As I just happened to see a photo of a Browning M2 in Britishfirst line use, can this really be true? And of course the M2 was practically a WWI design, was it not?
Anyway, you've clearly got more of this info to hand than the rest of us, but that jumped out at me.![]()
“There are invisible rulers who control the destinies of millions. It is not generally realized to what extent the words and actions of our most influential public men are dictated by shrewd persons operating behind the scenes.”
Edward Bernays, 1928
Much changes, much remains the same.
I am a novice with firearms I know a little but not a expert and I have gotten into a few discussions with people over .22 and .223 being the same caliber . Those people would argue that the .223 was a WAY BIGGER bullet . Weight wise yes I would agree but basicly same size around . I have had them pull out a .223 and say look at this , this is way bigger . I couldn't get them to under stand CALIBER . These people were few and most the AR type rifle they had was the only rifle they ever owned .
Frederick303, it seems most of the points you mention are applicable to all the military rifles of the same age; some more, some less. All problems solved by proper training.
I would like to read up about the doctrine, sounds very interesting. Could you recommend some sources please?
Last edited by Daan Kemp; 06-25-2020 at 01:13 AM. Reason: better wording
Read the Germanmanuals: there is a pre WWII Weimar one that covers it conceptually, I think the number was Zdh 240 to 242.
There is not a good English source, as most of the translations of German manuals do not explain the underlying meaning of technical words all that well. To be honest it was WWII vets in the Rifle club that explained most of what these words meant. An example is the word "Zeitbild" It literally translates to "time picture" but as used in the manuals "zeitbilder" would be better translated to "time moments" German is full of these words which are in essence a concept, clear to a native speaker but not so clear to those of us who are trying to decipher meaning in a second language. Most of concepts most stated in the MG manuals, they cover the Zietbilder and the difference between "fire power" (rounds per second) and striking power (effective power, meaning either a hit or complete suppression of the opponent reducing his abiity to fight to zero). The German idea of fire suppression was different, rather than volume of fire, they looked at the effect of fire. So a large barrage of fire was considered less effective that a small volume of fire that hit. That concept was applied to all small arms, not just MGs. The German idea of fire suppression was different, rather than volume of fire it was effective hits that count, or strictly translated "striking power". A strike that hit a man in the jaw was much more effective in keeping an enemy squad down, not observing, or actively taking part in action then 50 rounds simply hitting the parapet. while the latter suppressed them at the moment, it had much less effect on their moral or state of fighting spirit once the fire was lifted. In that regard the single shot coming in and hitting one man who raised his head would me far more effective, which is the basis for rifle fire, it is always a point weapon. The primary way such fire can be effected is in observation and careful shots rapidly applied upon target detection. Hence rapid rifle fire like we do, (rapid fire stages) did not exist as a suppression concept, until the Russiancampaign when things started to change due to mass Russian charges in the summer/winter of 1941.
hence the development of the K41/K43 and eventually the MP44. But I digress.
I suppose the problem would exist for a person who English was a second language. When you read "mission oriented orders" in a US manual what does it mean as opposed to normal "operation orders"? I seem to recall it was explained verbally when I first heard the phase, with examples to illustrate to the different between a task oriented order and a mission oriented order. So trying to get an first hand source that covers the nuance is difficult, Manuals are meant to be taught and references, they are not exhaustive. I would suggest knowing what the doctrine is and then reading the manuals will help illustrate the subtle different from
The idea originated in WWI, and the result was a new musketry course which was first applied to the strosstruppen, then the regular Infantry in the fall winter of 11918, That is confirmed in the long edition of "Storm of Steel " by Ernst Junger, where he discusses that. I was introduced to shooting by a US WWII Vet, whose father had gone through that course of fire in January-Feb 1918. For WWII training based on this concept, I believe the official history of the 12th SS has a detailed section on the small arms training. How it was taught. There is a 2 volume English version of this history. When you get done you will see where the US train fire program came from.
Sajer, Forgotten Soldier, if you read his book, covers both the doctrine in small arms training in Poland and how it was applied in his first firefight against partisans ( another German word: feuerkampf, which seems to have come over to English)
Shore in his book with Britishsnipers to the Reich discusses a bit of this with misunderstanding. His emphasis on the rigid positions employed by the Germans in training misses that the technique was to ensure the same pressure points on the rifle, so one zero would work in all positions.
Many of the ideas translated over to the New Bundeswehr and most certainly the Bundesgrenzeschutz. Jac Weller discusses this in this 1960s/1970s American rifleman articles on rifle training though most of it goes over his head, because he sees rifle training in a commonwealth/US orientation. As such he misses the emphasis on rapid engagement with reasonable accuracy. If you can fined a Bundeswehr man trained prior to 1996 or so you can still see the concept in how they saw the G3 to be employed. Maybe latter what changes occurred with the G36 I know not.
I think if you are curious that will get you started.
So the doctrine was a smaller volume of effective fire suppresses better than a larger volume of near misses? Anyone who doubts that just needs to read the accounts of a sniper pinning a company to the ground.
So how does the high rate of fire of the MG42 tie into that?
Last edited by Surpmil; 06-26-2020 at 01:32 AM. Reason: Typo
“There are invisible rulers who control the destinies of millions. It is not generally realized to what extent the words and actions of our most influential public men are dictated by shrewd persons operating behind the scenes.”
Edward Bernays, 1928
Much changes, much remains the same.
Thank you Frederick303. The doctrine makes it clear, seemed to work well for the Germanforces. Their concept of mission oriented action worked very well in South African operations in Angola too.
I'll read up what I can but my German isn't.
A story I heard while working in Riyadh just after the end of the first Gulf war:
A soldier in Kuwait wanted to test the indestructability of his Kevlar helmet; by pulling the pin on a live grenade then covering it with the helmet and sitting on it. When the grenade went off it blew his legs off.
I've seen photos of the result of a American service man attempting to disassemble the bolt in his 50 cal, with a live round, striking the stuck firing pin with the primer end. Not a pretty photo.
Just thought of another commonly repeated myth. The whole all grey finished Belgian Mausers are 'Naval' issue. This was not the case and was simply the type of finish they decided on later in time so when these Mausers and FN-49s were refurbished depending on the date, some got greyed, and some were blued. Makes no sense when you think about it, as why would the Navy need so many firearms?