Quote Originally Posted by mrclark303 View Post
Great to see the Royal Navy getting back into the swing of big flat top operations, seeing two 72,000 ton carriers in RN sevice makes me proud to be Britishicon....
Sadly, the recent NAO report on the RN and its CBG plan paints a less than rosy picture of the future, and post Covid financial pressures will likely make it even worse.

Key point summary of the NAO report:

The new Crowsnest system is 18 months late, which will affect Carrier Strike capabilities in its first two years. The initial contracted capability will not be available until September 2021, 18 months later than planned. Further delays mean that it does not expect to have full airborne radar capability until May 2023.
The Department has not yet made funding available for enough Lightning II jets to sustain Carrier Strike operations over its life.
The Department plans to reassess the number and type of Lightning II jets that it needs in the Integrated Review, but its ability to use Carrier Strike will be constrained if it has fewer jets than planned.
The Department has still not provided the necessary funding for logistics projects and munitions.
The Department expects to meet its target of declaring initial operating capability for Carrier Strike in December 2020, but with a basic(airborne) radar capability.
Initial operating capability is a single, trained Lightning II squadron (up to 12 jets), able to embark on a joint warfighting mission with appropriate support and maritime protection.
The Departments policy ambition for Carrier Strike will be reviewed.
It will assess the impact of ongoing financial pressures and determine its defence priorities, including whether it can fund all the original roles of Carrier Strike, including supporting amphibious capabilities
The Department faces investment prioritisation decisions to maintain and enhance the Carrier Strike capability over the longer term.
The Department has not established a consolidated view of the enhancements that are needed to continue to develop Carrier Strike capabilities, or their cost. It will need to make funding decisions in the next 10 years, such as deciding how to replace or extend Merlin helicopters, which are due to go out of service in 2030 (see point one about Crowsnest). These decisions will create added funding pressures at a time when the Equipment Plan is already unaffordable.
The Department is developing a fuller understanding of what Carrier Strike will cost to operate and support in the future.
Given the strategic importance of Carrier Strike, we would expect the Department to develop a clear view of support and operating costs. It estimated the additional costs of Carrier Strike in 2017, but this did not include all elements of a carrier strike group. It plans to update this estimate after the first deployment in 2021.
The Department may not have made sufficient provision in later years budgets to reflect the full costs of operating Carrier Strike
Failure to make realistic cost estimates creates a risk that the Department will face increased financial pressure in the future, perpetuating the cycle of short-term decision-making that we have seen in our reports on the Equipment Plan
The Department needs to ensure the revised governance arrangements establish clear responsibilities and cross-command coherence for developing Carrier Strike.

While the RN is getting on with what its got to do as best it can with what its been given and trying to make things look like they are OK, in the way our Armed Forces always does, the reality of these two new carriers are actually very different. I wouldn't be surprised to see one or even both be sold by the end of the decade, or one sitting in base having been stripped of bits to keep the other going as MOD haven't costed for sufficient spares to keep them both active, as per the NAO report.