Some rather interesting and potentially valid views there, Promo.
Let's take a step back, to Mr Skennerton's research, which is very close to the mark and widely cited. Ian has spent a lot of time talking to people whom worked in or around armaments production during the war. Much of his research is real stuff- talking to people whom did see/touch/do work on various armaments. Not a lot of detail of their input to war production was recorded formally, until Ian talked to them from the 1980's onwards. Some 40 years after the event.
To suggest anyone's detailed recollection after 40 years is spot on is a stretch. I'm not suggesting information presented is incorrect, fabricated or otherwise. What I am suggesting is it is unwise to believe everything one reads (particularly on the internet!)
Now Australia, as mentioned earlier, was in a real pickle when WW2 started. When we answered Great Britain
's call to arms, we were a rag-tag Army of hastily cobbled together people and equipment. Luckily, we fell on our feet and learned quickly, thanks in part to one Erwin Rommel who decided that training the second AIF and their Kiwi cousins was part of his brief. Kindly, he gave us much opportunity to hone our soldiering skills in the Western Desert and in the Palestine against the scurrilous Vichy French
. When we managed to wrap up our relatively successful innings in North Africa, we were hastily dispatched to turn Tojo around from PNG. Now the fellows initially thrown at Tojo were effectively Reservists, Citizen Soldiers, or Militia. These fellows were a mix of callings, capabilities, effectiveness and reliability. When they were thrown into action in New Guinea, they had WW 1 equipment, on average, at best. Whatever they could get their hands on, they used. Australia's logistics were disgraceful, at best.
Now, while Ian Skennertonconcentrates on what the Brits did with their No 3 Mk I* (T) that is a relatively different story. One needs to accept that Australia was in dire peril in 1941/42 when we were about ot be invaded and all our fighting forces were in the Western Desert, or about to be annihilated in Singapore and Malay. What ever we could scrounge, steal, requisition, buy, beg, lift, borrow - we did.
So, the P14s coming from Britain were valued. They were taken to Lithgow, our principal small arms factory or 'armoury' (in US terms). Lithgow was the main producer of rifle actions and other infantry and light artillery weapons. Further on in 1942, Orange Annex opened up, some 80 miles away, and it was the principal assembler of components from Lithgow (SAF) and the feeders: Wellington, Forbes and Bathurst. The specialist work for (T) rifles was done at Lithgow. Why the rifles (several known) were not complete is a wartime uncertainty. As for the potential of some one 'having a crack' at starting their own (T), that's a valid possibility. Is it probable, who knows?
What I would suggest, is that the vagaries of wartime necessity, production, availability, constraints from enemy action all add up to some differences in the norm. Peter Laidler, an expert with front line experience in both the UK and AU army logistics chain under combat duress, cites frequently the differences found from time to time that Base or Field workshops need to correct or work with.
Perhaps this Remington was supposed to be a (T) but priorities changed (ever hear that from the Army?), or stocks of No 1 Mk III* became available for the job. Perhaps the Army in its infinite wisdom decided to consolidate and only use the No 1 rifle, as spares were readily available, where P14s were not.
Dunno... All good possibilities and food for research and thought.Information
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