Arnhem

[GeeRam]

Was wondering about that: no helmet visible in the smaller photo either. Not that there weren't some spares around as the operation progressed I suppose.

I'm pretty sure it's only Capt Killick in the two smaller photo's, i.e the one of him on the streets of Arnhem, and the one above it from a group photo.
I don't think that is Capt Killick in the large photo with the German POW, as it doesn't even look like the same man.

[Flying10uk]

We all know that there were "problems" with the radios at Arnhem but I had never heard any suggestion that the Germans attempted to "jam" British radio communications at Arnhem until I heard it mentioned in a documentary this evening. Is that correct that the Germans tried to "jam" British radios at Arnhem? If true no wonder they had problems communicating.

[Gil Boyd]

We have heard this since Spetember 1944 within the Regiment and museum at Duxford.
However, this again stems from a book called "Echoes From Arnhem" by Lewis Golden specifically on page 149 where he says the following if it helps:

The difficulties which were being experienced on the radio links between units of the division on the day of the landing, later to be repeated when long-range communications were opened up to outside formations, were even greater than had been expected when doubt was expressed by divisional signals before the operation started. Those difficulties stemmed not only from the anticipated wooded terrain and the built-up approaches to Arnhem, but also from the sandy nature of the soil: sand dramatically inhibits good radio reception and transmission. They stemmed, too, from heavy interference from both British and German stations. Neither of these damaging factors had been expected and, even if they had, nothing could have been done to avoid them. They were simply added impediments which high-powered radios would have overcome, but the low-powered sets of 1st Airborne Division were at a great disadvantage. Possibly there was an element of enemy jamming in this interference, and the existence of a German bunker some miles to the north-west of Arnhem, somewhere between Ede and Deelen, has since been suspected. It is reputed to have bristled with all sorts of radio equipment.

I can only conclude, that well known films alluding to wrong crystals, poor training of signallers could not be further from the truth. The geographical conditions and distances from the various Drop Zones (DZ) were a major player, and where more powerful Regimental level radios were not available say from the Bridge to update other essential units on Drop Zones.....practically with the manpack low wattage radios was impossible. My son who was a 2 PARA Signaller many years ago, went back with both Dutch Military and British Paras to find out why things went so wrong and his take on it was, an old iron ore laden ground, and lots of forests didn't help the crystal sets of the day, and would have been a definite issue, as we know today!! Hindsight is a wonderful thing, but had the comms been working it could have been a very different outcome, and the armoured units would have been given precise details when to get to the Bridge too Far!!

Operation Market Garden a great plan, implimented by many very brave soldiers which the CWGC Cemetery at Oosterbeek bears testiment, which had it succeeded would have been a great feather in Airborne Forces cap

[Gil Boyd]

I meant to add also that the 1st Airborne Division Signals 2 i/c, Major 'Tony' Deane-Drummond, alerted the Senior officers of the 1st Airborne Division, that the plans they were making from late July onwards were far to ambitious for the radio network that they could provide as a unit - he was ignored!

[CINDERS]

It was just plain bad luck a German division was resting in that area otherwise there was no real obvious reason that all the targets of Market Garden could have been accomplished.

[Bob Womack]

I can't help but remember the Netherlands Army officers said when asked (after the fact) about the Market/Garden plan. The gist of it was that they had a final exam at the officer's school that had to be passed before you would graduate. They looked at each other, chuckled, and said, "Montgomery wouldn't have passed the exam." The big final exam was how to capture the Netherlands, and the answer was that you must never, ever, ever attempt to do it by attacking up Highway 69. Why? It was a raised, two-lane highway through flat polder land. Being raised, the road made you a sitting duck to any defiladed enemy. Having only two lanes it was considered far to easy to jam up and stop progress. The successful answer used side roads.

Of course, Manty's headquarters didn't trust the Netherlands officers or the resistance before or through the battle and suffered as a result.

Bob

[Gil Boyd]

Bob,
You made me laugh.............spot on.
They were effectively sitting ducks and picked off easily by 88's well prepared and ready.

When Brad Pitt came to us at Duxford during the filming of FURY, we made that really clear to him, that, it was tactics and knowing the German vulnerabilities that would have won us the operations, and Market Garden was so achievable.
As we all know today in this wonderful world of digital technology, had it been available then or even in the Falklands War the outcome could have been so much different and in both campaigns saved so many more lives as it would have been cut so short............COMMUNICATION key to any battle, and key to OUR lives today................ask Napoleon what he thinks!!

[Mk VII]

We talked to a Dutch guy who worked for one of the phone companies over there and he said they had trouble maintaining decent cellphone coverage in the area even then.