Irish (?) contract No4 rifles

[Frederick303]

Captain Laidler,

Prior to going over the serial number issue you have raised, I would like to make the case that the Irish Army would have considered purchasing 50,000 rifles, which is one of your primary arguments as to why they did not purchase 50,000, they had no reason to. As this involves figures, let me list the primary sources for each assertion prior to putting out the data itself:

For quantity of Arms held by the Irish army in 1945:

“The Irish Sword” Journal of Irish military history, “the Emergency Army” pages: 36 to page 39
And:
A History of the Irish Army, John p. Duggan, Gill and MacMillian 1991


For the size of Irish Army in WWII and the post war period up to 1961 (establishing their need for arms)

A History of the Irish Army, John p. Duggan, Gill and MacMillian 1991
And
Irish Army Orders of Battle, 1923-2004, A. J. English, Tiger Lily books, division of General Data LLC 2008


For the quantity of No1 MK III rifles left in Irish hands as of between 1961 and 1987

Small Arms Today, Edward Ezell, 2nd edition, 1988
And
Email communications with Nick Price, Helston Gunsmiths, Cornwall UK.


Best on-line source that covers the WWII era and is the source of all WWII LDF arms counts (also has the regular army stocks listed) is:

The War Room - Irish Defense Forces 1939-1945



Now to the numbers of SMLE/Rifles/army size/FCA size/etc:

As previously stated here were the stocks of small arms held by Ireland in 1945:

Enfields, SMLEMKI*** and SMLE MK III/III* ~42,413
P14 sniper rifles 112
M1917 .300 cal rifles ~19,985
Total: 62,510

So the Irish Army held over 60,000 rifles in May of 1945, of which no less than around 55,000 were serviceable (according to best estimates).


Strength of Irish Army:

Here are the official figures on the Irish defense forces and FCA as of the dates listed:

Regular Army

April 1940 Total strength, officers and ranks, 17,156
March 1943 Total strength, officers and ranks, 38,394
March 1944 Total strength, officers and ranks, 36,211
March 1945 Total strength, officers and ranks, 32,115

To this must be added the local defense forces (LDF):

March 1941 Total strength, officers and ranks, 88,035
March 1942 Total strength, officers and ranks, 98,439
March 1943 Total strength, officers and ranks, 103,530
March 1944 Total strength, officers and ranks, 96,152
March 1945 Total strength, officers and ranks, 84,449

Not all the LDF were armed; here are their issued arms as of various dates. Rifles include both SMLE and M1917 rifles, with the M1917 figure being around 19,960 of the total.

March 1942 Rifles 21,589, Shotguns 11370 total long arms: 32,959
March 1943 Rifles 27,689, shotguns 11365 total long arms: 39,054
March 1944 Rifles 27,009, shotguns 11944 total long arms: 38,953
March 1945 Rifles 27,298, shotguns 08218 total long arms: 35,516


So by the end of the war they had muster strengths, between the army and LDF of between 116,000 and 139,000, with around 62,000 rifles and 11,000 shotguns or 73,000 long arms. At that there were shortages of long arms throughout the war; you only see the numbers of shotguns issued declining in 1945 when the shotgun issue strength drops to 8,200 from a high of 11,944 in March of 1944.

So I think my case is made right here, in the mobilized state the Irish army could justify at least 60,000 rifles being on hand. But being the through engineering chap I am, let’s look at the post war plans, strengths to see if the post war period could justify 50,000 rifles, let alone the total figure I would assert, which is ~61,000 Serviceable bolt action Enfield Rifles (of all types) held between 1961 and 1987. Mind you the first major Irish sale of arms occurred to Interarms in 1961 so between 1956 and 1961 the peak holding of the Irish army exceeded 105,000 rifles of Enfield or M1917 pattern, with 5,000 + unserviceable arms that would eventually be dumped at sea between 1961 and 1966.

Post war strengths between 1946 and 1961:

After WWII both the regular defense forces and the LDF saw rapid declines:

In Feb 1945 the parliament approved a peace time defense force of 12.740 ranks and officers, with the army strength authorized at 10,900. For the entire period from 1946 to 1961 the strength of the Army declined from ~9000 men at the end of 1945 to ~8000 men in 1961

March of 1947 the strength was down to 8,803
March of 1948 the strength was down to 8,539
March of 1952 the strength was down to ~8,400
March of 1956 the strength was down to ~8,230
March of 1960 the strength was down to ~8,249

The formal Army reserves (not LDF or FCA) numbered around 5,750 during this entire period.

So in that regard Capt. Laidler is very much correct, the strength of the regular army was very low with an establishment of no more than 9 Infantry Battalions on paper, with most of them at less than full strength. On mobilization, (Full WWII style) the Army had plans to expand to 2 divisions + independent units, a hopeless task as it would have required something like 45,000 men considering the regulars and reserves forces.

But that leaves out the LDF, or after 1946 the FCA.

In 1946 the plan was laid down to have 99 battalions, with 6 of the urban battalions to be equipped on par with the regular army (at full strength). The rest of the battalions were required to have at least 150 effective volunteers (effectively companies). FCA battalions were to have Enfield rifles (no automatics) and each battalion would have no less than 6 or 12 (full strength battalion) .22 cal conversions which would be used for training, as most FCA units had no ranges to use, other than local small bore ranges.

So the 1946 requirements for the FCA were as follows:
6 battalions 700 rifles 4,200 rifles
93 battalions x ~350 rifles. 32,550 rifles (the highest anticipated strength being ½ TOE)
105 x 6 .22 cal conversions 630 rifles

Or a total requirement for 37,380 Enfield rifles

If you consider most units struggles to meet the 150 minimum requirement; or say 175 on average being closer to the real count, the numbers needed were far less. That is a total requirement for 21,105 Enfield rifles

Now as to actual strengths:

In March 1946 25,776 remained in LDF when it became the FCA
At the end of 1946 only 21,784 remained.

So the above analysis is not far off.

Exact figures are not published after the above date, but it would seem, reading between the lines that between 1946 and 1956 the FCA remained at strength of between 19,000 and 24,000 total (estimates). After Integration in 1957/58 the numbers went up (figure not found) only to decline again after 1962 when mandatory age limits took effect and the permanent defense forces were once again reequipped with modern arms such as the FN-FAL and FN-MAG. It would seem from 1963 to 1988 when the FCA was re-equipped with retired FAL rifles the FCA strength was always declining and units consolidating. This occurs just about the time of a young British soldier joining the British army as an armourer apprentice, and so would have been the underlying current of his time in service.

But the purchase of the No4 MK II rifles dates from the period of 1953 through 1955. What matters is the thinking then. At that period, a decade after WWII the Irish defense forces were still thinking in terms of WWII style mobilization and once again making a sizable defense force.

The regular Army was first equipped with No4 MK II rifles in October of 1954
The FCA was equipped with No 4 MK II rifles starting in 1956.

After re-equipment and trials in 1957 the FCA was integrated into existing units with the regular starting in 1958. Between 1958 and 1960 there was an increase in enrollment and use, along with the Border troubles. The highest estimate I have seen for enrolled FCA soldiers in this period was on the order of 27,000 in the 1957 to 1959 time frame. It might have been lower but in that crucial time of the rifle purchases the Irish defense forces were thinking about a larger FCA force, not a declining one.

So if you add up the authorized strength of the total defense forces ( 12,740), Authorized Army reserve (5,750) and theoretical FCA full bore requirement (36,7500) you get : 55,240 rifles , but bear in mind that not every single soldier needs a rifle so 50,000 might do handy.

I think this makes the point as well, on paper there could be a requirement for 50,000 rifles.

One last note: If we go by official figures, even after the great big Interarms sales in 1961 of over 44,000 rifles (see the FF rifle sticky on Gunboards under Fritz for my write up on that), the facts indicate that 10,000 SMLE MK III rifles were retained, along with 500 No 1 MKIII barreled actions.

That they existed is testified by the 1966 film the Blue Max, filmed in Ireland. You will note in that film the German infantry is equipped with Brand new No4 MK II rifles, No 9 bayonets and Vickers M29 helmets, while the Brits seem to be equipped with SMLE MKIII rifles. All the equipment for the ground forces in that film came from Irish army/FCA stocks.

In any case the held SMLE MKIII rifles were not sold off until late 1987. So the Irish army kept a stock of 60,000 Enfield rifles on hand (plus the .22 trainers), if the letter from the Irish army archives is to be believed. Which is very much in line with the what they had on hand at the end of WWII.

Which brings us back to the final issue you raised, the serial number ranges: I have some what of an answer to that, but rather than write it up, once I have found a way to send you the letter from the Irish army and you have reviewed it and you have read the above I ask for the following:

Do you agree that the above addresses the possibility that the Irish army would have seen a requirement for 50,000 rifles?

I see no further reason to go on until the acceptance of A) sources and B) reason that they might want that many rifles is resolved. Once in agreement on that, I will then present the evidence I have researched regarding the serial number range and how to identify a rifles as being from Ireland. A great part of that was tracing down when the guns were sold, where they went, ETC.

If you do disagree, lets resolve the above before proceeding. I recognize I could be wrong on this but I am laying all the data I have on the table for you to see. I would ask you do to the same, subject to any data that must be held in confidence. I would love to see tables of serial numbers found in the middel east, it woudl help refine my estimates.

With much respect

Frederick

[bigduke6]

After reading some of Hansard's record of House of Commons debates I think I understand it. They rearmed the Irish government so it would be able to control the IRA and stop attacks along the border with Northern Ireland. Giving them Lee Enfields makes sense. It arms them but not strong enough to be a threat if the government should fall.

Commons Sittings in the 20th century (Hansard)

And by the way.

Lord TREFGARNE HL Deb 24 June 1980 vol 410 cc1475-7

My Lords, I am sorry that the noble Lord is disappointed about the Minister who is answering his Question today. His Question is, however, tabled to the Government and I answer for the Government, as do all other Ministers from this Box. As for military aid to the insurgents, which the noble Lord was suggesting, the Afghan opposition to the Soviet Union appears 1476 to be sustained without external assistance. The main source of weapons for the insurgents seems to have been those obtained from Afghans defecting from the Afghan army and also those that they have captured from the Russians. I should like to make it quite clear that the United Kingdom have not supplied arms to the insurgents, as has been suggested. Indeed, the suggestions that we and various other nations instigated the fighting in Afghanistan by supplying the arms are of course quite untrue.

Rick

Most probably true Rick (if you can ever believe anything that is said in the house of commons), but they would of supplied arms to a third party who would of supplied them probably through another party till they reached the Destination, basic money laundering with rifles.....

[Robert303]

I cannot comment on the Irish contract as I do NOT have access to the source materials. However when we look at what happened to stores of 'Surplus' rifles we have to remember that regulations on private arms deals were a lot looser in the 50s and 60s than they are today.
We also have to remember that the Soviet Afghan war lasted quite a long time. 1979 to 1985 see.
Soviet war in Afghanistan - Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

For a good explanation of the 'Groupings' in the war. Russia was backing India at the time. So the Pakistanis turned to the Chinese for some stuff such as aircraft as the USA could not supply because of the Israeli situation etc. In the early stages all the arms for the rebels came over the Pakistan border. Lee Enfields were deniable and shipping more in to Pakistan was relatively easy.

Now whether they went from Canada or the UK direct to Pakistan is the first question. Who paid for them is second question. Who shipped them is the third question and so on. Much of it was financed by Saudi Arabia. Most of it was controlled by the Pakistan Secret Service which at the time had a growing fundamentalist section which was to come back and haunt us in the shape of their support for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.

As the war ramped up it became clear that the Mujhadeen needed better equipment and so 'Acquired' stocks of AK47s went in plus mines plus anti aircraft rockets inc the famous Stingers. Why? A mixture of reasons. The USA getting it's own back on the Soviets for their support of the North Vietnamese & VC in Vietnam. The U.K. to keep on side with the Chinese over the Hong Kong negotiations. The Saudis as they thought the Russians were 'Infidels' AND needed to counter Iran in the 'Leadership of the Muslim world' stakes.

This has now developed into the Shia Sunni war being fought in Iraq and Syria which is a 'Proxy War' between Saudi Arabia and Iran. In the next few years it will be interesting to see if the west shifts from supporting the Saudis to the Iranians. It will be interesting to see if Iran becomes more 'Liberal' as Saudi Arabia becomes more 'Fundamentalist'. The international arms trade has always been a fascinating one to watch over the last 70 years.

[Peter Laidler]

Fred, got all your messages and will respond but good lord, it's not a complete epistle that's needed as in thread 31. You could precis that thread relevant to my original doubts (of about 1980 or so) by giving the strength of the tiny Ir Def Force c.1954/5 and the order/contract for the collosal amount 'needed' at the time

Backed up by a one line answer of just why so many of this so called Irish order have turned up, from UK Military stocks, delivered via Pakistan, in Afghanistan. And that's in just a couple of Int briefings/summaries/reports. Now multiply that over 10 years(?) worth of same that I never saw. And just why and how have these same batch/serial numbers turned up on UK mil weapons and as we now learn from the thread (that's in great danger of being diverted) that many from these Irish batches were in private hands too.

I ain't convinced

[Seaspriter]

On the reason for Ireland buying 50,000 enfields.

Frederick, as an amateur historian, I deeply appreciate the hard work it takes to dig up the facts, do the calculations, and put your engineering mind to work. And while it is a rather long post, I read every word and find the sharing of this very data intriguing, enlightening, thought provoking, and highly beneficial. You are clearly trying to sort fact from opinion.

What we find when we do research on controversial subjects is that quite often there are:
1) anomalies in the data (which Captain Laidler is pointing out),
2) politicians say one thing, but it is a smokescreen for exactly the opposite (which Rickyv100 is quoting from Lord TREFGARNE), and
3) rather than solve all controversies, facts often raise a new level of questions (which is what's happening now.)
All these can ultimately lead to the truth ( which may not be what we expected when we started the search).

In examining history it's often not a black or white, either/or, one way or t'other, rather its often the confluence of many interactive forces/interests pulling and tugging the issue in multiple directions.

There is the distinct possibility that both Frederick and Captain Laidler are both right to some extent. The important thing here is not to turn a debate into a black and white, one side is right, the other wrong wrangle. Instead, lets look carefully at what the evidence is telling us and at this stage let the anomalies speak with the same veracity as the facts.

For example:
1) The Irish may have, indeed, needed to replenish their old stock of rifles, and, like the neutral Swiss may have wanted to fully arm a large civil defense force -- Britain has its CCF program, US has its CMP program, etc. -- and in 1954 there was a deep concern the Russians would try to pick off any non-NATO country to control Europe.
2)There may have also been a small, silent contingent that wanted to have an civilian force that could storm the ramparts of Northern Ireland to liberate the oppressor and reunite the country.
3) Over in Britain, keeping the Faz plant operational during the post-war rebuilding effort made economic and military sense, even if the rifles were "make work" and not sold at a profit, it beat putting skilled labourers into the ranks of the unemployed collecting benefits.
4) And the evidence also leads us to believe the CIA, which was deathly afraid of both Chinese and Russian world domination, may have picked up a sizeable portion of the Fazakerley production run (the stray serial numbers, perhaps ~15,000) and diverted them to other parts of the world to arm anti-communist insurgents.

All these factors could have been at play simultaneously and that is what is making this debate fascinating and revealing, and not solved by an either/or answer. This may be a conundrum for our engineering minds that naturally search a simple explanation, but history is often cluttered with multiple forces, illogical decisions, and ambiguities of memory.

Let's keep this set of revelations going, as others are chiming in with pieces of information from their war experiences that may lead us to some fascinating conclusions or more logical explanations of what really happened. Truth may be still hidden in the nooks and crannies of fragmented facts and foggy memories being reactivated.

[Frederick303]

Capt Laidler,

I await your review on the letter from V Laing, OIC of the Military records, once you get it. If need be I will mail you a copy, it is up to you. That is a definitive record. You will note in that letter that the range of serial numbers provides at least a basic answer to why you would see a lot of the so called Irish contract in other areas; the rifles sent included a much larger range of serial numbers than has previously been understood As detailed responses with sources do not seem to be of interest I will drop the subject with that letter.

Regards

FRS


Seaspriter,

Thanks for your kind words, but I think I am beating a dead horse on this topic of little interest to most folks on the forum. By the bye, do you know a Richard Gloyd down in the Naples/Fort Meyer area?

Regards

FRS

[RobD]

There is, as far as I know, only one precedent for a small nation purchasing a disproportionate quantity of rifles.
After the Jameson Raid (1895) the Transvaal Republic correctly deduced that they would be soon targeted by the British Empire. They imported first, enough Martini Henrys (in .577/.450 cal) to equip every adult male citizen. And then a couple of years later they imported 37,000 7mm Mausers, enough to arm everyone all over again, with rifles to spare for their sister republic, the Orange Free State who had somewhat under-ordered from Mauser. And the Transvaal imported 50 million rounds of 7x57 Mauser ammo. And the best artillery pieces which France and Germany could supply. But, this was fuelled by an entirely realistic fear of impending attack.
In all ignorance I need to ask: What was the mood of fear in Eire in 1955 which fuelled the purchase of 50,000 No4 Mk 2s? Did they import millions of rounds of .303 ammo? Did they import artillery and fighting vehicles?

[Seaspriter]

I think I am beating a dead horse on this topic of little interest to most folks on the forum.

Frederick, don't be dismayed.

In the 4 days this thread has been running we are closing in on nearly 1000 views, which means there may be a lot of silent observers who are keenly interested but don't have a substantive contribution. They are like "readers" and "observers" of the unfolding of a piece of history that has been heretofore poorly understood.

Please keep the debate alive -- as I said in my earlier post: the answer we find "may not be what we expected when we started the search." That's what makes history so fascinating. Not everyone will be convinced by the very same evidence -- we all come from many different backgrounds and points of view. As long as the debate is strong, fair, and not personally demeaning, it will be lively, revealing, and ultimately enlightening. Frederick, you've put your considerable evidence squarely in front of a global audience, you've been generous, objective, and extremely considerate of the people involved. Give us time to thrash it around, pull and tug on it, see it from many perspectives, thrive on the healthy exchange, and maybe derive some new data that lifts up to a truly new level of understanding.

I think there is a lot more to this story than meets the eye, and I'm curious what was really going on behind the scenes. It may take "reading between the lines" -- what's not said or what was implied or what was really intended in all those letters that explains the anomalies.

[Frederick303]

Seaspriter,

I was not disturbed or “taking my marbles and going home”, so to speak. Rather I was observing that Capt. Laidler for whatever reason was not really willing to go into the details that went into forming his opinion. Now it has been my observation that Capt. Laidler is a very through researcher, thorugh engineer and any opinion he has is well worth considering. Prior to dismissing what he says one had better be pretty sure of oneself. His book on the No 32 optics/No4 T is pretty much the book to read and his book on the Sterling is a very well researched volume, my copy is well worn, (though it really needs to be signed). In this case he has given a glimpse but nothing more on to some of the reasons for his opinion. Given the nature of the topic there may well be a reason for that so I was simply not belaboring the point. I had not noticed the numbers reading the thread and as not many had chimed in I though the topic was pretty esoteric and not of great interest to most folks.

If you get up to Easton, drop me a line and we can get a bite to eat or discuss rifles. I always enjoy that.

RobD,

I have some stuff on other Army purchases that may help illustrate the mind of the Irish army in the 1952 to 1959 time frame., I will try to write it up this evening. Now it is off to the range for a bit.

Regards

Frederick Salberta

[Mk VII]

They did take some other steps to modernise the Irish Defence Forces around this time. Some 25-pndrs were purchased from England to replace the 18-pndrs they had been given in 1922, which were looking a bit long in the tooth by this time, and some Comet tanks as well. Some Panhard armoured cars, which turned out to be mechanically rather unreliable, were purchased from France.