16-167 Garand Picture of the Day - Saipan

[Mark in Rochester]

105th Infantry, 27th Infantry Division - Purple heart ridge

On June 23, the rest of the 27th Division had attacked north through what became known as Death Valley. The nightmarish terrain between Mount Tapotchau and what American soldiers had dubbed Purple Heart Ridge featured sheer cliffs and hills. The valley itself was a plateau of open farmland about three quarters of a mile wide. The Japanese had hidden in the caves along the cliffs. Units of the 27th moving through the valley, including the 106th Infantry Regiment, which had just rejoined the division, were subject to intense enemy fire. The soldiers had to advance through wooded areas at the opening of a plateau onto a flat plain where the Japanese held the high ground on both sides.

The enemy had carefully prepared artillery, mortar and machine-gun positions on the cliffs, which controlled the entire area. One observer compared the Americans’ situation to that of the British Light Brigade, which charged the Russians at Balaclava.The 2nd and 4th Marine divisions moved up the coasts of the island with little or no opposition. The 27th Division’s progress through Death Valley was slowed by the difficult terrain as well as the Japanese opposition.

Without resupply, the battle on Saipan was hopeless for the defenders, but the Japanese were determined to fight to the last man. Saito organized his troops into a line anchored on Mount Tapotchau in the defensible mountainous terrain of central Saipan. The nicknames given by the Americans to the features of the battle — "Hell's Pocket", "Purple Heart Ridge" and "Death Valley" — indicate the severity of the fighting. The Japanese used the many caves in the volcanic landscape to delay the attackers, by hiding during the day and making sorties at night. The Americans gradually developed tactics for clearing the caves by using flamethrower teams supported by artillery and machine guns.

Information

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[Mark in Rochester]

Three paratrooper buddies enjoy a quick lunch consisting of the emergency "K" Field Ration developed by the Quartermaster Corps
Undated Signal Corps Photo

[browningautorifle]

Three paras with nice clean crisp 1942s...and beautiful new gear. The whole pile would be worth a fortune now...

[RT Ellis]

It was this battle where Holland Smith allowed his long and well known animosity towards the Army to get the better of him as a corps commander, and relieved the 27th ID commander MG Ralph C. Smith with shameful trumped up excuses for his relief, and spent the rest of his life trying to justify. No one could have done better in the terrain and Japanese defensive preparations, but all Howling Mad Smith could see was the Army wasn't keeping up with the Marines leaving their flanks exposed. Part of the problem as Holland Smith saw it was the 27th Division was a national guard outfit, which in his opinion automatically made the unit unfit for combat, compared to his beloved Marine Corps.

Ralph Smith was returned stateside and was assigned to command of the 89th Infantry Division and other assignments in Europe.

[Bob Seijas]

I don't know the details of the situation you describe, but your summary reminds me of MacArthur's displeasure with the Marine advance at the Chosin... he thought they were being timid for refusing to outrun their ability to get resupplied. The Chinese attack proved they were right and Tokyo was wrong. The Army units that bowed to the pressure to drive on were slaughtered.