ANZAC Day

[KimW]

The Australian and New Zealand Army Corps - ANZAC - landed at ANZAC Cove on the Gallipoli peninsular at dawn on 25 April 1915. British and French troops landed elsewhere on the peninsular.

There were more than 100,000 Allied casualties at Gallipoli. Of this, Australia suffered 26,000 casualties including 8,709 fatalities and New Zealand 7,500 casualties including 2,721 fatalities (or one quarter of New Zealanders who landed at Gallipoli). In defence of their homeland it is estimated that the Turks suffered as many as 250,000 casualties including 87,000 dead.

For the SMLE Board, the NZ troops arrived equipped with Long Lees, soon replaced by battlefield pickups.

The commemoration of the landings is a National day in Australia and New Zealand. I attended the Dawn Service in Wanganui, a small town of 45 000. A very good turnout with many young people in attendance.

At the Going Down of the Sun, and in the Morning, We will remember Them.

Information

Warning: This is a relatively older thread This discussion is older than 360 days. Some information contained in it may no longer be current.

[RJW NZ]

The Wellington regiment attained the farthest highest ground of the campaign at Chanak Bair and in a night of battle only half a dozen men remained of the one thousand that started up the hill
Considering how small a town Wellington (now capitol city) was then to lose a thousand men overnight must have been shocking event. No one ever talks about it.

[beachbumbob]

Your friends stand in silent remembrance of those who gave their all for King and Country.

[pdh]

Thanks for your reminder of the sacrifices from our comrades down under. I will remember them in our next American Legion prayer service.I will also hoist a pint in their Honor.

[goo]

Gallipoli was one of the Allies great disasters in World War One. Gallipoli was the plan thought up by Winston Churchill to end the war early by creating a new war front that the Central Powers could not cope with.

On November 25th 1914, Winston Churchill suggested his plan for a new war front in the Dardanelles to the British government?s War Council. On January 15th 1915, the War Council gave its agreement and British troops in Egypt were put on alert. The Central Powers were fighting primarily on two fronts ? the Western and Eastern Fronts. Fighting against such he armies as the Russian and French armies put a great deal of strain on the German military. The input of the smaller Austrian army into the major battles had been small when compared to the German army?s input.

Churchill?s idea was simple. Creating another front would force the Germans to split their army still further as they would need to support the badly rated Turkish army. When the Germans went to assist the Turks, that would leave their lines weakened in the west or east and lead to greater mobility there as the Allies would have a weakened army to fight against.

The Turks had joined the Central Powers in November 1914 and they were seen by Churchill as being the weak underbelly of those who fought against the Allies.

Churchill had contacted Admiral Carden ? head of the British fleet anchored off of the Dardanelles ? for his thoughts on a naval assault on Turkish positions in the Dardanelles. Carden was cautious about this and replied to Churchill that a gradual attack might be more appropriate and had a greater chance of success. Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, pushed Carden to produce a plan which he, Churchill, could submit to the War Office. Senior commanders in the navy were concerned at the speed with which Churchill seemed to be pushing an attack on the Dardanelles. They believed that long term planning was necessary and that Churchill?s desire for a speedy plan, and therefore, execution was risky. However, such was Churchill?s enthusiasm, the War Council approved his plan and targeted February as the month the campaign should start.

There is confusion as to what was decided at this meeting of the War Council. Churchill believed that he had been given the go-ahead; Asquith believed that what was decided was merely ?provisional to prepare, but nothing more.? A naval member of the Council, Admiral Sir Arthur Wilson, stated:

?It was not my business. I was not in any way connected with the question, and it had never in any way officially been put before me." Churchill?s secretary considered that the members of the Navy who were present ?only agreed to a purely naval operation on the understanding that we could always draw back ? that there should be no question of what is known as forcing the Dardanelles.?

With such apprehension and seeming confusion as to what the War Office did believe, Churchill?s plan was pushed through. It would appear that there was a belief that the Turks would be an easy target and that minimal force would be needed for success. Carden was given the go ahead to prepare an assault.

Ironically in 1911, Churchill had written:

?It should be remembered that it is no longer possible to force the Dardanelles, and nobody would expose a modern fleet to such peril.?

However, he had been greatly impressed with the power and destructive ability of German artillery in the attack on Belgium forts in 1914. Churchill believed that the Turkish forts in the Dardanelles were even more exposed and open to British naval gunfire.

On February 19th 1915, Carden opened up the attack on Turkish positions in the Dardanelles. British and ANZAC troops were put on standby in Egypt.




The battleship "Cornwallis" bombarding the Gallipoli peninsula
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http://www.historylearningsite.co.uk...te/gallip3.jpg
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Carden?s initial attacks went well. The outer forts at Sedd-el-Bahr and Kum Kale fell. However, more stern opposition was found in the Straits. Here, the Turks had heavily mined the water and mine sweeping trawlers had proved ineffective at clearing them. The ships under Carden?s command were old (with the exception of the ?Queen Elizabeth?) and the resistance of the Turks was greater than had been anticipated. The attack ground to a halt. Carden collapsed through ill health and was replaced by Rear-Admiral Robeck.

By now, there was a military input into Britain?s plan. Lieutenant-General Birdwood, who had been a former military secretary to Lord Kitchener, commanded the ANZAC?s based in Egypt. He reported that a military support for the navy was imperative and General Sir Ian Hamilton was appointed commander of the newly created Mediterranean Expeditionary Force. It contained 70,000 men from Great Britain, Australia and New Zealand along with troops from France. Hamilton left for the Dardanelles on February 13th along with a hastily gathered staff. He had little information on Turkish strength and he arrived on March 18th knowing little about the military situation there. It is probable that he had the same opinion as many as to the ability of the Turks in battle ? and this was to prove very costly to the force under his command.

Also on March 18th, the Allies suffered a chronically embarrassing naval disaster. Three British battleships were sunk, three were crippled (but not sunk). At a stroke, the British had lost 2/3rds of their battleships in the Dardanelles. Robeck had little idea of what to do next. The mine clearing trawlers were ineffective, the Turks held the higher ground which was of great strategic importance and the idea of using destroyers to clear the minefields would have taken time to organise. The army suggested that it should take over.

On March 22nd, Hamilton and Robeck decided that the naval fleet would sail to Alexandria to give it time to reorganise itself while Hamilton prepared his force for a land battle. According to Winston Churchill, this decision was taken without the knowledge of the government:

?No formal decision to make a land attack was even noted in the records of the Cabinet or the War Council. This silent plunge into this vast military venture must be regarded as extraordinary.? (Churchill)

While this was going on, the War Council did not meet and was not to meet for another two months!

The army?s input into the Gallipoli campaign was a disaster. It would appear that the senior commanders on the ground believed that their opposition simply was not up to the standards of the British and ANZAC troops.

The Secretary to the War Council, Sir Maurice Hankey, called the whole affair a ?gamble? based on the belief that the Turks would be an inferior force. Even the General Officer commanding Egypt, Sir John Maxwell, wrote ?Who is co-coordinating and directing this great combine?? Maxwell?s comment was apt. Hamilton commanded the army on the ground; Robeck the navy while Maxwell was GOC Egypt where the troops were based. No one was given overall charge.

Hamilton decided on a landing at Gallipoli. The landing place was barely a secret as security at Hamilton?s headquarters was regarded as weak at best. Hamilton?s plan was that:

The 29th Division would land on five small beaches at the southern end of the peninsula

The ANZAC?s would land further north just by a jutting promontory called Gaba Tepe.

The French would launch a feint ? a ?landing? at Besika Bay. The French were to make a proper landing at Kum Kale to protect the 29th Division

It is generally assumed that one major failing of the Allied forces in the Dardanelles was that they underestimated the ability of the Turks. In fact, the Turkish Army was weak in the region and it was poorly led. On March 24th, the command of the Turks was passed to General Liman von Sanders. He had to defend a coastline of 150 miles with just 84,000 men. However, its fighting capacity was just 62,000 men. The troops that were there were poorly equipped and supplies were poor. Sanders could not call on one plane to assist him. However, he placed his men away from the beaches much to the consternation of the Turkish officers there. They argued that there were so few beaches that the Allies could land on, that Turkish troops were better being placed on the beaches or immediately above them.

The landings started on April 25th. The British landed unopposed on three beaches at Cape Helles. Another landing was resisted but the Turks were defeated. But the landing at Sedd-el-Bahr was a disaster. The British were caught in the fire of well dug-in Turkish machine gunners. Many British troops could not get ashore and were killed at sea.

The ANZAC?s landed at Anzac Cove. Here they were faced with steep cliffs which they had to climb to get off the beach. To make matter worse, Anzac Cove was a tiny beach and quickly became very congested. The Turks pushed back the initial ANZAC move inland. The fighting was bloody and costly. The Turks in this area were led by the unknown Colonel Mustapha Kemel. Lieutenant-General Birdwood asked Hamilton for permission to withdraw his troops. Hamilton refused.

Some months later Birdwood wrote:

?He (Hamilton) should have taken much more personal charge and insisted on things being done and really take command, which he has never yet done.?

By May in Helles, the British had lost 20,000 men out of 70,000. Six thousand had been killed. The medical facilities were completely overwhelmed by the casualties. Trench warfare occurred along with the fear of dysentery and the impact of the heat. One British soldier wrote that Helles:

?looked like a midden and smelt like an open cemetery.?


The next phase of the battle started in August. Hamilton ordered an attack on Sulva Bay that was not heavily defended. The landing took place on August 6th and involved the landing of 63,000 Allied troops. This time the secrecy behind the operation was so complete that senior officers were unaware of what others were doing. These 63,000 men were meant to take the area around Sulva Bay and then link up with the ANZAC?s at Anzac Cove. The plan very nearly worked but the ANZAC?s could not break out of Anzac Cove. The British at Sulva were pushed back by a frantic attack led by Mustapha Kemal and by August 10th, the Turks had retaken Sulva Bay.

However, the opponents of the campaign in London had become louder and more numerous. Hamilton was recalled and he was replaced by Sir Charles Monro. He recommended evacuation and the task was given to Birdwood. The evacuation of Sulva Bay and Anzac Cove was a brilliant success. It was accomplished on December 19th to December 20th. Not one casualty occurred.

The evacuation of Helles occurred on January 8th to January 9th, again with no loss of life. Thus the campaign ended with two successes.

However, the overall campaign was a disaster of the first order. Over 200,000 Allied casualties occurred with many deaths coming from disease. The number of Turkish deaths is not clear but it is generally accepted that they were over 200,000.

Before the Gallipoli campaign even got started, Lloyd George had prophetically written:

?Expeditions which are decided upon and organised with insufficient care generally end disastrously.?

After the end of the campaign, opinions were divided. Sir Edward Grey and Lord Slim (who fought at Gallipoli) were scathing in their criticism. Slim called those who had been in command at the campaign the worst in the British Army since the Crimean War. Despite the losses, Churchill remained a defender of what had gone on ? as was Hamilton.

[John Sukey (Deceased)]

Things might have been very different if an Australian or New Zealand officer had been in command. However the British insisted on putting an ANTIQUE in command who instead, should have remained on the retired list.

Again, if the British had managed to get one seaplane in the air with a camera on board, (which they could easily have done) the expedition might never have taken place.)

[KimW]

The main NZ Memorial is on the summit of Chunuk Bair, taken by storm on 8th August 1915. Part of the summit is still littered with shrapnel, cartridge cases and bone fragments - it occupies a special place in NZ Military lore.

"The view from Chunuk Bair is breathtaking. The Wellington Battalion –men from the ‘Uttermost Ends of the Earth’, as words on the nearby New Zealand Memorial state – struggled up here at dawn on 8 August 1915, and were momentarily awed by where they were and what they could see. With little opposition, they had taken Chunuk Bair. Spread out to the east was the long watery sliver of the Dardanelles, the capture of which was the whole point of the campaign. The Wellingtons had little time to savour the moment before Turkish fire drove them to ground.

If the New Zealanders could have hung on to Chunuk Bair until strongly reinforced, the outcome of the Gallipoli campaign might have been different. Chunuk Bair gave artillery observation over the entire battleground. Throughout 8 August, the Wellingtons defended Chunuk Bair against repeated Turkish attacks. Leading them was someone who has become the best-known New Zealander of the campaign, Lieutenant Colonel William Malone, aged 53. With rifle and bayonet, Malone fought with his men and died that day. ‘Of the 760 Wellington Battalion who had captured the height that morning’, wrote Charles Bean, ‘there came out only 70 unwounded or slightly wounded men … they could talk only in whispers … their eyes were sunken … some broke down and cried’. During 9 August, other New Zealand soldiers hung grimly to Chunuk Bair, but no reinforcements arrived. Continual Turkish counter attacks in overwhelming numbers and driven home with no regard for casualties, retook Chunuk Bair"

Lt Col Malone and 700 of his men sleep forever on the summit. Some very hard men attended the 90th anniversary and were not ashamed to tell me that they were openly weeping as dawn broke over the summit.

[RJW NZ]

On a happier note ANZAC day is also the day a friend gave me my first Enfield Rifle, a 1918 Lithgow, still in the safe after 14 or so years, along with several others he's inspired as a result.

[wazza2222]

On a MUCH happier note, a friend well met at the ANZAC day shoot in Opotoki has made (and will continue to make) single spring forends for the SHTLE Mk1.
Surely a day to remember for me!
I attended Dawn Parade at 0550hrs in Ohinemutu (Rotorua) and was pleased to note literally hundreds of young people in attendance (young= <50yrs old)
Truly stirring

[RJW NZ]

single spring forends for the SHTLE Mk1.

I'm not familiar with the term, what is this?