14-305 Garand Picture

[Snafu]

MACHINE GUNS AND AUTOMATIC RIFLES cover advancing infantrymen as a tank and tank destroyer, in background, move forward. The machine gun in foreground is a .30-caliber M1919A4. Tanks helped cover the advance of the foot soldier and clear roadways for vehicles

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[CINDERS]

BAR as well in background one can only assume it was one of the islands possibly late in the war there being a TD behind the Sherman also guys what year did the TD come out and was it solely to be on equal gun terms with the King Tiger in the European theatre

[RT Ellis]

In retrospect the concept of a separate tank destroyer force, seems ill-conceived. No country other than the U.S. developed such a specialized force. Taken in the perspective that the doctrine of the U.S. Army was that tanks were intended to support infantry advance, and to maintain the momentum of the assault. The TDs were to seek out the enemy tanks and neutralize them. A task that meant being in the forefront of the battlefield with the equipment that had capability to defeat tanks. The initially towed, and later gun motor carriages provided to the TD Force was constantly up-graded to fulfill that mission, but for the most part could not keep up with Wermacht developments

Tanks being with the infantry in the assault, defense, or withdrawal often encountered enemy tanks with unpleasant results. So the “historians” that think they are so clever to have divined that American tanks were a poor match for German tanks are merely demonstrating their ignorance that the intended use of the armor force was in support of infantry. And BTW a fertile topic for the illustrated history magazines. The doctrine and specifications didn’t call for tanks to fight, or survive enemy armor.

The concept was that somehow the TD’s would be in the right place at the right time to deal with enemy armor. As a consequence the two driving factors for the design of tank destroyers was mobility (at the sacrifice if armor) and gun/ammunition capable of destroying enemy tanks. It seems that the tactical concept was faulty and the TD’s were rarely in the right place at the right time, leaving “infantry” tanks vulnerable to enemy tanks.

It is my understanding that German tanks were developed as infantry support, but with experience, especially against Soviet armor, the tank evolved to heavier armor, and better armament. Better armor to protect the crew and better armament to destroy enemy tanks. Both of these features to the detriment of mobility, and to a certain extent reliability.

So American “infantry” tanks, were never intended to take on the later, or any, German tanks, which people seem to faun over as the greatest thing the Germans ever produced. As the U.S. Army became enlightened to the realities of war the idea that it was necessary to build tanks that could survive enemy munitions, and destroy enemy armor, finally overcame the faulty doctrine.

The result of this re-thinking was the M26 tank. The Ordnance Depart did develop the M6 tank that was an answer to the newer German models, but Armored Force turned down the M6 as too heavy, unreliable, and inadequately armed. When the Ordnance Department offered the T/M26 (90mm gun and adequate armor protection) the Armored force also declined, as the T26 had not yet completed testing.

Further development of better TD equipment waned as it was now thought that what was required was a tank that could support the infantry (mobility, firepower), and take on enemy tanks (armor for survival, gun/ammunition to defeat armor). The concept of course was that tanks, in their infantry support role, were frequently in the position of dealing with enemy tanks.

So the Ordnance Department was proactive in designing better armored equipment that in the case of the Armored Force didn’t fit with current doctrine requiring speed and maneuverability. In the case of the TD Force the Ordnance Department did provide better equipment in the form of M36, and M18, but because of the tactical doctrine requirement for high speed (M18 with 76mm gun had a maximum speed capability of 55MPH) the armor and armament were inadequate.

In the post-war threat that the Soviet Union would expand into Western Europe, the tank was further developed to take on “threat” armor and a series of U.S. tanks (M26/46, M47, M48, M60, and M1) were designed and fielded for that purpose. The NATO allies, and Soviet Bloc similarly developed better tanks that could defeat and survive the opposing force, as better tanks were fielded by each side.

The deployment of armor defeating munitions has developed so that infantry generally has the capability of defending against AFVs to the point that today’s battlefield is lethal to tank crews that aren’t trained to use terrain as cover and concealment for survivability.

“Armored Fighting Vehicles in Profile, Vol. 4 American AFVs of World War II” Doubleday 1972.

BTW this image was most likely taken in the Philippines where the IJA was known to have tanks, that the TD gun motor carriages (M10, M36, M18) were capable of defeating.