Canadian Rifle Issue

[Seaspriter]

The pertinent question that should be being asked about LB No4T production is this. If production of LB sniper rifles was always dictated by the slow rate of No32 LENS production why on earth was REL No42 production so prolific?

Other things about REL production seems mysterious to me too! I have worked on several REL's.
17 Mk1's, and 18 1A's ranging in mixed numbers from 10C to 469C
18 Mk2's ranging from 475C to 690C
38 Mk3's ranging from 1C to 353C.
That's 91 and there's probably more too that I haven't listed

Peter, these are excellent questions, and get to the heart of many production issues regarding the Long Branch snipers. I will try answer these with some limited knowledge and some intuition, and others will have more to add to the answer. To begin, we need to understand the nature of REL:

First, unlike many UK scope manufacturers that had been producing telescopes for generations since the English defeated the Spanish Armada in 1588, the Canadians had neither a telescope industry populated with industrial production facilities, nor skilled craftsman who understood the process of creating scopes, nor the a ready source of optical equipment and supply of quality glass. Remember, in 1940, this is still a fledgling nation of 11 million people spread over a vast territory about the same size as the US. In 1940 Canada is still an agrarian nation with emerging industrial capacity.

Second, the role of the National Research Council in Canada is a vital piece of the story. Major-General McNaughton became the president of NRC in 1935. He was noted for his championing advanced technology, including the 1920s development of a cathode-ray tube direction finder, and could see the possibility of detecting aircraft by some electrical means, thus sowing the seeds for Canadian involvement in the exploration of radar well before it became known Great Britain was already working on this technology. Radio Physics programs were already underway at McGill, University of Western Ontario, Queens, and Toronto. McNaughton apparently understood if Canada was to become a player on the world scientific stage, the best strategy would be to work closely with its natural partners, the United Kingdom and the United States. NRC became the centre of all the radar work in Canada, and was responsible for pulling together teams from these universities to engage in top-secret work. It was this radar effort that became the central focus of both NRC for development and then hand-off to REL for engineering and manufacturing. As a fascinating underlying story, in early 1940, a secret mission was conducted by the British to engage as many as 300 Canadian and American scientists into joint research and development of Radio Direction Finding (the code word for what would become Radar see "Radar Development in Canada: The Radio Branch of the National Research Council of Canada 1939-46"). NRC had been approached by the Tizard Mission from the British government, whose purpose was to begin joint development and design by exchanging critical radar technology needed for the war effort. (see "Top Secret Exchange, The Tizard Mission and the Top Secret War" -- Britain had no money to develop the advanced magnetron tube that power a Radar transmitter on a massive scale; Churchill agreed to offer the magnetron to the Americans in exchange for their financial and industrial help. Apparently this was the Top Secret part of the "deal" to entice Roosevelt to launch the Lend-Lease program .) Within three months, this scientific collaboration was commencing. Before the end of 1940, the Radiation Laboratory had been set up on the campus of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology to develop various types of radar using the magnetron; NRC and MIT had close liaison for development, setting the stage for rapid innovation by collaborative interchange of ideas. This became the standard of excellence at NRC & REL which was imbedded their corporate cultures from inception.

Third, by the spring of 1940 at the time of Dunkirk, just before the Battle of Britain, that the urgency became clear in Canada for new electronics and optics (such as binoculars, battle optics, which then grew to a need for dial sights such as range finders). As the private sector did not have sufficient capacity nor a return on investment model for developing an electronics or optical industry. The initiator of the NRC/REL project, General McNaughton recalled the optics shortages in the Great War and resolved to prevent the problem. He formed joint collaboration agreement for support in both the electronics and optics fields (the US National Bureau of Standards, Bausch & Lomb in nearby Rochester New York, and Spencer Lens of the American Optical Company in Buffalo, just across Lake Ontario; all of whom recalled the US problems of optics supply during the past war and were forthcoming to lend a hand in solving the problem. The Canadian government spun off a Crown Corporation, which is essentially a government owned, quasi-government, independent corporation run for the good of the people. For this reason, Research Enterprises Limited was created for advanced electronics and special optics. A plant was built, which was ready by June, 1941, and continued to grow for the next four years. This was a startup company, creating everything anew. Pressures during the war created massive demand on REL to perform. Scientists included Dr. L.E. Howlett, head of the NRC Optics Section; and Dr. R.J. Montgomery, formerly in charge of optical glass at Bausch & Lomb, men who knew their trade well. The high degree of cooperation between the U.S., U.K. and Canada on technical development of radar and the proximity fuze is well documented. Similarly, the working relationship with REL and the U.S. National Bureau of Standards and the British Admiralty for binoculars seems to have been very mutually supportive and aimed at innovation. But the relationship with the British on sniper scope design and development seems less than collaborative, and quite testy at times, as the memos and actions show deep irritation with the lack of flexibility and desire to innovate in the U.K.. This would be termed a "culture clash," as the REL culture seemed quite innovative and entrepreneurial compared to its British "keepers of the standards" who where more rigid in their adherence to the current designs and drawings.

Fourth, because there was no optics industry in Canada, everything had to come together from scratch -- buildings, glass making, grinding, manufacturing, engineering, quality control, and the like. Further, much of the work was in small batches, which means no large scale production facilities could be utilized for economies of scale. As Clive Law says in Without Warning "It was necessary to embark on a series of limited gambles, creating facilities in what looked like minimum economic units, expanding, altering, and adjusting these as the real requirements became known." Additionally, REL had an equally important division focused on electronics. During its brief existence, REL produced more than 8300 highly secret radar sets for Canadian, U.S. and British forces, as well as most of the components, including vacuum tubes, magnetrons, klystrons, CRTs, spark-gaps or trigatrons, TR and ATR cells, rectifiers, neon RF indicators and any other tube required for their radar production. Most of the tubes were custom designed. Some tubes marked as 'REL' were actually built by Canadian and U.S. firms; others were built by REL itself. Very few is known about its tube production, some may have been for supplied to the U.S. forces. From the evidence, it appears REL was highly engaged in joint development with both British and US organizations in electronics, particularly radar and possibly proximity fuzes. This level of joint collaboration on electronics side of the business may have set a standard of expectations that the same would occur on the optics side of the business -- something that clearly did not occur.

Fifth, the business grew by leaps and bounds as the war raged. Hiring and training new staff, and, on the optics side of the business, finding quality optical sand, and furnaces to melt it was difficult due to the stresses of war on the support industries. In a note by McNaughton about the radar side of the business, in 1942 he comments about "a general deterioration of the nerves these days, people were tired and there was a lot of loss of control." Nearby Spencer Lens and Bausch & Lomb across the US border, natural and willing strategic partners, was under similar stress and could provide only limited help. This was complicated by the National Bureau of Standards used in the US did not coincide with British Standards, resulting in a rejection by the UK of optics made to American Standards. Thus the technical standards for batch composition, heating, cooling, and timing had to be provided by specialists sent from the UK rather than nearby US. Reading between the lines, this infuriated the performance-driven entrepreneurial and innovative Canadians who were always trying to improve methods of production and design in contrast to their British counterparts, who were more standards-driven, emphasizing few design changes to ensure quality. (In defense of the keepers of the standards in the UK, in addition to REL, there were six other scope suppliers that had to be dealt with: Vickers, W.Watson, Houghton-Butcher, Kershaw, Cook,Troughton & Sims, and Taylor-Hobson; which must have been an ordeal, because apparently they too were having problems with quality.)

Sixth, REL's optics facilities were pulled in many directions, including the fabrication of five different types of sighting telescopes, dial sights, tank periscopes, spare optic prisms, clinometres, and their transport cases. The Long Branch contract was just one of their many products. During the four war years, REL produced 160,000 optical items, sprawled out to 750,000 square feet of space and employed 7,500 people. Sniper scopes must have been a frustrating part of their business, having produced only 1,174 during the entire war -- a miniscule amount compared to 6 x 30 binoculars (almost 50,000 units) and 7 x 50 binoculars (about 25,000 units). REL was also not happy with the British engineering standards of No.32 Mk1 scopes, finding the design outdated and too complex, while the manufacturing process was cumbersome with too many production steps. These engineering and manufacturing problems resulted in delays in production, especially in 1943. Apparently this level of defects infuriated REL that could not afford a high production failure rate. The production system resulted in rejected scopes, cracked lenses, inability to retain zero, brackets that would not stay tight, and other problems. Recommendations for improvements were resisted by British authorities. REL produced new experimental designs, such as a 5X scope, but these were politely rejected. Eventually REL produced the No. 32 Mk1A, which was there version of a scope that would hold up under fire. REL presented alternative designs which, though improvements, were rejected in late 1944. Apparently REL was holding off production anticipating an approval of the improved designs, which was not forthcoming. REL created the C No. 67 MK. I, which was initially labelled by the British as C No. 32 MK. IV. The Canadians were infuriated, as their creation was 10 ounces (280 g) lighter than the British models – it was a radical departure from the incremental improvements designated by a Mark change – and deserved its own designation.

Regarding the 91 REL #32 scopes you have worked on Peter, your point is well taken. Recently I found a data base from a Dutch Collector (see http://photos.imageevent.com/badgerd...stracking2.pdf ) that contains a large number of (T) Scopes, often linked to rifles. In the data base are over 30 Long Branch/REL related rifles or scopes. Seaforth72 has an additional data base which has not yet been integrated with the Dutch data. And, if we add the Laidler data base we might have a very good picture of how many scopes are really out there. Like any alliance, only when we join forces can we get our arms around the details and anomalies and foggy conceptions.