The M1 Carbine was so ineffective in Korea

[Rick H.]

I read an in depth study on Korean War complaints about the carbine a number of years ago, a study that showed that as a rule, the carbine "failures" were because they were shooting at the human waves at 300 yards, and using untrained full auto fire. As far as Carbine "freezing," M1 Garands and BARs also suffered from the freezing of the oils at the same rate, and guys would pee on their weapons to thaw them.

As far as M1 Carbine being a "pistol round" The M1 Carbine has more energy at 100 yards than a 357 at the muzzle. Untold hundreds of thousands of combatants in three wars have bit the dust from the Carbine. I am not saying it is an assault rifle, but it is a PDW. Heck an HK P90 PDW in 5.7mm has a fraction of the Carbines utility, and no one thinks of bashing it!

Thank you for the extremely valid response Imarangemaster! I for one will never understand why this argument/discussion seemingly never ends. Comparing the .30 M1 carbine to the M-1 rifle is similar to comparing a service pistol to the carbine. They are not in any way, shape, manner or form in the same league. When you cut thru all the baloney and remember what role the .30 carbine was intended to fill you will come to the realization it performed very well. Answer this question: was the .30 carbine intended to be an offensive weapon? Answer: No. What role was the .30 carbine supposed to fill and why? Answer: It was primarily meant to replace handguns that were being carried by support troops who for the most part couldn't hit a barn door with a handgun. Anyone truly familiar with firearms knows that it takes much more training time to make an average marksman with a handgun than with a shoulder fired weapon. Even with lengthy training a person firing a handgun at a target more than 50 yards away will have a difficult time hitting that target under combat conditions. The .30 carbine gave the military exactly what they needed and wanted. It was an easy firearm to train people how employ and take care of and it offered much better hit probability when compared to the handguns it replaced. The .30 carbine was never meant to be employed as a front line weapon, yet for a host of reasons it was inappropriately placed in that situation. It wasn't the fault of the carbine for being placed in the wrong role, it was the fault of people placing it where it didn't belong. All things being considered, take away the carbine and many of the troops would have found themselves carrying 1911's or revolvers. What would the results have been if these troops would only have had handguns to rely on? Let's get real and remember why the .30 carbine was developed and what role it was designed to fill. By the way, don't kid yourself for a minute, many an M1 rifle froze up in the extremely cold weather of Korea. Almost nothing was immune from the cold conditions in that region.

Rick

[DaveHH]

When the Germans invaded Russia they were severely hampered by a lot of things; worst being that the railroad gauge of Russians is different than German. The Russian gasoline would not work well in German vehicles and German locomotives after the gauge change would freeze up in use. Most people don't realize that the vaunted German army was a horsedrawn army throughout the war. Half of tonnage shipped during the winter by train was fodder for their horses. They used captured French and English lorries for most of the war and you can imagine how bad things got in the dead of winter hung out on a frozen rope at Stalingrad. That was the end of the German conquest in Russia, Feb 1943 it was all retreat after that. The battle of Kursk in July 1943 the Russians were waiting for them and the Germans lost about 600 tanks in 7 days.

[firstflabn]

What role was the .30 carbine supposed to fill and why? Answer: It was primarily meant to replace handguns that were being carried by support troops...

With the exception of the above, you make some good points. BQ has worn out several keyboards posting this 1938 Ordnance letter (see Reply #13):

Bayonet on M1 Carbine

The very first page of War Baby! contains further pre-WWII support for Brian's point.

A look at T/O 7-15 for the infantry battalion shows assignment of pistols and carbines in what is obviously the primary ground combat unit. The 1 Oct 40 edition (the last one without the carbine) shows 313 pistols; the 1 Apr 42 (the first one with the carbine) shows 60 pistols and 290 carbines - that's more than an 80% drop in pistols. In each rifle company, pistols dropped from 48 to 10; in the heavy weapons company pistols plunged from 152 to 28. (The two battalions are within 2% of each other in total manpower.) These numbers make a good case for the implementation of the plans discussed in Brian's letter. HW crews (including their ammo bearers) were the impetus for development of the carbine. Often operating away from their unit's position, moving through all sorts of terrain, they badly needed something lighter than a 10 pound rifle - and something more than a pistol.

The WWII Army's use of the term 'support' creates some confusion, so I would suggest that if you're going to use it, you need to be specific about MOS and/or unit designation.

[Barryeye]

I'm not condemning the rifle at all. I'm simply pointing out a known issue based upon the experience of the men that were there that some here want to deny happened or they wish to pile excuse after excuse on as to why this should not count, a few calling it a "myth". It is not a myth, it happened.

Stating fact is not condemnation. It has an outstanding reputation in every other theater of war it was utilized in and is obviously loved by those that own it.

That they aimed and fired is not in dispute. Could it be? Just could it be that they missed? Rounds fired to hit ratio in war is very high. No doubt they thought they hit or should have hit and they don’t do autopsies on survivors. Bottom line is I don’t believe winter clothing would stop a carbine bullet. I do believe that some good men did believe that it could.

[shadycon]

How good is your accuracy when you are shivering with cold at freezing temps. and no way to warm up? GK

[DaveHH]

When we were in basic, my squad,which was a good group of riflemen, hit almost nothing in the night firing course. After the ground was littered with burning tracers and lit up like a freeway wreck, it improved somewhat. Almost all of the fighting at the Chosin was done at night. The number of hits drops off the charts unless there is constant mortar flare use like we had in RVN.

[Rick H.]

When we were in basic, my squad,which was a good group of riflemen, hit almost nothing in the night firing course. After the ground was littered with burning tracers and lit up like a freeway wreck, it improved somewhat. Almost all of the fighting at the Chosin was done at night. The number of hits drops off the charts unless there is constant mortar flare use like we had in RVN.

Very true DaveHH. Without night-sights, or illuminated optical sights or artificial light of some sort hit probability goes to zero at night.

Rick

[Rick H.]

With the exception of the above, you make some good points. BQ has worn out several keyboards posting this 1938 Ordnance letter (see Reply #13):

Bayonet on M1 Carbine

The very first page of War Baby! contains further pre-WWII support for Brian's point.

A look at T/O 7-15 for the infantry battalion shows assignment of pistols and carbines in what is obviously the primary ground combat unit. The 1 Oct 40 edition (the last one without the carbine) shows 313 pistols; the 1 Apr 42 (the first one with the carbine) shows 60 pistols and 290 carbines - that's more than an 80% drop in pistols. In each rifle company, pistols dropped from 48 to 10; in the heavy weapons company pistols plunged from 152 to 28. (The two battalions are within 2% of each other in total manpower.) These numbers make a good case for the implementation of the plans discussed in Brian's letter. HW crews (including their ammo bearers) were the impetus for development of the carbine. Often operating away from their unit's position, moving through all sorts of terrain, they badly needed something lighter than a 10 pound rifle - and something more than a pistol.

The WWII Army's use of the term 'support' creates some confusion, so I would suggest that if you're going to use it, you need to be specific about MOS and/or unit designation.

Firstflaban: I don't think the term "support" is confusing at all when it is used in general context. I also don't think a detailed description of "support troops" is necessary when speaking of the reasons for development of the .30 M-1 Carbine. If one were to designate MOS and/or unit designation for use of the .30 cal carbine it would get to be a very long and very detailed thread that would put most people to sleep. When a student of the M-1 carbine looks at the big picture it is pretty easy to understand why a replacement shoulder fired weapon was desired by the military instead of the then current 1911 service pistol. From a purely personal standpoint I not only understand why the carbine was developed and put in service, but what eludes me is why so many front line troops were issued the carbine if in fact it was such a poorly regarded arm. Obviously, I wasn't there so I can only surmise that troops liked the lightweight of the carbine as well as the fact it carried 15 rounds instead of 8. My Dad was in an artillery unit at the very end of WWII and he carried an M-1 carbine. He loved the carbine based on its weight versus the M-1 rifle in his role as an artilleryman and told me so on many occasions.

Rick

[vintage hunter]

Took the time to do a bit of experimenting this morning and hopefully the results will change the minds of those who still buy into the rumors going around about the carbine being weak and under powered. I decided to see for myself just how much oak wood the carbine was capable of penetrating. Ammo used for these tests was LC 44 ball and one hand load with a 110gr Sierra Pro Hunter SP. Range: 60 yards. First block tried was 6'' in diameter. Fired 2 LC and one hand load into it against the grain. Both LC ball rounds zipped right through, the SP penetrated just short of 3'' before stopping. No big surprise there. Tried a second 6'' block this time firing into it end ways with the grain. Penetration was a whopping 12 1/2''. Third and last block measured 7 3/4''. At first I didn't think it had gone all the way through but figured it was close judging by the splinters on the back side. Upon splitting the block to measure actual across the grain penetration I saw that it had indeed gone through, albeit not in in a straight line as it had the smaller blocks. It had turned and traveled with the grain exiting the top edge. The one recovered LC FMJ bullet was intact and showed no signs of damage or distortion, the soft point as can be expected didn't fair as well. Not much left but a ball of lead, jacket material and wood chips.

[tspence35]

Wow....they ought to make a sticky out of the above reply. Would help quiet the nonbelievers. Course to disagree makes life fun and educational.