Lee enfield accuracy question

[Eaglelord17]

Simple just pull your trigger when they square up to you solves the to short issue quite nicely...........

I am quite aware of that, that was just the mentality of the day (which is how people should look at history, with the mindset of the people of the era). You also have to remember they also expected you to single load your rifle with the magazine cut-off on as a reserve for close range if ordered. Anyone can look back in hindsight and say, well that was stupid, it takes a genius to look forward and accurately say this is what will be needed in the future.

For example the 'Lions led by Donkeys' myth is a great example of people thinking they know better because after the fact they can say people did things wrong. WWI was not fought the way anyone expected it to be fought or were trained to fight. First it was very fluid (not what people expect when they think of WWI), before it settled down on the Western Front (though it remained fluid elsewhere like the Eastern Front or African Front). Imagine training your whole life for something and then instantly all your training is meaningless and you have to come up with new solutions to problems that never existed before. This is what these Generals faced. It is not like they didn't try to solve the problems, it is just it took a while to figure it out (creeping barrages etc.). And yes some were incompetent, however like most militaries it takes a good long war to correct that as how do you tell who is competent until they get placed in the firing line?

[Sentryduty]

Eaglelord is touching on a very important transitional bit of military thinking, the evolution of military tactics from the tightly controlled, only do what you are told when you are told, to the WW2 and beyond thinking of allowing individual soldiers to use their initiative within the scope of the commander's intent.

Reflecting backwards it seems throughout history from the 1700's to 1939 a soldier was considered a well trained monkey, but not to be trusted with making his own battlefield decisions, when to use the magazine for example. If you give a soldier an automatic weapon he will just shoot all of the ammunition away and sit dumbfounded when there is no more. We know this is not the case, but it took a lot of failure to recognize the value of a well trained soldier's initiative, the man best suited to decide how to attack an enemy is the guy holding the rifle looking at his opponent scant yards away.

There's that Hun, but me 'Sir says we only usin' 'er bay-nets on this charge, 'ere's hopin' I poke 'em before his Mauser barks.

Seems ridiculous, but it was the case.

Even in modern times this attitude still holds, when I first joined the Army, we would do forced marches, we would have a single 1 Qt canteen of water, as you tromp about a guy gets thirsty, but you were not permitted to drink until the officer said it was time to drink. Why?

Well he was rationing his combat resources, which consists of men, ammunition, food, and water, if Private Dum-Dum drank all of his water on the first leg of the march he might not have any later and become a causality. The same reasons you don't let a horse share a stall with the feed bin.

Nowadays, water is much more available, in Camelbacks and we are trusted to drink as we need, but the thinking of individual soldiers are not to be trusted is not fully gone.

During WW1 it was just a lot more controlled, especially in the early days of war.

[Peter Laidler]

Darren makes a good and valid point in thread 42. You can soon spot someone who you'd never really need to question his judgement, regardless of rank. They just had a handle on things. The only exception was as Darren alluded to - that they didn't know the bigger/overall picture. And they were generally good blokes too.

[Seaspriter]

(I recall one instance of a young Scots Highlander, being the only one of his lot to reach the German trench. He shot or bayoneted 11 of the occupants, and captured another 14 all by himself. (Sorry, will have to look up Reg't etc))

Point well taken -- As Sgt. York proved in 1918 in an attack on a German machine gun nest, taking 32 machine guns, killing at least 20 German soldiers, and capturing 132 others in October 8, 1918. He carried a M1917 Enfield and a 1911 Colt. Here's a fun account of such heroics (from Wikipedia):

Under the command of Sergeant Bernard Early, four non-commissioned officers, including recently promoted Cpl. York, and thirteen privates were ordered to infiltrate the German lines to take out the machine guns. The group worked their way behind the Germans and overran the headquarters of a German unit, capturing a large group of German soldiers who were preparing a counter-attack against the U.S. troops. Early's men were contending with the prisoners when machine gun fire suddenly peppered the area, killing six Americans and wounding three others. The fire came from German machine guns on the ridge. The loss of the nine put Corporal York in charge of the seven remaining U.S. soldiers. As his men remained under cover, guarding the prisoners, York worked his way into position to silence the German machine guns. After his platoon suffered heavy casualties and 3 other noncommissioned officers had become casualties, Cpl. York assumed command. Fearlessly leading seven men, he charged with great daring a machine gun nest which was pouring deadly and incessant fire upon his platoon. In this heroic feat the machine gun nest was taken, together with 4 officers and 128 men and several guns.

York recalled:

The Germans got us, and they got us right smart. They just stopped us dead in our tracks. Their machine guns were up there on the heights overlooking us and well hidden, and we couldn't tell for certain where the terrible heavy fire was coming from ... And I'm telling you they were shooting straight. Our boys just went down like the long grass before the mowing machine at home. Our attack just faded out ... And there we were, lying down, about halfway across [the valley] and those German machine guns and big shells getting us hard. And those machine guns were spitting fire and cutting down the undergrowth all around me something awful. And the Germans were yelling orders. You never heard such a racket in all of your life. I didn't have time to dodge behind a tree or dive into the brush... As soon as the machine guns opened fire on me, I began to exchange shots with them. There were over thirty of them in continuous action, and all I could do was touch the Germans off just as fast as I could. I was sharp shooting... All the time I kept yelling at them to come down. I didn't want to kill any more than I had to. But it was they or I. And I was giving them the best I had.

During the assault, six German soldiers in a trench near York charged him with fixed bayonets. York had fired all the rounds in his M1917 Enfield Rifle, but drew his M1911 automatic pistol and shot all six soldiers before they could reach him.

German First Lieutenant Paul Jürgen Vollmer, commander of the First Battalion, 120th Landwehr Infantry, emptied his pistol trying to kill York while he was contending with the machine guns. Failing to injure York, and seeing his mounting losses, he offered in English to surrender the unit to York, who accepted. By the end of the engagement, York and his seven men marched 132 German prisoners back to the American lines. Upon returning to his unit, York reported to his brigade commander, General Julian R. Lindsey, who remarked "Well York, I hear you have captured the whole damn German army."

York replied "No sir. I got only 132."

[Paul S.]

A few points:
Firstly, the point is made above that the beginning of WWI was very fluid. One needs to read about the battles of Loos and the Marne to appreciate just how dynamic it was. Once halted, the Germans settled on tactically better ground than the BEF. Terrain became an ally for the Germans. That alone is a significantly under appreciated factor as to why the Western Front became so static. The same aspect, terrain, essentially determined the outcome of the Gallipoli campaign.
Secondly, we need to remember that battlefield communication of the day was signal flags, dispatch riders or runners, and once things became static, easily damaged wired telephones. None of which allowed rapid decision-making or dissemination of orders.
Thirdly, for the blokes in the trench, there was no bigger picture. That remains true today. All of us who have been in a war - at least it was for me in Vietnam - knows that your world and war is what you can see, hear and are told, and not much more.
Finally, society in the day was far different than it is today. With that, unlike today, one did as one was asked or told by a superior with little question. That attitude was essentially universal and it was as it was. Today, we will eagerly raise our hand and say, 'Beg pardon Sir, but . . . ' no worries at all. The meaning here is we need to think in the context of the day when we look at the events of the day.

[Roger Payne]

I'm hugely refreshed to see what a well informed thoughtful lot of forummers we have. For decades the impression one gets is of the general public worldwide swallowing the 'Oh What Lovely War', 'Blackadder' & so forth views of the Great War. 'Lions led by Donkeys' & all that. No doubt there were incompetent generals just as there would have been incompetents of all ranks. I suspect they were relatively few. The Great War was the first war of global proportions, & was also the first major war fought since the revolution in small arms & artillery technology caused by the developments in ballistics in the 1860's to the 1890's. The US Civil War was fought only half a century before 1914 yet the firearms used bore a closer resemblance to flintlocks than modern centre fire magazine rifles. Sadly developments in communication lacked behind developments in killing; early telephones existed & were widely used, but cables soon broke during artillery barrages. This left commanders with runners, heliographs & carrier pigeons! It is hardly surprising that generals often sent men into horrendous situations, reinforcing failure rather than success - but not because they were callous & reckless with men's lives, but because they lacked accurate & up to date information on the course of the battle. If they had KNOWN that the German wire was uncut, if they had KNOWN that the German Maxims were still intact & exacting a terrible toll of the attacking battalions, then I am sure few general would have pushed on with futile attacks. Contrary to popular belief most of them were not the stupid unfeeling ogres they are portrayed as.
The Second World War is often seen as the 'just' & 'rational' war when commanders learned from the mistakes of 1914 - 18; they carefully husbanded their troops, not attacking unless they were fairly certain of victory. No doubt many lessons were learned, but it is fact that more officers of the rank of Brigadier General or higher lost their lives in the Battle of Loos than in the whole of the 1939 - 45 war. IIRC three British or Commonwealth generals lost their lives on active service during WW2 yet around 70 did during WW1. For me that rather puts a lie to the 'Lions led by Donkeys' myth.

[Seaspriter]

'Lions led by Donkeys' myth

I must confess that until I read Pierre Berton's book on Vimy Ridge, I had only the most superficial understanding of the war and how it was conducted, having been much more attuned to the political histories of the times.

What was most interesting (for me at least as a student of both history and leadership) was the culture clash between the more fluid Canadian approach to war compared to a more rigid British approach (which I suspect our British forum mates may contest).

For what it's worth, I pulled the "Leadership Lessons" from the book and compiled them into a 10 page overview (to be used in a course I teach at University of Alberta in Collaborative Leadership). I know the piece will spark some controversy, and perhaps/hopefully shed more light than heat on the subject. In the piece, I focus solely on the leadership issues. There are many very touching passages on life in the trenches that were extremely heart-wrenching, not included (read the book -- he is an excellent writer).

Berton served in the Canadian Army and instructed infantry training and army intelligence at the Royal Military College.

You can find the overview at http://www.naples.institute/Leadersh...y_Ridge_V2.pdf

[Paul S.]

. . . What was most interesting (for me at least as a student of both history and leadership) was the culture clash between the more fluid Canadian approach to war compared to a more rigid British approach (which I suspect our British forum mates may contest). . . .

We need to remember here that Australia and Canada were served by militia and, unlike Britain, had no real standing army at the beginning of the war. The character of the militia units was far more personal than a regiment with 200 years or more of history and tradition. Having a company or troop commander - or subordinate for that matter - who was also a life long neighbor, a workmate or your children's school master impacted how business was done in the militia units. Admittedly, the same could be said to a lesser degree about the territorial battalions as well. While those in command were trained to lead, command and operate in the same ways they still had to deal with the distinctions of the forces they led.

Again, context needs to be understood. Comparing different leaderships styles between Colonial, Imperial and British forces requires considering the society from which they came and the nature of their structure.

An aside here. Anyone reading the history of the Desert War of WWII will quickly see a litany of inept commanders, rogue (insubordinate) commanders, good but poorly advised commanders and excellent but sacked for the poor performance of his subordinates commanders being cited. Likewise, there was an American general officer, a division commander if memory serves, at Anzio who was grossly inept. The point here is that bad - or good leadership is not unique to a time or place.

[Frederick303]

There is some debate on the topic of Lions lead by Donkeys", the Mons Myth, the Myth the British tactical incompetence/German competence, etc. All can be argued both ways.

But I think at this late date a more relevant point to consider:

WWI was the worst disaster to befall western civilization since the black death. In the long term effects, it might have been far worse than that event.

[5thBatt]

There is some debate on the topic of Lions lead by Donkeys", the Mons Myth, the Myth the British tactical incompetence/German competence, etc. All can be argued both ways.

But I think at this late date a more relevant point to consider:

WWI was the worst disaster to befall western civilization since the black death. In the long term effects, it might have been far worse than that event.

The Spanish flu that followed was a bigger disaster, about 17 million died in WW1 but 20 to 50 Million from the Flu, some estimates put it at 50 to 100 million but of course the returning troops & displaced people returning home help spread the disease so it can be partly blamed on the war.