappear in OD bean counts).
So, after all that, the answer to one of your questions is: the calculations factoring current stock, projected production, and projected issue demand shows your assumptions were wrong on 1944 supply status.
Your other question about how equipment is assigned is an important one, but I'm out of play time for today, but the anecdotes presented so far are misleading at best. Google 'WWII T/O&E' and report back with what your learn.