Can someone please help with this WW1 sniper

[Surpmil]

Interesting that the Geman optics and attachments in WWI were so much better and easier, but the Brits didn't learn from and copy them. Possibly NMH is the reason [not made here]. Seemed to be solved in WWII and subsequently if the long term use of the LE sniper rifles is considered.

We (Brits) didn't copy the over the bore mounting principle until 1918, so left ourselves at somewhat at a disadvantage, yet two of our most significant sniping scopes of the Great War were indeed plagiarised German scopes. The 'original' PPCo scope as fitted offset on the SMLE was a slightly modified version of the Fuess Helios 3, & the later Model 1918 scope (also made by PPCo) was a copy of the Hensoldt Light model scope. Notwithstanding our limitations in equipment British & Dominion marksmen did eventually match, if not surpass, the German forces. This was largely due to the single mindedness of people like Crumm & Hesketh-Prichard in setting up dedicated schools of sniping for each of the British armies.

I'll add to that comment that if you (Daan) ever have the chance to look through some clean examples of the Aldis No2 and No3 you will find them the equal of probably all contemporaneous German scopes. The only exceptions might be the Zeiss and Goerz prismatics. So the potential was there if it was pursued. Loch Aline(sp?) in Scotland had and has some of the best optical silica in the world; it's all exported now I believe.

Unsurprisingly, cultural factors play as large a role in business as they do in political and military matters: even before WWI more thorough and scientific methods in glass production were putting the German manufacturers ahead. The British optical industry remained unorganized post-war despite the lessons partially learned in WWI. The military was largely uninterested in technical innovation and budgets were being clear-cut post-war. The British optical industry had to sink or swim on its own sales: no cosy relationships with banks or government/miitary support, meaning the focus was always on short term profitability rather than long-term investment and technical innovation. These were all factors, as they were in the abject failure of the US optical industry between the wars, and even after WWII.

Returning to the micro again, chance plays a role in these things. If Lord Roberts for example had determined to push through Dr. Common's sight, or if Dr. Common had not died in 1903, it probably would have come into service, been demonstrated as effective and the whole situation in 1914/15 would have been different.

If Churchill when 1st Lord of the Admiralty had not sponsored the tank, would it have ever appeared? The list goes on...

Britain was impoverished by WWI and then WWII. That meant reduced internal markets for higher end goods, and optics for civilian markets were then low volume durables only the wealthier could afford. Scopes were not part of the British way of hunting traditionally, and companies without much support must focus on the highest volume, highest return products.

And of course those countries which pursue business with the unity and strategy of war, take care to if possible prevent the rise of competitors in their target markets, while taking control if they can of those that already exist. Germany, Japan, China, Korea are all pursuing this sort of approach today with eminent success. The USA has tried to use the big stick to secure markets, but that never works in the long term unless carried to its logical conclusion, and even then is doomed to failure in the end as economies and mentalities driven solely by short-term profit simply rush their capital off to whatever opportunity looks to provide the highest immediate return, making the long-term investment that builds high tech industries and R&D difficult to maintain.

Just a footnote: IMHO it is a mistake to think that once our own sniping equipment and efforts got better organized, German sniping did not continue to be effective. Yes, a battalion can dominate its sector to the extent that the enemy is kept almost silent, but there is plenty of evidence that heavy losses were sustained from sniping right to the end of the war, especially in the attack when snipers are concealed by all the other artillery and small arms fire.